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Defamation is a complex topic, historically lying at the crossroads of tort and 
criminal law. In the current state of the law, various common law jurisdictions 
(including England) have abolished criminal defamation. By contrast, civil law 
jurisdictions approach defamation first and foremost as a criminal offence, 
although in many countries (including France), the claimant’s right is also civilly 
actionable. From a comparative perspective, this distinction supports a generally 
held view that the national particularisms of defamation laws reflect very 
different approaches to the protection of reputation. This thesis considers and 
challenges this view by critically examining the extent to which the nature of the 
regulation, tortious or criminal, influences the substantive content of the rules on 
defamation in England and France. It argues that the current regulatory features 
are the result of a haphazard historical development, rather than of a conscious 
choice. Thus, the distinction between tortious and criminal liability in England 
and France does not necessarily epitomise fundamentally irreconcilable 
conceptions of reputation. This suggests that the English and the French laws of 
defamation are comparable despite their different regulatory features. This is 
confirmed by studying key features of the law of defamation: standards of 
liability, the defence of truth and remedial aspects of the wrong. At first sight, 
their apparent differences seem to be justifiable on the basis of each system’s 
disparate regulatory features. Upon closer analysis of each of these features 
however, elements of commonality emerge. The English and French rules on 
fault are comparable and are underlined by a shared concern to promote media 
accountability, their treatment of truth is becoming analogous, and the remedial 
aspects of defamation are functionally comparable. The thesis concludes that 
despite substantive differences owing to the regulatory features of each system, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Defamation is a complex topic, historically lying at the crossroads of tort and 
criminal law. The nature of the regulation – tortious or criminal – varies greatly 
from one jurisdiction to the other. From a comparative perspective, such a 
distinction supports a generally held view that the national particularisms of 
defamation laws reflect very different approaches to the protection of reputation.1 
This thesis challenges this view by examining and challenging the existence of a 
link between the nature of the regulation (tortious or criminal) and the 
substantive content of the rules on defamation in England and France. 
 
I. Background and context 
 
The purpose of the law of defamation is to hold a balance between freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation.2 In recent years, cross-border violations of 
the right to reputation have been facilitated by the increased accessibility of 
means of publication,3 including international newspaper circulation and internet 
posting.4 However, there exist no European rules determining which law should 
                                                
1
 See, e.g.: European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Working Document on the 
Amendment of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (Rome II)’ (2010), 5. 
2
 Panday v Gordon [2005] UKPC 36, [2006] 1 AC 427,  [12]; in this sense: Richard Parkes et al, 
Gatley on Libel and Slander (Sweet & Maxwell 2013), 1.1; David Kenny and Liz Heffernan, 
‘Defamation and Privacy and the Rome II Regulation’ in Peter Stone and Youseph Farah (eds), 
Research Handbook on EU Private International Law (Edward Elgar 2015), 315. On this 
balancing process, see further: Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an 
overview and introduction to the tort/crime distinction, II; and Chapter 4: A similar doctrine of 
truth across the tortious and criminal wrongs of defamation, IVA2. 
3
 Cross-border litigation in defamation is relatively rare (Ministry of Justice, Report of the Libel 
Working Group (2010) Annex B: Cases with a foreign connection issued in the High Court in 
2009). However, Svantesson argues that ‘what is interesting is not the number of cases currently 
brought before the courts. After all, the small number of cases may be directly attributable to the 
complexity of the system… The significance of the problem is more accurately assessed by 
reference to the number of instances of cross-border violations of privacy and personality rights 
[including defamation].’ See: Dan Svantesson, ‘The Rome II Regulation and Choice of Law in 
Internet-Based Violations of Privacy and Personality Rights - on the Wrong Track, but in the 
Right Direction?’ (2014) 16 ARIEL 275, 276. 
4
 See, e.g. Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] UKHL 25, [2000] All ER 86. This is particularly true in 
a context in which the use of social media has become the norm, since tweets, retweets, Facebook 
and blog posts characterise the requirement of publication in both England and France. In 
England, this was brought to light in the case of McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342, which 
received extensive coverage in the media. This was also the focus of Cairns v Modi [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1382, [2013] 1 WLR 1015, in which the Court of Appeal recognised at [27] ‘that as a 
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apply to defamation cases involving an international element.5 The answer to this 
question is found in each Member State’s domestic choice of law rules.  
 
This creates a complex framework for cross-border defamation claims. The 
substantive rules on defamation vary from one jurisdiction to the other.6 Yet, in 
the absence of unified choice of law rules, the law governing the parties’ liability 
cannot accurately be predicted. One regular suggestion to simplify this state of 
affairs is to harmonise the substantive laws of defamation in the European 
Union.7 But the feasibility of this harmonisation is doubted. This is due to the 
perceived existence of ‘wide divergences’ in the conception of the right to 
reputation across the twenty-eight Member States, and in the content of domestic 
defamation laws.8 
 
One major difference is the existence of two types of liability for defamation: 
tortious and criminal. The standards vary from one jurisdiction to another. Only 
in England has criminal defamation been fully abolished. Trends found in other 
Member States include the partial abolition of criminal defamation9 or, as is the 
                                                                                                                               
consequence of modern technology and communication systems any such stories will have the 
capacity to “go viral” more widely and more quickly than ever before. Indeed it is obvious that 
today, with the ready availability of the world wide web and of social networking sites, the scale 
of this problem has been immeasurably enhanced, especially for libel claimants who are already, 
for whatever reason, in the public eye.’ On the law of defamation in the context of the internet in 
general and of social media more specifically, see: Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and 
the Law (Routledge 2015), Chapter 3. 
5
 The ‘Rome II’ Regulation contains general rules on choice of law for torts and other non-
contractual obligations. However, violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, 
including defamation, are expressly excluded from its scope in art. 1(2)(g). See: European 
Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to 
Non-Contractual Obligations [2007] OJ L199/40. 
6
 ‘Working Document on the Amendment of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007’ (n 1), 5. 
7
 Steering Committee on the Media and New Communication Services, ‘Working Paper on the 
Alignment of Defamation Laws with ECHR Case-law’ CDMC(2005)007 (2006); Directorate 
General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, ‘Study on the alignment of laws and practices 
concerning defamation with the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on 
freedom of expression, particularly with regard to the principle of proportionality’ 
CDMSI(2012)Misc11 (2013); High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, A free and 
pluralistic media to sustain European democracy < 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/hlg/hlg_final_report.pdf> 
accessed 13 May 2015, 22. 
8
 See, e.g.: ‘Working Document on the Amendment of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007’ (n 1), 5. 
9
 Member States that have partly abolished criminal defamation are: Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland and 
Romania. See: ‘Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union and its Effect on Press 
Freedom’ (Free Media, 17 July 2014) 
<www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/uploads/pics/Out_of_Balance_OnDefamation_IPIJuly2014.pdf> 
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case in France, the more limited measure of abolishing the imprisonment penalty 
whilst preserving a criminal type of regulation.10 In the other Member States, 
defamation remains a criminal wrong punishable by imprisonment.11 Beyond the 
issue of decriminalisation of defamation, this highlights the existence of 
substantive disparities between the Member States’ legal systems. In the words 
of Glenn, ‘difference implies isolation.’12 
 
II. The research question 
 
The aim of this thesis is to consider the extent to which the nature of the 
regulation, tortious or criminal, influences the substantive content of the rules on 
defamation in England and France. The argument is that despite substantive 
differences owing to the regulatory features of each system, England and France 
adopt a shared conceptual approach to the wrong of defamation. The thesis 
makes out that argument by examining central aspects of the English and French 
laws of defamation.  
 
It is because of its practical consequences on the future development of the law 
that it is necessary to clarify the link between the nature of the regulation and the 
substantive content of the rules on defamation. In recent years, there have been 
various calls to decriminalise defamation on account of the fact that criminal 
libel produces a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression.13 This is a routine 
                                                                                                                               
accessed 14 May 2015, 12-13. This information was collected by the International Press Institute 
under the European Commission-supported European Centre for Media Pluralism and Freedom 
Pilot project scheme. See: ‘Digital Agenda for Europe: A Europe 2020 Initiative’ (European 
Commission, 9 February 2015) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/out-balance-
defamation-law-european-union> accessed 27 July 2015. 
10
 Member States that have retained a criminal regulation but abolished the imprisonment penalty 
are Bulgaria, Croatia and France. See: ‘Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union 




 H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (4th edn, OUP 
2010), 45. 
13
 For recent calls for reform, see: Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Resolution 1577: Towards 
Decriminalisation of Defamation’ (Council of Europe, 2007) 
<http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/eres1577.htm>; 
Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Recommendation 1814: Towards Decriminalisation of Defamation’ 
(Council of Europe, 2007) 
<http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/erec1814.htm>; 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights and a Changing Media Landscape’ (Council of 
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remark in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which finds its 
roots in the Grand Chamber judgment of Cumpana v Romania.14 In that case, the 
seventeen judges stated that the ‘fear’ of criminal sanctions (which in this case 
included the imposition of a prison sentence) had a chilling effect on journalistic 
freedom of expression.15 In light of this principle, authors have noted the 
existence of a trend in the Court’s case law, whereby the use of criminal 
proceedings for defamation and injurious words was only warranted in narrow 
circumstances.16 However, the Grand Chamber appeared to go back on its 
previous position in the later case of Lindon v France,17 in which it did not 
declare the use of the criminal law as inappropriate for defamatory statements 
and injurious words uttered in the course of public interest debate. This is 
especially surprising when considering that a few weeks prior to the Lindon 
judgment, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had identified 
the French law of 29 July 1881 (which regulates defamation and injurious words) 
as being in need of reform ‘in light of the Court’s case law’.18 Lindon thus left 
the law in a state of confusion, and in need of clarification as to whether the 
chilling effect principle in Cumpana extends to the French law of 29 July 1881. 
This would justify a renewed debate on the decriminalisation of the wrong of 
defamation, which was the object of a failed proposition by the Guinchard 
Commission in 2008.19 
 
What is more, there is a perception that the domestic laws of defamation are 
fundamentally different across the European Union. These perceived issues with 
the law of defamation played a role in its express exclusion from the scope of the 
Rome II Regulation, which contributes to the harmonisation of European private 
international law. Kenny and Heffernan note that ‘defamation creates particular 
                                                                                                                               
Europe, 2011) <http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/MediaLandscape2011.pdf>; all 
accessed 14 May 2015. 
14
 (2005) 41 EHRR 14. 
15
 Ibid, [113]-[114]. 
16
 Rónán Ó Fathaigh, ‘Article 10 and the Chilling Effect Principle’ (2013) 3 EHRLR 304, 308-
09. 
17
 (2008) 46 EHRR 35. 
18
 Resolution 1577: Towards decriminalisation of defamation (n 13), [17.6.2]. 
19
 Commission sur la répartition des contentieux présidée par Serge Guinchard, L'Ambition 
Raisonnée d'une Justice Apaisée (La documentation française: Rapports officiels 2008), 290ff. 
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issues, not least because it is intimately bound up with fundamental rights’;20 and 
although the importance of the conflicting rights to reputation and to freedom of 
expression is recognised throughout the European Union, ‘there seems to be no 
common vision as to how [harmonisation] might best be achieved.’21 Under this 
view, harmonisation of defamation laws (whether of substantive or of private 
international law rules) is therefore impossible. 
 
The present thesis informs our understanding of these issues. It proves that the 
nature of the regulation is not the sole, or sometimes even the primary 
determinant, of the substantive rules. This observation undermines the recurring 
calls to decriminalise defamation, and opens the possibility of finding grounds of 
agreement across the European Union as to how the balance between reputation 
and freedom of expression should be struck. 
 
Although earlier studies have examined the substantive rules on defamation from 
a comparative perspective, their analysis was limited to specific issues and/or to 
jurisdictions belonging to the same tradition – common law.22 When they did 
engage with the law applicable in jurisdictions within the European Union, they 
considered the law applicable in various (if not all) the Member States.23 As 
such, they did not engage in an in-depth comparative analysis. The present thesis 
takes a more extensive approach. It undertakes a comprehensive critical analysis 
of core elements of the English and French laws of defamation, which uncovers a 
shared conceptual approach to the right to reputation. This finding challenges the 
                                                
20
 Kenny and Heffernan (n 2), 315. 
21
 Ibid, 326. 
22
 Andrew T Kenyon, Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice (UCL Press 2006); Adrienne 
Stone and George Williams, ‘Freedom of Speech and Defamation: Developments in the Common 
Law World’ (2000) 26 Mon LR 362; Itai Maytal, ‘Libel Lessons from Across the Pond - What 
British Courts Can Learn from the United States' Chilling Experience with the 'Multiple 
Publication Rule' in Traditional Media and the Internet’ (2010) 3 J Int'l Media & Ent L 121; 
Elizabeth Samson, ‘The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional English 
and U.S. Defamation Laws and the Dawn of England's Modern Day’ (2012) 20 Cardozo J Int'l & 
Comp L 771. Descheemaeker’s work is one exception in that it engages with a comparison of 
defamation laws across legal traditions; however he also focuses on individual issues. 
23
 András Koltay, ‘The Right of Reply in a European Comparative Perspective’ (2012)   
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2162935&download=yes> accessed 27 
May 2015; ‘Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union and its Effect on Press 
Freedom’ (n 9). 
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perception that the ‘wide divergences’ in the legal systems across the European 
Union jeopardise any possibility of harmonisation. 
 
The analysis draws on various fields of existing literature: comparative law, the 
scholarship on tort and crime, and legal history. Overall, the thesis provides an 
in-depth comparative analysis of the English and French laws of defamation, 
thereby uncovering elements of commonality. 
 
III. Legal systems in this thesis 
 
A. The choice of the legal systems in this thesis 
 
This thesis focuses on the law of defamation in two jurisdictions: England and 
Wales, and France. Three key reasons justify this jurisdictional choice, which 
relate to each jurisdiction’s legal culture, the representative character of their 
regulatory features, and the (non-)existing framework within which tort and 
crime operate. 
 
First, English and French law are part of different legal cultures. They are 
emblematic of the common and civil law traditions within the European 
jurisdictions. By focusing on these two legal systems, this project avoids the 
vagueness of a simple comparison as between ‘common law’ and ‘civil law’. 
Yet, it allows for a comparison that is not limited to providing insights into the 
foundations of a given subject-area of law – defamation. It also provides insights on 
each legal culture, thereby challenging some of the myths about the ‘other 
system’.24 
 
                                                
24
 On the destruction of myths being an integral part of the comparative lawyer’s role: Basil 
Markesinis, ‘The Destructive and Constructive Role of the Comparative Lawyer’ in Basil 
Markesinis (ed), Foreign Law and Comparative Methodology: a Subject and a Thesis (Hart Pub 
1997), 438-39. For instance, I challenge the view that tort law is ‘an area of law where the legal 
rules have been developed by judges with limited statutory intervention’ (Paula Giliker, The 
Europeanisation of English Tort Law (Hart Pub 2014), 4). See Chapter 2: The framework of 
defamation liability in comparative historical perspective, IIIC1. 
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Second, the modern English and French laws have adopted different approaches 
to the regulation of defamation: while it is a tort in England, it is a criminal 
wrong in France. This is their most obvious point of divergence, and was a key 
motivating issue for this study. These regulatory features are representative of 
the regulation of defamation in other common law and civilian legal systems. 
Generally speaking, in common law jurisdictions defamation is primarily 
regulated as a tortious wrong. Indeed, various common law jurisdictions have 
abolished criminal defamation;25 other common law jurisdictions recognise both 
civil and criminal legal actions with respect to defamation, with a primacy (both 
in number of cases and in doctrinal support) for the tortious approach.26 By 
contrast, most civil law jurisdictions approach defamation first and foremost as a 
criminal wrong, although in many countries including France, the claimant’s 
right is also civilly actionable.27 The French system is particularly representative 
of the general approach to defamation liability found in European Member 
States. Twenty-three out of twenty-eight Member States still regulate defamation 
as a criminal wrong.28 The majority of these legal systems possess a hierarchy of 
responsibility similar to the French one,29 whereby the primary defendant is the 
                                                
25
 E.g. England, Ireland and New Zealand have abolished the common law criminal defamation: 
see s. 73 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK); s. 35 Defamation Act 2009 (Ireland); s. 
56(2) Defamation Act 1992 (NZ). 
26
 In the United States criminal defamation legislation does not exist at the federal level. Since 
1964, ‘sixteen states, and the District of Columbia, repealed their criminal libel statutes. Courts in 
other states subsequently struck down the laws on constitutional or other grounds. As a result, 
only 17 of 50 states retain criminal libel statutes’ (Jane E Kirtley, ‘Criminal Defamation: An 
Instrument of Destruction’ in Anna Karlsreiter and Hanna Vuokko (eds), Ending the Chilling 
Effect: Working To Repeal Criminal Libel and Insult Laws (OSCE 2003), 91). Note that as of 
2012, only 16 of 50 states retained criminal libel statutes (‘Defamation Maps’ (Article 19, 2012) 
<www.article19.org/defamation/map.html> accessed 7 April 2015). Similarly, in most Australian 
states (except the Northern Territory and Victoria) a version of a model provision on criminal 
defamation is in force. See: ‘States and Territories Model Defamation Provisions’ (Australasian 
Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee, 21 March 2005) <www.pcc.gov.au/uniform/pcc-279-94-
d10.pdf> accessed 23 September 2015, clause 4.2 (model criminal defamation provision); Crimes 
Act 1900 (ACT) s. 439; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s. 529; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s. 365; 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s. 257; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s. 196; 
Criminal Code (WA) s. 345. Only the Northern Territory and Victoria did not adopt a version of 
the model provision: Criminal Code (NT) ss. 203-208; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) Pt 1. 
27
 See, e.g. regarding the EU Member States and candidates (almost all of which are civilian 
jurisdictions): ‘Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union and its Effect on Press 
Freedom’ (n 9), 8. 
28
 Note that in many countries including England, other crimes might bear on defamatory speech. 
On this issue, see Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and 
introduction to the tort/crime distinction, IIIA2 and IVA2. 
29
 Chapter 3: Tortious and criminal standards of liability in the English and French laws of 
defamation, IIIC. 
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responsible editor or commercial publisher rather than the author.30 Further, the 
French law on the press has sometimes influenced the legislation of other 
European jurisdictions, for instance in relation to the right of reply.31  
 
Although the English and French laws represent the dominant approach to 
regulation of defamation within the common and civil law traditions, they also 
embody a specific type of regulation within a given tradition. As such, in 
comparison with a variety of other common law jurisdictions that retain a wrong 
of criminal libel rarely used in practice, England has chosen to abolish criminal 
defamation. Similarly, although a significant number of civilian jurisdictions 
regulate defamation as part of the criminal law, the French legislation is of 
specific interest because such a criminal wrong is not punishable by 
imprisonment.32 
 
Finally, the English and French legal systems approach the substantive and 
normative overlap between tort and crime in a distinctive fashion. While England 
has no overarching framework organising the relationship between both, French 
law has an elaborate procedural structure coordinating tortious and criminal 
claims.33 Overall, these three factors suggest that England and France are of 
specific interest for a comparative study of defamation. 
 
B. The comparability of the English and French legal systems 
 
The past half-century has seen a remarkable evolution in the models used to map 
the world’s legal systems. Comparatists have moved away from the rather 
rudimentary models of David’s ‘families’34 and Zweigert and Kötz’s grouping of 
                                                
30
 Richard C Donnelly, ‘The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel’ (1948) 34 
Virginia L Rev 867, fn 41. The French right of reply is considered in Chapter 5: The remedial 
aspects of defamation: modes of protecting reputation and their functions, VB. 
31
 Ibid, 885. 
32
 Out of the twenty-three jurisdictions which regulate defamation as a criminal wrong in the 
European Union, only three (France included) have abolished imprisonment penalties. See above, 
n 10. 
33
 Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to the 
tort/crime distinction, VB.  
34
 René David, Les Grands Systèmes de Droit Contemporains (Dalloz 1966). 
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these families according to ‘style’35 to more complex ones nowadays labelled 
‘legal cultures’ or ‘legal traditions’.36 Whichever the model, the common and 
civil law have constantly been differentiated (although to varying degrees).37  
 
The question of the comparability of laws within two different families is 
debated, with some authors arguing that a meaningful comparison can only be 
intra-cultural.38 The common and the civil legal systems have traditionally been 
starkly distinguished, generating various clichés that are nowadays entrenched in 
the minds of non-comparatists.39 It is undeniable that the English and the French 
legal systems, which are emblematic of such a distinction, present great 
differences. Perhaps the major one is embodied in the fact that English law uses 
cases to develop and modernise legal principles; whereas in France legal 
principles are determined and codified by the legislator, and the case-law merely 
applies such codified rules.40  
 
In spite of the primary opposition of the English and French legal systems, a 
measure of similarity can be found between both; their differences are often 
exaggerated at both the doctrinal and the practical level.41 Although various other 
practical obstacles to a useful comparison have been pointed out by the 
                                                
35
 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, 
Clarendon Press; OUP 1998), 63ff. 
36
 Glenn (n 12). Glenn’s legal traditions have sometimes been interpreted as marking a return to 
David’s main ideas. 
37
 René David identified as one of the main families of law the ‘Western Laws’, within which he 
distinguished Romano-Germanic and Anglo-Saxon laws. Zweigert and Kötz distinguish the 
Roman, German and Common law styles. Glenn distinguishes the Civil and the Common law 
traditions. 
38
 Mark Van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal 
Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 495, 509. 
39
 On a discussion on the myths surrounding the common and the civil legal systems, see 
Markesinis, ‘The Destructive and Constructive Role of the Comparative Lawyer’ (n 24). 
40
 A better formulation would be: ‘is said to merely apply’. Although French judges officially 
only apply the law, the practice shows that to some extent, ‘le juge est également créateur de 
droit’. See, for instance: Sadok Belaid, Essai sur le Pouvoir Créateur et Normatif du Juge (LGDJ 
1974). 
41
 On the convergence of common and civil law systems, see: Basil Markesinis, ‘Learning From 
and Learning In Europe’ in Basil Markesinis (ed), Foreign law and comparative methodology : a 
subject and a thesis (Hart Pub 1997), 191ff. One finds that both positions (the convergence and 
the divergence of the common and civil law systems) can be and are, in fact, defended in 
doctrinal works. 
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doctrine,42 they are of little relevance for this particular project. Language is not 
a barrier,43 with no necessity to rely on second-hand materials; the study does not 
engage with the difficult issues surrounding legal transplants; and the wrong of 
defamation presents direct conceptual parallels between both jurisdictions, as 
will be seen throughout the study. The English and the French legal systems are 
undoubtedly different, but this cannot in and of itself present a sound obstacle for 
the comparatist. It provides an opportunity for a more interesting (if more 
challenging)44 comparison. 
 
C. The comparability of the English and French laws of defamation 
 
Favouring the macro-comparison of laws, Van Hoecke and Warrington criticise 
comparative projects that concentrate on rule-comparison – such as this one –, 
for their lack of scientific value.45 Their position is a bold one,46 which utterly 
disregards the objectives of the micro-comparison. The general value of micro-
comparison of laws will not be discussed; the above-mentioned goal of this 
project47 also establishes its value.  
 
A more fundamental issue that this project faces with regards to the 
comparability of defamation laws in England and France is their classification 
under different branches of the law – respectively tort and criminal law. Complex 
theoretical issues, regarding the interrelationship of tort and crime, linger under 
the surface. However, whether this affects the overall comparability of the 
subject matter of defamation is disputable. Just as one can oppose the arguments 
                                                
42
 Jane Stapleton, ‘Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation’ (2007) 1 JTL 
30. 
43
 Except to the extent that terminology can arguably create barriers of communication across 
legal traditions. See Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and 
introduction to the tort/crime distinction, I. 
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raised in favour of an intra-cultural comparison, one can oppose the impossibility 
of comparing legal rules belonging to different areas of law. Comparability does 
not depend on a theoretical classification within one or the other branch of the 
law; this argument is particularly doubtful with regards to the English and French 
laws of defamation when the current classification happens to be the result of an 
erratic historical development.48 Various doctrinal reflections on comparability 
point to the legal institution’s structure, function, content and result.49  The 
English and French rules on defamation present a great deal of similarities in that 
respect: both protect the reputation of persons as what will be termed a primary 
interest.50 In spite of their classification under different areas of the law, the 
functional overlap of the English and French rules thus establishes their 
comparability. 
 
IV. Theoretical method 
 
The existence of a comparative law methodology has long been doubted. Half a 
century ago, the tendency was to deny its existence – either because the 
methodology used was found not to differ from those generally used in the 
sciences51 or because it was identical to that used by jurists analysing national 
laws.52 This debate was linked to a more general question regarding the existence 
of comparative law as a science.53 Now that the legitimacy of the field and the 
existence of, and the need for, a comparative methodology have been 
established, there is a considerable amount of doctrinal discussion on the 
appropriate comparative methodology. 
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Although there are countless forms of comparative methodology,54 the current 
scholarship can mostly be classified into two categories: rule-comparison 
(epitomised by the functional method) and the contextual approach (exemplified 
by Legrand’s ‘law as culture’). Functionalism, in its original Rabelian form, 
focused on rules and institutions, analysing their similarities and sometimes 
differences.55 In its accomplished form, as developed by Zweigert and Kötz, the 
functionalist method goes even further, and establishes a presumption of 
similarity between laws.56 The functionalist premise – that all societies face 
similar social problems57 – is a good starting point for a comparative project, and 
rule-comparison is useful in that it provides the comparatist with an actual 
practical methodology. However, grounds for criticism are numerous. The major 
ones are found in the presumption of similarity between laws, when such a 
necessary convergence does not have a sound legal basis; the requirement for an 
objective comparison, when the comparatist necessarily approaches a project 
with his own preconceptions; and an evaluation process as the end result of the 
comparative research, which raises complex issues about the legitimacy (and 
consequently, the usefulness) of such an evaluation. 
 
By contrast, Legrand’s idea of law as culture lies in a comparative analysis of 
laws focusing on the structures of the law, on differences between the laws and 
on the general context surrounding the law. Legrand’s approach overcomes some 
issues found in the rule-comparison method – it acknowledges the comparatist’s 
subjectivity, questions the evaluation process and seeks to understand law-in-
context, by looking not only at law-as-text but also at its overall epistemological 
framework. However, Legrand falls into another kind of excess. First, the theory 
of traces analyses the legal text (the ‘visible’) as the tip of the iceberg, with an 
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infinite number of unique traces (the ‘invisible’) inscribing the text in the 
world. 58  This analysis tends to excessively relegate law-as-text to the 
background, in favour of a variety of contextual and cultural elements. Second, 
his sound criticism of Zweigert and Kötz’s presumption of similarity 
paradoxically inverts the paradigm. Although he denies it, 59  his writings 
ultimately appear to advocate the search for alterity in law.60 
 
Building on the idea of methodological pluralism,61 this project departs from the 
traditional dichotomy of rule-comparison and law-in-context in order to apply a 
composite methodology. The comparison starts with the premise that England 
and France face a similar social problem, which they regulate through their laws 
on defamation. Abandoning rule-comparison’s search for similarities, the 
question is reframed in the following terms: what exactly can the comparatist 
find? In doing so, the project rejects a positivistic approach in favour of one 
striving to ‘understand how foreign legal communities think about the law, why 
they think about the law as they do, why they would find it difficult to think 
about the law in any other way, and how their thought differs from ours’.62 
Where relevant, historical and social considerations will be referred to.  
 
Each chapter will offer a juxtaposition of specific parts of the English and French 
laws of defamation, identify their similarities and differences, and analyse them 
by identifying their raison d’être and their value in the given legal system. How 
are the legal categories constructed in each jurisdiction? Are the philosophical 
perspectives that the English and French legal systems adopt on defamation 
comparable? These are some of the questions that will be considered. Ultimately, 
this analytical project will offer an evaluation of the comparability of the English 
and French laws of defamation, rather than a ‘better law’ appraisal. 
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V. The aspects of defamation law examined in this thesis 
  
This thesis assesses the influence of the nature of the regulation on the 
substantive content of the rules on defamation in England and France by 
examining four main issues that follow the general structure of the law of 
wrongs. In turn, it considers: the framework of liability, the standard of liability, 
the defence of truth, and the remedial aspects of defamation. The main reason for 
choosing to focus on these features is that they misleadingly appear to result 
from each jurisdiction’s distinct regulatory features, when in fact the link 
between the nature of the regulation and the substantive rules is not as evident or 
persistent as might originally have been thought. 
 
A. Justifying the four points of comparison 
 
At first sight, the way in which each jurisdiction approaches these features seems 
to be justifiable on the basis of their disparate regulatory features. Their interest 
for this thesis lies in the fact that contrary to this, on closer analysis the link 
between the type of liability – tortious or criminal – and the substantive content 
of the rules is challenged.  
 
The distinction between oral and written defamation can be explained by 
reference to the existence of two types of regulation – one tortious and one 
criminal –, and of the influence of one over the other.63 The standards of liability 
– strict liability in England, intention in France – reflect standards commonly 
found in tort and criminal law.64 The traditional rules on truth – that it justifies 
per se in England, but only with an added element of public benefit in France – 
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echo the objectives of tortious and criminal liability.65 The English remedies and 
French penalties are directly prescribed by nature of their regulation.66 
 
But a more precise analysis reveals that this link is not as strong as has originally 
been suggested. The consideration of the framework of liability is useful to 
understand how the wrong is conceptualised in each country. The justifications 
for choosing tortious or criminal liability, and for distinguishing (or not) between 
written and oral defamation give important indications as to the comparability of 
the English and French wrongs. A conscious and reasoned choice might reveal 
fundamentally different approaches to the right to reputation; on the contrary, 
what I argue to be the result of a haphazard development with lasting 
consequences might suggest that more common grounds can be uncovered.67 
 
Indeed, commonalities emerge when considering the remaining three features – 
standards of liability, the defence of truth and remedial aspects of defamation. 
An analysis of the historical evolution of these rules and of some recent 
developments in the law of defamation suggests that the existence of a link 
between the nature of the regulation and the content of the rules is at the very 
least nuanced,68 if not ultimately denied.69 
 
B. Explaining the exclusion of privilege  
 
The main reason for which privilege70 is excluded from the scope of this thesis is 
that neither the similarity between absolute privilege and the French immunités 
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(privileges) of article 41 of the law of 29 July 1881, which regulates defamation, 
nor the disparity in the English and French approaches to qualified privilege can 
be rationalised on the basis of their distinct regulatory features.  
 
The publication of a defamatory statement is absolutely privileged in those 
instances in which the dissemination of the information it contains is considered 
to trump the protection of the right to reputation. The doctrine of absolute 
privilege is distinctly similar in England and France. In both systems it focuses 
on the protection of parliamentary and judicial proceedings, and of statements 
made in pursuance of the state’s executive power.71 Further, in both systems 
absolute privilege is mistakenly justified on the basis, or approached through the 
lens of, the doctrine of good faith.72 So the theoretical background and practical 
application of the English absolute privilege and French immunités are largely 
similar. However, nothing suggests that this state of affairs has anything to do 
with the tortious or criminal regulatory features of the English and French laws 
of defamation. Rather, they likely represent a shared ‘classification device’,73 the 
effect of which is to render the law of defamation inapplicable to certain sets of 
facts. As such, they do not warrant substantial examination in this thesis. 
 
From a comparative perspective, the English doctrine of qualified privilege is 
rather more interesting. Its development is closely bound up with the notion of 
malice, which will be analysed in depth in Chapter 3. For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to note that by the 18th century the accepted principle was that the 
publication of a defamatory statement gave rise to a presumption of malice. The 
doctrine of qualified privilege provided that in defined circumstances, the context 
in which a defamatory statement was published would displace this presumption 
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of malice. The burden would then be on the claimant to positively prove the 
defendant’s malice in order for liability to arise. Broadly speaking, the 
circumstances in which the modern doctrine of qualified privilege arises can be 
divided into two categories. The first category includes situations in which a 
special relationship exists as between the claimant and the defendant in relation 
to the information contained in the statement. Consequently, the defendant 
makes the statement in discharge of a duty and the claimant has an interest in 
hearing the statement, the prime example being that of employment references.74 
The second category, expanded in the Defamation Act 2013, covers various 
types of reports.75 
 
There is no equivalent doctrine to that of qualified privilege in the French law of 
defamation. That this is a gap in the French approach has been recognised by 
Lécuyer,76 and has led to a level of protection being afforded through other 
(perhaps less fitting) doctrines such as the defence of bonne foi (good faith).77 
However, contrary to the four issues that this thesis focuses on, there is nothing 
to suggest that this discrepancy as between the English and the French laws of 
defamation can be rationalised on the basis of their distinct regulatory features. 
Indeed, Lécuyer’s argument is not restricted to the law of defamation, the law of 
29 July 1881, or for that matter the criminal law. His argument is that the effect 
of some legal provisions – whether civil or criminal – is to unduly limit the right 
to freedom of expression in situations in which it is used in pursuance of a higher 
interest. This is the dual effect of article 41 of the law on the press, which 
establishes categories of privileged statements and simultaneously excludes the 
extension of this protection to other statements not listed in article 41. Further, 
there are no indications that the development of the doctrine of qualified 
privilege in English law is linked in any way to the tortious nature of the 
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regulation.78 Because the purpose of this thesis is to explore the link between the 
nature of the regulation – tortious or criminal – and the substantive content of the 
rules, a comparative analysis of the doctrine of qualified privilege falls outside of 
its scope. 
 
VI. Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is a preliminary chapter, which 
defines the subject matter of the study and delimits its scope. It characterises the 
wrong of defamation as the violation of one’s personal right to reputation, 
examines the four main modes of protecting reputation and considers the various 
causes of action providing this protection in English and French law. The ambit 
of the study is then delimited by reference to the scope of the English tort and the 
French criminal wrong of defamation. This is because historically, the English 
tort was the only cause of action that protected reputation in what will be labelled 
a ‘right-constituting’ way, and the French wrong had a foundational role in 
protecting reputation. The chapter concludes by giving an overview of the 
English and French laws of defamation, and outlining the main distinguishing 
traits of tortious and criminal liability.  
 
Having laid the foundations of the study in the opening chapter, Chapters 2 to 5 
engage in the comparative analysis. Chapter 2 addresses the question of the 
framework of liability. In this context, the ‘framework of liability’ refers to the 
nature of the liability (tortious or criminal), the internal structure of the wrong 
and its position on the national legal maps. It begins by a consideration of the 
historical evolution of defamation liability in England and France, analysing the 
justifications for imposing tortious and criminal liability respectively. This 
choice is rationalised on the basis of path dependence, in particular owing to the 
internal characteristics of the common law and civilian legal traditions. Having 
addressed the rationale for the distinct natures of the regulation, the focus 
switches to the impact of this disparate regulatory structure on the doctrinal 
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conceptualisation of the wrong in each system. The chapter suggests that the 
nature of the regulation has had a limited effect on the rest of the framework of 
liability. Specifically, it denies that these regulatory features could explain the 
existence (or absence) of a sub-division of the wrong into oral and written 
defamation. To the contrary, it identifies distinct signs of convergence in the 
frameworks of defamation liability in England and France. It concludes by 
noting that the current regulatory features are the result of a haphazard historical 
development, rather than of a conscious choice. Thus, the distinction between 
tortious and criminal liability in England and France does not necessarily 
epitomise fundamentally irreconcilable conceptions of reputation. 
 
The following chapters substantiate this argument by challenging the strength (or 
continued existence) of the link between the regulatory features of each system 
and their substantive rules, and by identifying a shared conceptual approach to 
key aspects of the wrong of defamation in England and France. Chapter 3 
considers the standards of liability in the English tort and French criminal wrong 
of defamation. At first sight, the applicable standards – strict liability in England, 
intention in France – are in line with the general rules on fault in tort and 
criminal law. However, the chapter argues that adherence to these standards is 
not strict, and that each system in fact relies on notions of fault that are 
extraneous to their chosen type of regulation. Further, a comparison reflecting 
the hierarchical lines along which responsibility for defamation is organised in 
each jurisdiction unveils shared standards of liability. These are rationalised on 
the basis of another facet of path dependency, whereby similar societal factors 
led to the development of similar rules in both jurisdictions. The chapter 
therefore reveals an enduring shared approach to the standards of liability in 
England and France.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the treatment of the defence of truth. Its historical evolution 
suggests that in theory, the way in which it is approached should be dictated by 
each system’s regulatory features. It will be argued that in tort, a recognised 
public policy principle considers the exposure of truth as the paramount interest, 
superior to that in protecting reputation. Consequently, liability only arises in 
relation to the publication of statements which cannot be proved to be true. By 
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contrast, criminal law’s focus on maintaining the public peace commands that 
the truth or falsity of the statement be disregarded. This approach is contrasted 
with the modern rules: 20th century and more recent case law developments 
suggest that the French law of defamation has gradually embraced the English 
treatment of truth following the disappearance of the violent practices leading to 
breaches of the public peace. The chapter goes further and positively establishes 
the existence of a common approach to truth. It identifies a shared underlying 
value system justifying that truth be treated as a defence, with limitations 
pursuing a common goal of promoting social cohesion through the protection of 
privacy interests. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the remedial aspects of defamation proceedings. One of the 
fundamental distinguishing traits of tortious and criminal liability identified in 
Chapter 1 is that the response to the defendant’s wrong differs. The type of 
defamation sanctions available in each system are linked to the nature of the 
regulation: English law responds with tortious remedies; French law with 
criminal penalties. Yet, despite such marked differences, the chapter identifies a 
common spirit in the responses to defamation claims. The English and French 
sanctions are argued to be functionally comparable, implementing both tortious 
and criminal remedial goals. Thus, England and France approach the remedial 
aspects of defamation in a comparable way, and the link between each 
jurisdiction’s regulatory features and their responses to the wrong is not as strong 
as was originally thought. The result is the development of a shared hybrid 
model of liability, which draws on tortious and criminal principles. Its origin is 
found in a lack of reflection around the modes of protecting reputation identified 
in Chapter 1. A renewed analysis of these modes of protection suggests that only 
two of them should be retained. The chapter concludes by analysing the practical 
consequences of this finding which, if implemented, would align the English and 
the French remedial aspects of defamation.  
 
Finally, the concluding chapter brings together the analysis in the preceding 
chapters to illustrate the shared conceptual approach in the English and French 
laws of defamation, despite the substantive differences owing to the regulatory 
features of each system. Linking back to the practical significance of the research 
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identified above, the chapter identifies two main consequences to this finding of 
comparability. The first is the necessity for a renewed debate on the 
decriminalisation of French defamation law, based on the societal changes 
identified in the previous chapter and on the related gradual privatisation of the 
French wrong. The second is a direct challenge to the perceived heterogeneity of 
national defamation laws, with provides a new angle to the debate on the 





THE MODERN LAW OF WRONGS AGAINST REPUTATION: AN 





Some of the main challenges of comparative research lie in terminology and 
language, which arguably create barriers of communication across legal 
traditions.1 A comparative analysis of law must therefore resist the ‘reductionist 
urge’2 to confine the comparison to elements of sameness in the formulation of 
concepts and statutes. Indeed, the existence of commonalities at the most 
superficial level may be deceptive. Specific concepts may cover slightly different 
grounds; for example, the scope of defamation in English law differs from that of 
diffamation in French law. The use of the English language throughout the thesis 
exacerbates this risk by referring to ‘defamation’ in relation to both English and 
French law. 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the protection of reputation in English and 
French tort and criminal law prior to the in-depth comparative analysis. Its 
purpose is both explanatory and delimitational. It starts by reflecting on the 
nature of reputation and the mechanisms through which it is afforded legal 
protection. It then presents the various causes of action protecting reputation in 
English and French law. On the basis of considerations grounded in the historical 
development and fundamental importance of the wrong of defamation, it limits 
the scope of the thesis to that of the English and the French laws of defamation 
(as opposed to other related wrongs). The chapter concludes by giving a brief 
outline of the modern laws of defamation in England and France, and by 
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summarising the fundamental distinguishing traits of tortious and criminal 
liability.  
 
II. Unpacking the concept of reputation 
 
Defamation was presented in the Introduction as balancing freedom of 
expression and the right to reputation.3 The fundamental importance of the right 
to freedom of expression, protected in article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), is well established. Following section 12 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which introduced the rights and freedoms of the ECHR 
into domestic law, a court ‘considering whether to grant any relief which, if 
granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of 
expression’4 ‘must have particular regard to the importance’ of that right.5 In this 
context, since the protection of reputation is a justification for a restriction 
freedom of expression,6 it is necessary to reflect on the nature of reputation and 
on the modes of protecting it.  
 
The nature of reputation has long remained under-analysed (and is still so in 
France). In recent years, however, a number of significant doctrinal works have 
engaged in an in-depth analysis of the nature of the right that is protected by the 
common law of defamation.7 In his seminal article published in the 1986 issue of 
the California Law Review, Post identified three concepts (or constructs) of 
reputation: property, honour and dignity. More recently, Howarth has 
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reconsidered the nature of reputation and consequently suggested a fourth 
construct: sociality. These constructs of reputation are analytic tools for 
understanding the law of defamation; they are best understood as describing 
distinct modes of protecting reputation. In what follows, I summarise the main 
theoretical modes of protecting reputation, and adhere to Howarth’s view, with 
some reservations. 
 
A. Four modes of protecting reputation 
 
The first concept of reputation which Post considers is an economic construct: 
reputation as property. He theorises reputation as a good, acquired through one’s 
labour. This good, akin to goodwill, possesses a value in the marketplace and is 
therefore capable of pecuniary assessment. Examples are ‘the merchant who 
works hard to become known as creditworthy or … the carpenter who strives to 
achieve a name for quality workmanship’.8 However, this concept of reputation 
is equally applicable to private individuals whose reputation is also the fruit of 
their ‘personal exertion’.9 When approaching reputation as property, the primary 
mode of protection of reputation is therefore to compensate the defamed 
claimant’s economic losses. This reflects the origins of the tort in the action on 
the case for words, the aim of which was to award damages for actual (or, in the 
terminology then in use, ‘temporal’) losses stemming from the injury to 
reputation.10 
 
Post’s second concept of reputation is that of honour, which he defines as ‘a form 
of reputation in which an individual personally identifies with the normative 
characteristics of a particular social role and in return personally receives from 
others the regard and estimation that society accords to that role.’11 This type of 
reputation is not earned but rather endowed to the individual by virtue of his 
social status. It therefore rests on a fundamentally unequal conception of society. 
Reputation is protected through the restoration of the individual’s status. Post 
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labels such a restorative process ‘vindication’. In this context, the concept of 
vindication is grounded in ideas of vengeance and punishment.12 Under the 
honour construct of reputation, an important concern is to therefore preserve 
social harmony.13 This harmony might be disrupted by the practice of duelling, 
which was a common private response to defamatory statements until the mid-
19th century.14 Thus, it justifies that reputation be protected by punishing the 
defendant defamer, the ultimate goal of the punishment being to preserve the 
public peace. 
 
Finally, Post proposes a dignity construct of defamation. He defines dignity as 
‘the respect (and self-respect) that arises from full membership in society’.15 It is 
a fundamentally private attribute of the individual, inherent in every person by 
virtue of his or her existence. Mullis and Scott, building on this analysis, 
rationalise reputation as an aspect of dignity on the basis of the ‘looking-glass 
self’ theory. This theory approaches the dignity construct of reputation in its 
association with the concept of psychological integrity. 16  According to it, 
violations of the right to reputation can impact an aspect of the individual’s 
psychological integrity – their self-esteem (or self-worth in Mullis and Scott’s 
terminology).17 Aplin and Bosland acknowledge that the ‘looking-glass self’ 
theory is criticised for giving too much weight to external evaluations in the 
individual’s pursuit of self-esteem. Nevertheless, they contend that despite these 
critiques there is value in protecting self-esteem through the law of defamation, 
so that the dignity justification should not be dismissed.18 So, a third mode of 
protecting reputation is to compensate the defamed claimant’s injured feelings. 
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 John Simpson and Edmund Weiner (eds), The Oxford English Dictionary (OUP 1989), 
‘Vindication’: ‘a. The action of avenging or revenging. b. Retribution, punishment.’ As will be 
seen below, vindication acquires a different meaning in relation to the sociality construct of 
reputation. 
13
 Guillaume Lécuyer, Liberté d'Expression et Responsabilité (Dalloz 2006), 67. 
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 Mitchell (n 10), 66. The practice of duelling survived for a longer period of time in France: see 
Chapter 3: Tortious and criminal standards of liability in the English and French laws of 
defamation, IVA, fn 126. 
15
 Post (n 7), 711. 
16
 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘The Swing of the Pendulum: Reputation, Expression and 
the Recentering of English Libel Law’ (2012) 63 NILQ 27, 39. 
17
 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Reframing Libel: taking (all) rights seriously and where it 
leads’ (2012) 63 NILQ 5, 10; also in this sense: Mullis and Scott, ‘The Swing of the Pendulum’ 
(n 16), 41. 
18
 Aplin and Bosland (n 7), forthcoming. 
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Widespread criticism of Post’s three constructs of reputation 19  prompted 
Howarth to suggest a fourth construct: that of sociality.20 Under this view, 
defamation is a social wrong, interfering with the interests of society at large; at 
its core is the individual in relation to the community, understood as a social 
construct. Thus, the law of defamation protects two kinds of interests, flowing 
from the individual’s inclusion or exclusion from such community: first, the 
individual’s interest in being part of the community; second, the community’s 
interest as a whole in achieving and maintaining social cohesion.21 Reputation is 
protected because it partakes in a person’s ability to associate with other people, 
the protection of which is important both from a private and public perspective: 
 
‘The individual pain caused by a threat to sociality might be a private 
matter, but the functioning of human groups and networks is important to 
the welfare of all of their members, not just to those threatened with 
exclusion.’22 
 
So a fourth and final mode of protecting reputation is to vindicate the defamed 
claimant’s good name, the ultimate goal of the vindication being to promote 
social cohesion. The concept of vindication is used in a different way in relation 
to the sociality construct than in relation to the honour construct of reputation. In 
relation to the sociality construct, it is not grounded in ideas of vengeance and 
punishment. Rather, it captures the communicative element necessary to restore 
the plaintiff’s name by convincing the public of the baselessness of the charge. 
This mechanism is designed to restore the defamed claimant’s ability to associate 
with other people. 
 
                                                
19
 See below, IIB. 
20
 See generally: Howarth (n 7). This view had already been defended by Bellah (n 7), 743: 
‘reputation… is a relation between persons’. 
21
 Again, this echoes Bellah’s arguments: see Bellah (n 7), 744-45: reputation is ‘a public good, 
not merely a private possession.’ 
22
 Howarth (n 7), 859. 
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B. Rationalising the protection of reputation 
 
Post’s account of defamation has come under heavy criticism. The property 
concept of reputation is alleged to reflect the views of judges at a given point in 
time – specifically, the 19th century –, and to lack support in contemporary 
judicial approaches. 23  The continued relevance of the honour construct of 
reputation is doubted, with some authors arguing that the non-egalitarian 
conception of society underlying the concept of reputation as honour is 
outmoded.24 They submit that the concept of honour has been gradually replaced 
by that of dignity, which is more in line with the modern concept of equality.25 
Yet there are two problems with the dignity construct of reputation. First, the 
concept of dignity is inherently uncertain, and its definition is vague.26 Second, 
the ‘looking-glass self’ theory cannot be reconciled with the general principles of 
tort law. This view, which endorses an argument developed by Descheemaeker,27 
will be further developed in Chapter 5.28 For present purposes, it is sufficient to 
note that compensating the claimant’s feelings (‘internal’ interests) runs against 
the general approach in English tort law, which is to compensate the injury to the 
claimant’s ‘external’ interests (in this case, the injury to reputation).  
 
This has prompted authors to either suggest a new approach (as is the case in 
relation to Howarth’s sociality account) or to only adhere to some (one, or at best 
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 Rolph (n 7), 22. 
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 Eric Barendt, ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ (1999) 52 CLP 110, 116; Howarth (n 7), 852. 
25
 For a summary of the common law literature on this issue, see: Rolph (n 7), 27. A similar 
argument is made in France: see Emmanuel Dreyer, JCl. Communication, Fasc. n°3740, 66. For 
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Spécial (12th edn, Dalloz 2008), 234ff; J Pradel and M Danti-Juan, Droit Pénal Spécial (5th edn, 
LGDJ 2010), 393ff. 
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 See, discussing the vagueness of the concept of dignity: Denise G Réaume, ‘Indignities: 
Making a Place for Dignity in Modern Legal Thought’ (2002) 28 Queen's LJ 61. In fact, prior to 
advancing their own theory of reputation as dignity, Mullis and Scott have argued that Post’s 
dignity construct of reputation ‘is at once everything and nothing’ (Mullis and Scott, ‘The Swing 
of the Pendulum’ (n 16), 38). 
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 Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Solatium and Injury to Feelings: Roman law, English law and Modern 
Tort Theory’ in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common Law (Hart 
Pub 2013). 
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 Chapter 5: The remedial aspects of defamation: modes of protecting reputation and their 
functions, IVC. 
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two) of the four main modes of protecting reputation summarised above. What 
will be argued in this thesis is that all of the above-mentioned modes of 
protection are currently relevant, and that both England and France recognise all 
of what I will argue to be their associated remedial goals.29 However, they have 
been balanced differently across jurisdictions.30 It will be further suggested, 
endorsing Howarth’s view, that the vindication of the claimant’s good name 
should be recognised as the dominant mode of protecting reputation.31 However, 
departing from Howarth’s argument, it will not be envisaged in isolation; I will 
argue that compensation of economic losses should still act as a secondary mode 
of protection. 32  On the other hand, the protection of reputation through 
punishment of breaches to the public peace and compensation of injured feelings 
should be abandoned.33 The argument made in the thesis is therefore that there 
are two appropriate modes of protecting reputation: first, through vindication of 
the claimant’s good name; second, through compensation of economic losses.34 
 
III. The protection of the right to reputation in English law 
 
Having considered the modes of protecting reputation, I now turn to an analysis 
of the existing causes of action protecting reputation.  
 
A. Wrongs protecting reputation 
 
McBride and Bagshaw consider that ‘the function of tort law is to determine 
what legal rights we have against other people, … and what remedies will be 
available when those rights are violated’.35 Indeed, one of the most prominent 
                                                
29
 Chapter 5: The remedial aspects of defamation: modes of protecting reputation and their 
functions, IVA. 
30
 Ibid, III. 
31




 Ibid, IVB, IVC. 
34
 This argument is made only in the context of the law of defamation, i.e. in a cause of action 
which protects reputation in what will be referred to in section III as a ‘right-constituting’ way. 
35
 Nicholas J McBride and Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (4th edn, Pearson 2012), 1. See also: 
Tony Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law - Questions and Answers’ in David G Owen (ed), 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (OUP 1995), 75: ‘One point of creating a tort … is to 
define and give content to people’s rights by providing them with a mechanism for protecting 
them and securing compensation if their rights are infringed’. 
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theories of tort law in England is Stevens’ rights-based account of tort law.36 He 
analyses a tort as a species of wrong, conceptualised as a breach of duty, itself 
characterised by the infringement of a right.37 
 
In line with Birks’ characterisation of tort law as a ‘tangle of crisscrossing 
categories’,38 it is clear that one tort may protect a wide range of interests.39 
Descheemaeker argues that not all these interests are protected in a ‘right-
constituting’ way. In some cases, recovery is parasitic upon some other right 
violation.40 He illustrates this argument by reference to the tort of defamation, 
which protects not only the interest in reputation but also other interests that are 
consequential to the injury to reputation. 41  However, while the former is 
protected in a right-constituting way as a primary interest, the latter are only 
protected as secondary interests.42 Conversely, he notes that other torts protect 
the interest in reputation parasitically.43 This chapter endorses this view. It uses 
the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ interests, and that between 
‘right-constituting’ and not ‘right-constituting’ as analytical tools to considers the 
various heads of liability – civil or criminal – which overlap with defamation 
law, with particular reference to whether or not reputation is protected in a right-
constituting way. 
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 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007). 
37
 Ibid, 284ff. 
38
 Peter Birks, ‘Harassment and Hubris’ (1997) 31 Irish Jurist 1, 32. 
39
 Descheemaeker notes that the relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘interests’ is made difficult by 
the fact that these terms are commonly used interchangeably. However, a right can be conceived 
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1. Overlapping heads of civil liability 
 
Malicious falsehood and wrongs protecting privacy interests are considered in 
detail because they most frequently and obviously overlap with defamation. 
However, various other tortious causes of action have also come to protect 
reputation; an outline of these heads of liability is given in the third sub-section. 
 
a) Malicious falsehood 
 
Malicious falsehood, which protects the claimant against the defendant’s 
falsehoods causing him or her economic harm, is often used as an alternative 
cause of action to defamation. Its constituent elements are close to those of the 
tort of defamation, but in one respect it features a higher evidentiary hurdle. 
There does not exist a presumption of falsity as is the case in defamation, and the 
claimant must prove that the defendant acted maliciously. Consequently, a claim 
in malicious falsehood will only be preferred to one in defamation where there is 
a tactical reason to do so. Some such tactical reasons have included the wish to 
circumvent some rules applicable in the tort of defamation (including the offer of 
amends procedure44 and the single meaning rule)45 or the desire to benefit from 
the legal aid scheme, as illustrated in Joyce v Sengupta.46 In this case, the 
claimant alleged that the defendant had written a ‘grossly defamatory’ article 
about her. In order to benefit from legal aid, which was not available in 
defamation proceedings, she brought her claim in the tort of malicious falsehood. 
While the first instance judge found for the defendant and held the claim to be an 
abuse of process, the appellate court allowed the appeal, thereby highlighting the 
overlap that exists between the two causes of action. 
 
                                                
44
 Tesco Stores Ltd v Guardian News & Media Ltd and Rusbridger [2008] EWHC B14, [2009] 
EMLR 5. 
45
 Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v Asda Stores Ltd (No 2) [2010] EWCA Civ 609, [2010] 4 
All ER 1029. See, expanding on this decision: Cruddas v Calvert [2015] EWCA Civ 171, [2015] 
All ER (D) 184. 
46
 Joyce v Sengupta [1992] EWCA Civ 9, [1993] 1 WLR 337. Note that following s. 6(6) and 
Sch. 2 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, malicious falsehood can no longer be funded as part of 
the Community Legal Service. 
 49 
In some cases, the two heads of liability have been assimilated, misleadingly 
obscuring their conceptual differences. In Khodaparast v Shad,47 Stuart-Smith LJ 
considered that ‘malicious falsehood is a species of defamation’.48 This is 
supported by the fact that in 1952, statutory intervention in relation to defamation 
also amended the common law tort of malicious falsehood.49 However, the 
approximation of these torts is not opportune. In Ajinomoto,50 Sedley LJ took the 
view that ‘the two are not so close as to be variants of a single tort, as libel and 
slander might be said to be.’51 Indeed, ‘both concern the protection of reputation, 
[but] one protects the reputation of persons and the other the reputation of 
property, typically in the form of the goodwill of a business.’52 So the primary 
purpose of malicious falsehood is to protect a person’s economic interests, vested 
in his property or trade. The protection of one’s individual reputation only 




The common law did not traditionally recognise a freestanding tort of invasion of 
privacy. 53  The equivalent protection would be obtained through other pre-
existing causes of action, including defamation.54 However, the law has evolved 
and nowadays protects privacy interests through common law and statutory 
mechanisms. 
 
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 has come into force, English law has 
developed to give effect to its obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In order to actuate the article 8 right to respect for one’s private 
and family life, the law has recognised a new cause of action. The tort of misuse 
of private information protects the claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
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 Khodaparast v Shad [2000] 1 All ER 545, [2000] 1 WLR 618. 
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 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
54
 See, e.g.: Tolley v Fry [1931] UKHL 1, [1931] AC 333. 
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in relation to information for which disclosure is threatened. This is balanced 
against the expression rights of others.55 
 
In many cases, claims in the tort of misuse of private information involve 
defamatory statements. Tugendhat J identified various types of cases illustrating 
this overlap in Terry (previously ‘LSN’) v Persons Unknown.56 The only real 
overlap is found in cases ‘where the information relates to conduct which is 
voluntary, discreditable, and personal … but not unlawful’.57 In those cases, the 
decision to bring a claim under one or the other cause of action can affect the 
outcome of the case.  
 
‘In defamation, if the defendant can prove one of the libel defences, he 
will not have to establish any public interest…[ 58] But if it is the 
claimant’s choice alone that determines that the only cause of action 
which the court may take into account is misuse of private information, 
then the defendant cannot succeed unless he establishes that it comes 
within the public interest exception’.59 
 
This has led some authors to characterise the tort of misuse of private 
information as an alternative to a claim in defamation.60 Nevertheless, in practice 
the causes of action remain distinct from one another. Defamation focuses on 
harm to reputation caused by false statements. Falsity is irrelevant to the tort of 
misuse of private information,61 which rather focuses on harm caused by the 
dissemination of information about one’s private life. 62  Reputation is only 
protected through the tort of misuse of private information as a secondary 
interest. 
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61
 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2007] 3 WLR 194, [80] per Buxton LJ: ‘provided 
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Alongside the common law tort of misuse of private information, privacy rights 
are also given statutory protection through the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998. 
The purpose of the Act is to protect privacy rights in relation to computerised 
and manual files. Compensation is awarded to the data subject who suffers 
damage as a result of the data being improperly or inaccurately used. While the 
scope of the Act is broader than that of the wrong of defamation, it may be relied 
on to bring claims in relation to defamatory materials. For instance, in Hegglin v 
Persons Unknown,63 abusive and defamatory allegations had been posted on 
various websites. The claimant, a businessman and investor residing in Hong 
Kong, was applying for the information to be removed by Google under the 
provisions of the DPA. Considering the issue of jurisdiction, Bean J noted that 
the claimant had ‘business interests as well as a home within the jurisdiction 
[England], and [that] the defamatory material damaged or risked damaging his 
reputation here.’ 64  The collateral effect of Bean J’s judgement granting 
permission to serve proceedings on Google under the DPA is therefore to protect 
Hegglin’s reputation against the defamatory statements outside of the traditional 
framework of defamation law. However, the primary focus of the proceedings is 
undoubtedly on the fair, lawful and accurate use of personal data. Again, 
reputation is only protected as a secondary interest. 
 
c) Other civil heads of liability protecting reputation 
 
The interest in reputation can also be protected under various other civil heads of 
liability. Sometimes, a claimant abusively pursues proceedings based on a cause 
of action whose predominant purpose is different from that for which the claim is 
brought. This may be struck out as an abuse of process, for instance if ‘a claim in 
breach of confidence was brought where the nub of the case was a complaint of 
the falsity of the allegations, and that that was done in order to avoid the rules of 
the tort of defamation’.65  
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 McKennitt (n 61), [79]. 
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However, reputation may receive some level of protection under other heads of 
civil liability without there being any misuse or perversion of the relevant cause 
of action. In some torts, harm to reputation is a direct consequence of the wrong. 
This can be the case in malicious prosecution66 and in the tort of passing off.67 
But again, the protection of reputation is only collateral; the torts’ respective 
primary goals are to promote due process and the reputation of property, in the 
form of the goodwill of a business. 
 
Various other civil causes of action have come to protect reputation as a 
secondary interest, albeit less frequently. They treat reputation as an aggravating 
feature of the tort (as is the case in the tort of false imprisonment)68 or as a type 
of consequential loss (for instance in the torts of conversion69 and negligence).70  
 
Perhaps of most interest is a wrong connected with copyright. Copyright is 
traditionally regarded as a means of protecting the economic interests of creators 
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of original work. However, cases have noted that reputation is protected in a right 
constituting way under the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act (CPDA) 1988. 
The right to object to derogatory treatment of a work under section 80 is described 
as being ‘designed to protect the reputation of others’71 as authors. Indeed, before 
this right was introduced by the 1988 Act, authors generally objected to this type 
of treatment by bringing a claim in the tort of defamation.72 In fact, the wording of 
the Act was chosen because of its close resemblance to existing personal rights in 
defamation and passing off.73 So, in the wrong of section 80, as is the case in 
defamation, reputation is protected as a primary interest. 
 
2. Overlapping heads of criminal liability 
 
Although the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolished the offence of defamatory 
libel,74 there still exist criminal wrongs which afford some degree of protection 
to reputation. 
 
The Public Order Act 1986 (POA) criminalises abusive words in specific 
circumstances. Under sections 18-19, it is a criminal offence to use, display or 
publish threatening, abusive or insulting words intended or likely to stir racial 
hatred. This type of hate speech often takes the form of a defamatory statement 
aimed at a group or class of persons. Some jurisdictions (including France) in 
fact reflect this state of affairs by characterising these offences as ‘group libel’ or 
‘collective defamation’.75 While this is not the case in England, up until the end 
of the 19th century the main source of interference with freedom of expression 
were public order crimes, commonly known as libels. It is these crimes that the 
Public Order Act has supplemented. 76  The conceptual overlap between 
defamation and public order offences is therefore apparent; the latter clearly 
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afford some protection to reputation. However, their purposes are fundamentally 
different. This is apparent in R v Sheppard and Whittle,77 in which the judges 
warned against applying principles of the civil law of defamation directly to the 
criminal law realm.78 The main goal of public order offences being to preserve 
the public confidence in the stability of society, the statutory wrongs in POA 
only protect reputation as a collateral interest.79,80 
 
Similarly, the statutory wrong of harassment under the Protection From 
Harassment Act 1997 (PFHA) sometimes protects reputation as a secondary 
interest.81 Under section 1 of the Act, a person must not pursue a course of 
conduct which amounts to harassment and which he knows or ought to have 
known amounts to harassment of the other. While harassment is not defined in 
the Act, Lord Phillips MR described it in Thomas v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd82 as ‘conduct targeted at an individual which is calculated to produce the 
consequences described in section 7 and which is oppressive and 
unreasonable.’83 There is a clear overlap with defamation in that such conduct 
includes speech.84 By way of example, in Trimingham85 the conduct complained 
of was the repeated publication of statements concerning an affair the claimant 
had engaged in with a public figure. While the statements were defamatory, they 
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were also true and therefore not actionable in the tort of defamation. The claim 
was brought under the PFHA, highlighting how the Act can be used to ground 
liability for the publication of defamatory statements. However, the PFHA and 
the law of defamation have different aims. The law of defamation focuses on 
harm to reputation. The distress that may be caused to the subject of the article is 
irrelevant (although it may impact the quantum of damages if liability is 
established). By contrast, the wrong of harassment solely focuses on the distress 
experienced by the claimant, when it is attended by some exceptional 
circumstance which justifies the imposition of sanctions.86 
 
3. The focus on the tort of defamation 
  
This overview suggests that the protection of reputation in English law is 
reasonably spread out. However, only two causes of action protect reputation in a 
right-constituting way: the tort of defamation and the right to object to 
derogatory treatment of a work under section 80 of the CPDA. The choice to 
focus exclusively on defamation is based on historical considerations. The law of 
defamation possesses a long history in English law, and has always been the 
primary legal means to protect reputation. The right in section 80 has built on the 
existing framework of protection of reputation, and supplemented it in specific 
circumstances in relation to authors. Nevertheless, the concept of reputation it 
relies on is still interpreted in light of the principles developed in the context of 
the wrong of defamation.87 This thesis therefore only examines defamation, as it 
remains at the roots of the protection of reputation in English law. It is this tort 
and its constituent elements and defences to which this chapter now turns; 
remedies as a topic will be addressed later on in Chapter 5.88 
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B. Overview of the modern law of defamation 
 
In England, the only tortious cause of action that protects reputation as a primary 
interest is defamation. The current law of defamation is the result of the interplay 
of complex common law rules and repeated statutory efforts to rationalise them, 
the latest Defamation Act (2013) having come into force on 1 January 2014. 
 
The general principle is that any defamatory statement communicated to a third 
party which is likely to substantially harm the claimant’s reputation is a legal 
wrong. The tort of defamation distinguishes two kinds of statement according to 
the permanence of their form. Libel consists of a defamatory imputation in a 
permanent form, such as writing;89 slander consists of an imputation in a non-
permanent form, such as spoken words, sounds or gestures. The main difference 
between the two is that slander is only actionable per se when the imputation 
falls within one of two specific categories of statements.90 
 
1. Establishing a case in the tort of defamation 
 
For an individual claimant to establish his case in the tort of defamation (subject 
to any available defences) he must prove that the statement is defamatory, has 
caused or is likely to cause serious harm, refers to him and has been published. 
Where the claimant is a company, it can maintain an action for any words which 
have a tendency to damage its trading interests.91 
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There exist various tests to determine whether a statement carries a defamatory 
meaning, all of which refer to a societal norm.92 Commonly cited is the test in 
Sim v Stretch, which considers whether the statement would tend to lower the 
claimant in the estimation of the right-thinking members of society generally.93 
This reference implies that the defamatory nature of a statement depends on the 
judgement of the members of society, which will be influenced by changing 
mores. In order to characterise its defamatory nature, the statement is examined 
in its ‘natural and ordinary meaning’:94 the whole of the publication is taken into 
account95 in order to identify the exact meaning of innuendos or ambiguous 
words. Further, according to section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, the 
statement must be shown to have caused or be likely to cause serious harm to the 
claimant’s reputation. This is a higher standard than those that existed prior to 
the coming into force of the Act, which respectively referred to a threshold of 
seriousness96 and to the necessity to prove a real and substantial tort.97 In Cooke 
v MGN Ltd,98 the court found that a statement which would have counted as 
defamatory prior to the coming into force of the 2013 Act did not qualify as such 
under the new framework of section 1(1). There was no specific evidence that 
the article had caused harm to the claimants’ reputations, serious harm could not 
be inferred, and it was not more likely than not that serious harm would be 
caused in the future. 
 
The actionability of defamatory matter further depends on the statement’s 
reference to the claimant. This is judged on an objective basis, regardless of the 
defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge. Thus, where the statement refers 
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 The original test was whether the statement complained of was calculated to hold the claimant 
in ‘hatred, contempt or ridicule’ (Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, (1840) 151 ER 
340). Its inherent limitations led to the widening of the test to include any statement that would 
tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of the right-thinking members of society generally 
(Sim v Stretch [1936] 52 TLR 669, [1936] 2 All ER 1237), affect him adversely in the estimation 
of reasonable people generally (Gillick v BBC [1996] EMLR 267) or cause him to be shunned or 
avoided (Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581). 
93
 Sim v Stretch (n 92), 1242. 
94
 Gillick v BBC (n 92), 268. 
95
 Broome v Agar (1928) 138 LT 698, 44 TLR 339, 341. 
96
 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414, [2011] 1 WLR 1985. 
97
 Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75, [2005] QB 946. 
98
 Cooke v MGN Ltd [2014] EWHC 2831, [2015] 1 WLR 895. 
 58 
to a group, body or class of persons, an individual member of the said group will 
be able to bring a claim where the words are understood to refer to him.99 
 
Finally, defamation claims can only proceed where the claimant proves that the 
statement has been published. Understood in a legal rather than a literal sense, 
publication involves any communication of the statement to a third party other 
than the claimant himself.100 The publication must be either intentional or 





Where the above-mentioned requirements are proven, the claimant has 
established a case, subject to available defences. The Defamation Act 2013, 
building on the common law, considerably modified the landscape of defences to 
an action for defamation. 
 
First, the Act put pre-existing defences on a statutory basis in sections 2 to 4. The 
truth defence in section 2 allows the claimant to escape liability, either fully or in 
part,102 where he can prove the substantial truth of the statement.103 In section 3, 
the defence of honest opinion protects statements of opinion which indicate the 
basis of the opinion and could have been held by any reasonable person on the 
basis of any existing facts or privileged statements published at the time the 
opinion was issued.104 Finally, section 4 protects ‘publications on a matter of 
public interest’ where the defendant reasonably believed that there was a real 
public interest in the subject-matter of the published statement.105 
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The Act also expanded the scope of the categories of privilege in sections 6 and 
7. As a rule, privilege can be given at common law or by statute to certain 
statements. This privilege can be absolute (for statements which are judicial, 
parliamentary or official),106 or qualified (for a variety of statements including 
reports of legislatures, courts, governmental inquiries, public meetings, general 
meetings of listed companies, peer-reviewed statements; this form of privilege 
can be defeated on proof of malice).107 
 
Finally, the Defamation Act 2013 created a new defence benefiting operators of 
websites. Since the 1996 Act came into force, a person who is not the author, 
editor or (commercial) publisher of the defamatory statement can escape 
liability.108 By virtue of section 5 of the newest Act, the legislator broadened the 
category of persons escaping liability due to their lack of involvement in the 
process of publication. A defendant website operator will not be liable for 
statements published on his website by an identifiable third party, unless he acted 
maliciously. 
 
IV. The protection of reputation in French law 
 
A. Wrongs protecting reputation 
 
Defamation, which is one of the so-called French ‘press wrongs’,109 is expressly 
regulated by the law of 29 July 1881 on freedom of the press. At its inception, 
the law of 29 July 1881 served an instrumental purpose in that it collected 
previously scattered legislative provisions regulating the abuses of the right to 
freedom of expression. Barbier notes that its codification-like aim was to bring 
together in a single law all the wrongs that could be committed by way of the 
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press.110 However, this goal was soon defeated; as early as 1894 a variety of laws 
which implemented restraints outside of the scope of the law of 29 July 1881 
were adopted. Doctrinal writers note the consequent difficulty in establishing an 
exhaustive list of all the restrictions to the right to freedom of expression in 
French law.111 Nevertheless, a variety of studies do consider the scope of 
freedom of expression by studying its limits, which they classify by reference to 
the interests they protect. Among such interests, the public order and the rights to 
privacy and reputation are commonly cited.112 
 
The protection of the right to reputation is illustrative of the proliferation of 
independent causes of action outside of the scope of the 1881 law. As is the case 
in English law, the interest in reputation is protected by different causes of 
action, but not always as a primary interest. 
 
According to doctrinal writers considering the scope of freedom of expression, 
the right to reputation is protected by the délits (a species of criminal offence)113 
of article 29 of the 1881 law: defamation and injures (injurious words). The 
wrong of defamation consists in any allegation or imputation of a precise114 fact 
which harms the victim’s honneur (honour) and considération (esteem).115 The 
wrong of injures116 covers any outrageous or contemptuous words that do not 
impute a fact or do not have a sufficient degree of precision.117 Thus, a statement 
imputing a fact capable of being characterised as a criminal wrong is sufficiently 
precise to fall within the scope of defamation.118 By contrast, a statement 
alleging that the claimant has committed, against persons unknown, acts 
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comparable to those that are usually undertaken by petty offenders, with no 
specific indication of location or time, was considered by the Cour de cassation 
to fall within the scope of injures due to its imprecise character.119  Despite this 
formal distinction, the wrongs of defamation and injures share constituent 
elements such as the reference to the claimant, the defendant’s intention and the 
need for the statement to be published. The dividing line between both is 
sometimes tenuous, and there is some measure of overlap between the two 
causes of action, insofar as the definition of injures is only residual to that of 
diffamation: as long as the remaining constituting elements of the wrong are 
characterised, anything that is not sufficiently precise to be defamatory falls 
within the scope of injures.  
 
Doctrinal studies do not usually mention any other wrongs, thereby suggesting 
that defamation and injures are the only wrongs which limit freedom of 
expression by protecting the right to reputation in French law. This reveals a gap 
in the authors’ analyses. In practice, reputation is protected by a variety of other 
causes of action, which stretch across tortious and criminal liability.  
 
1. Overlapping heads of civil liability 
 
While the French courts have expressly rejected the freestanding imposition of 
civil liability in respect of the wrongs of article 29,120 there exist other civil 
causes of action which protect reputation. The most obvious cases of overlap 
arise in the wrong of dénigrement (disparagement). However, other causes of 
action – including the law of authors’ rights – also offer (more limited) 
protection to the interest in reputation and will be examined in a second sub-
section. 
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The tortious wrong of dénigrement, regulated by article 1382 of the Civil code, 
covers similar ground to that of malicious falsehood in English law. It is an act of 
unfair competition which consists in discrediting a competitor’s products or 
services.121  
 
The distinction with the wrong of defamation may be difficult to establish. 
Indeed, the same statement may ground liability under both causes of action. The 
type of criticism grounding liability in dénigrement may be (and in fact often is) 
defamatory. Further, even if the object of the criticism is a person rather than a 
product or a service, the statement will not automatically fall within the scope of 
the law on the press. In such a situation, one must ascertain the goal of the 
critique in order to determine the appropriate cause of action. It is only in cases 
in which the defendant does not merely intend to harm his competitor’s 
reputation but rather does so as a way to (and with the ultimate objective of) 
diverting his competitor’s clientele, that the wrong will fall outside the scope of 
the law on the press.122 By way of example, dénigrement is characterised where a 
company criticises a competing company’s manager with the goal of contesting 
the claimant company’s quality of services and thereby to divert its clientele.  
 
Therefore, while the concern for the victim’s reputation is at the core of both the 
wrong of dénigrement and that of defamation or injures, it is the ultimate goal of 
the critique which distinguishes the former from the latter. Mirroring the 
approach adopted in the tort of malicious falsehood, dénigrement only protects 
an individual’s interest in their reputation as a secondary interest. 
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b) The moral right in article L121-1 of the Intellectual Property code 
 
As is the case in England, reputation is protected by some wrongs connected 
with authors’ rights. The French Intellectual Property (IP) code protects the 
author’s right to respect for his name, his authorship and his work.123 The 
provisions of the code allow an author to bring a claim in respect of actions 
which threaten the integrity of their work. It is widely accepted that reputation is 
one of the interests protected by article L121-1.124 However, it is not protected as 
a primary interest. It is only protected insofar as it is expressed in a work 
protected by the provisions of the code; article L121-1 cannot be used as a basis 
to provide freestanding protection to one’s private interest in reputation.125 
Indeed, where the interference with an author’s right to reputation is not directly 
linked to the author’s work, the interference is only actionable under the 
traditional causes of action protecting reputation (including defamation).126 
 
c) Other civil heads of liability protecting reputation 
 
It has sometimes been argued that other heads of civil liability also protect 
reputational interests. Building on pre-existing doctrinal works, Beignier thus 
argues that some instances of privilege are designed to protect reputation. He 
illustrates his view by referring to the patient-physician privilege, for which he 
suggests that what is being concealed is not the patient’s condition but rather its 
potentially suspicious origins.127 He develops a similar line of reasoning in 
relation to the wrong of blackmail. Beyond the wrongful extortion of money, 
Beignier sees blackmail as a type of moral violence that instils fear for one’s 
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reputation.128 However, actionability does not depend on the harm to reputation, 
but rather on the wrongful disclosure or extortion of money. Thus, reputation is 
only protected as a secondary interest. 
 
2. Overlapping heads of criminal liability 
 
As is the case in England, there also exist various criminal causes of action 
which protect reputation. Interestingly, in France all of these overlapping heads 
of liability protect reputation in what can be labelled a ‘wrong-constituting way’. 
This terminology is intended to evoke that of ‘right-constituting’ used above129 
whilst reflecting the fact that these wrongs do not correlate with individual rights. 
 
The most obvious overlap is found in situations in which liability arises on the 
basis non-public defamation and injures. These wrongs mirror those of article 29, 
but ground liability on the basis of the ordinary provisions of the Criminal code 
for statements which fall short of the publicity requirement of the law of 1881. 
Reputation is also protected by two other criminal wrongs, outrage (contempt) 
and dénonciation calomnieuse (false denunciation), whose scope closely mirrors 
that of article 29 defamation. Distinguishing these wrongs from those of article 
29 has practical consequences: falling outside the scope of the law on the press, 
they do not benefit from its defendant-friendly procedural guarantees.130 
 
a) Non-public defamation and injures 
 
Under the law of 29 July 1881, the concept of publication is not understood in a 
literal sense. Rather, article 23 lists the ‘means’ by which publication is 
characterised for the purposes of the law on the press. The spectrum is broad: it 
includes speech, cries and threats uttered in public places as well any other 
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medium of communication covering writings, images and speech that are sold, 
distributed or displayed in public places, or transmitted online.131  
 
Where defamation and injures are considered not to have been published for the 
purposes of article 23, they fall within a different category of criminal wrongs, to 
reflect the lesser degree of the offence. The Criminal code mirrors the wrongs of 
defamation and injures recognised in the law of 29 July 1881.132 Lacking the 
aggravating circumstance of publicity, 133  they are characterised as minor 
criminal wrongs (contraventions rather than délits) and the applicable sanctions 
are less severe. For a ‘simple’ wrong against a private person, the quantum of the 
fine is thus drastically reduced from a maximum of €12,000 to a mere €38.134 
Yet, insofar as the statement is still communicated to a third party, their primary 
aim is one and the same with the wrongs of defamation and injures which do 
meet the publicity requirement. It is to protect the victim’s reputation, which is 
treated as a primary interest.135  
 
b) Outrage (contempt) 
 
This goal is also shared by the wrong of outrage. In its ordinary meaning, the 
word outrage is understood as an extremely serious offence harming a person’s 
honour or dignity. It is a form of affront or insult136 that is addressed directly to 
the victim, whereas defamation and injures are usually addressed to an 
indeterminate audience.137 Its close relationship with the wrongs of article 29 is 
reflected in its historical treatment. Before the first laws on the press were 
enacted in 1819, outrage was technically treated as a sub-category of injures. 
Gradually, the scope of the wrong was reduced to the restricted position that it 
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possesses in the present day.138 Only three forms of outrage subsist, all of which 
are criminal wrongs: one is found in the law on the press and the other two in the 
Criminal code.139 To this day, their degree of similarity with the wrongs of 
defamation and injures is such that it has been suggested that the essence of the 
wrong can only be grasped by way of comparative analysis with the wrongs of 
article 29.140  
 
Thus, defamation and outrage are analogous causes of action. Outrage is perhaps 
best understood as a specific instance of defamation. As is the case in English 
law for slander affecting official, professional or business reputation, the status 
of the claimant has led to the devising of a distinct set of rules.141 And so, 
reflecting its historical treatment as a sub-category of article 29 injures, the 
wrong of outrage shares the general goal of protecting the victim’s reputation as 
a primary interest. 
 
c) Dénonciation calomnieuse 
 
More puzzling than all other wrongs protecting reputation is that of dénonciation 
calomnieuse. It consists in the false imputation of a criminal offence and falls 
within the scope of the Criminal code rather than within that of the law on the 
press.142 In that sense it mirrors the English wrong of malicious prosecution. But 
in practice, contrary to its English counterpart, it is difficult to justify the separate 
existence of the wrongs of defamation and of dénonciation calomnieuse. 
 
Often, the facts grounding liability for a dénonciation calomnieuse can also 
ground liability for defamation. Due to the very nature of the wrong of 
dénonciation calomnieuse, defamation law’s strict requirement that a sufficiently 
precise fact be imputed is always met.  
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The main formal distinction with the wrong of defamation appears to be the 
existence of a requirement of falsity for the wrong of article 226-10 of the 
Criminal code, when there is no corresponding requirement in the law of 
defamation.143 Nevertheless, the distinction between dénonciation calomnieuse 
and defamation is questionable in light of the policy objectives underlining the 
former type of wrong. Parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of the law 
of 8 October 1943 which modified the wrong of dénonciation calomnieuse noted 
that the interest it protects is of private character.144 Indeed, actionability is not 
based on the fact that an offence may have been committed against the 
administration of justice and that the claimant may be put in jeopardy of criminal 
proceedings. Rather, as is the case for defamation, it is based on the damage 
caused to the claimant’s reputation, which is protected as a primary interest.  
 
So the only distinction with the wrong of defamation is the object of the disputed 
statement: where the statement imputes a criminal offence, it falls outside the 
scope of the law of 29 July 1881. In practice, dénonciation calomnieuse is better 
analysed as a specific instance of the wrong of defamation than as a distinct 
wrong. This is, in fact, the position in the English law of defamation, where 
liability for the imputation of a criminal offence arises under the wrong of 
defamation.145 
 
3. The focus on the wrong of article 29 
 
It is now clear that, as is the case in England, in France various heads of liability 
protect reputation. The wrong of defamation in article 29 is only one of the 
causes of action which protect defamation in a right- or wrong-constituting way, 
alongside non-public defamation and injures, outrage and dénonciation 
calomnieuse. The reason for choosing to confine the scope of this thesis to the 
more limited wrong of article 29 relates to its foundational importance in the 
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protection of reputation. The wrong of defamation in article 29 remains the core 
provision protecting reputation in French law. The other causes of action which 
protect it as a primary interest are alternatively analysed as specific instances of 
defamation (this is the case for the wrongs of outrage and dénonciation 
calomnieuse, as was noted above) or as wrongs of secondary importance (as is 
the case for the article 29 wrong of injures, since it is only characterised where 
the statement complained of falls short of the precision requirement of the wrong 
of defamation, or for the wrongs of non-public defamation and injures which are 
only characterised where the statement falls short of the publicity requirement of 
article 23).  
 
This thesis therefore only considers article 29 defamation, as it remains the core 
provision protecting reputation in French law. The next section will give an 
overview of the regulation of defamation under the 1881 law on the press; the 
remedial aspects of defamation will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5.146 
 
B. Overview of the modern law of defamation 
 
1. Establishing a case under article 29 
 
To a large extent, the requirements to establish a case under article 29 mirror 
those in the English wrong of defamation: the statement must be defamatory, 
refer to the claimant and have been published. A further distinctive requirement 
is found in the French wrong: namely, intention. 
 
According to article 29, a statement is defamatory where it consists in a negative 
comment that relates to a precise and determined fact, which harms the 
claimant’s honneur and considération.147 The debate about whether the reproach 
should consist in an imputation (imputation) or allégation (allegation) rests on a 
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subtle distinction of doubtful utility.148 The crux of the enquiry is whether the 
statement is sufficiently precise to be the object of proof and contradictory 
debate. In order for a statement to be characterised as defamatory, it is also 
necessary to prove harm to the claimant’s honour or esteem. The case law 
considers whether the statement has harmful consequences objectively and 
contextually.149 As a result of this examination in abstracto,150 as is the case in 
England, it is sufficient to prove that the statement is likely to cause harm.151 
 
The defamatory statement must refer to a person (be it a private person or a 
corporate body) or to a group; they need not be named as long as they are 
designated and identifiable. Where the statement concerns a group, which does 
not have legal personality and consequently no standing to sue, the Cour de 
cassation has adopted a reasoning similar to that of the (then) House of Lords. 
Individual claims are allowed where the statement concerning a group is not so 
generalised that the individual claimant cannot show that he was a clear target, 
personally affected.152 
 
The statement must have been published for the purposes of article 23, which 
lists various means which satisfy the publication requirement in the law on the 
press.153 
 
Finally, and in contrast to English law, in French law liability for the wrong of 
defamation requires proof of the defendant’s intention, which is presumed.154 
This requirement of intention has two facets: the will or conscience that the 
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statement may adversely affect the claimant’s honneur and considération, and 
the intent to publish the statement.155  
 
2. Specific forms of defamation 
 
There exist additional, specific forms of the wrong of defamation. Only one of 
them, defamation contre la mémoire des morts (against the memory of the 
dead),156 follows the exact same rules as those in article 29. For other forms of 
defamation, the applicable rules are slightly different, either more relaxed or 
more stringent. Thus, defamation of the deceased’s heirs does not require the 
claimant to prove that the statement relates to a precise and determined fact.157 
On the contrary, rules are stricter in the context of aggravated forms of the wrong 
of defamation, which correspond to the POA offences in England. Where 
defamation is discriminatory158 or directed at either a public institution159 or a 
public official,160 the substantive elements to be proven in order to bring a claim 




Where the claimant has proven the relevant constituent elements, he has 
established a case under article 29 subject to proof that the statement was 
privileged, 162  or to any defences. The categories of privileged statements 
correspond to those covered by absolute privilege in England (judicial and 
parliamentary statements) and of their reports. Absent any privilege the onus is 
on the defendant who can escape liability by proving that he was allowed to 
publish the statement by establishing its truth (exceptio veritatis) or that he made 
                                                
155
 Michèle-Laure Rassat, Droit Pénal Spécial (6th edn, Dalloz 2011), 577. 
156
 Art. 34, alinéa 1. 
157
 Cass crim, 9 January 1948, Bull crim 1948, n°9. 
158
 E.g. racist, xenophobic and religious defamation (art. 32 alinéa 2).  
159
 Art. 30. 
160
 Art. 31, alinéa 1. 
161
 In the context of defamation of a public institution, the defamatory statement must concern the 
institution itself (rather than one of its members). Regarding defamation of a public official, the 
defamatory character of the statement must relate to the person’s occupation; this implies the 
need to identify the given profession.  
162
 Art. 41. 
 71 
it in good faith (bonne foi). 
 
While the truth defence was originally limited in scope,163 article 35 of the law 
on the press now allows it in respect of all defendants, including private persons. 
There exists only one exception to the rule that truth can always be proven: 
according to article 35, alinéa 3, a), the exceptio veritatis is not permitted where 
the statement relates to the claimant’s private life. This defence is subject to such 
strict procedural rules that some authors have suggested that they render the 
defence illusory.164 
 
The second defence, which is most commonly relied on, is that of bonne foi 
(good faith). It consists in an indirect rebuttal of the presumption of culpable 
intent.165 Relying on a doctrinal piece,166 the Cour de cassation has identified 
four elements characterising the defendant’s good faith: the legitimate duty or 
interest in making or receiving the statement; the lack of personal animosity; the 
expression’s caution and moderation; the reliability of the investigation.167 
 
Finally, the defence of provocation may in some instances become relevant. The 
law on the press only envisages this defence in the context of injures. However, 
because of the difficulty in distinguishing the wrongs of injures and diffamation 
and the overlap that exists between both, the reasoning applicable to one is 
sometimes extended to the other.168 
 
V. Sketching a distinction between tort and crime 
 
While the wrong of defamation is regulated as a tort in England, French law 
regulates it as a criminal offence. Both the common law and the civilian 
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traditions recognise fundamental differences between civil and criminal 
proceedings. The impact of such a classification will be addressed throughout the 
thesis;169 it is however necessary in a preliminary stage to give a brief account of 
the distinction between tort and crime by identifying distinctive marks of tortious 
and criminal wrongs.  
 
A. Private wrongs and public wrongs 
 
A common assertion170 in the distinction between tort and crime is based on the 
purpose of each area of law, and can be summarised as follows. Tort is a private 
law subject, which establishes a framework within which the wronged claimant 
can seek redress (often embodied in the award of compensatory damages). It 
holds the wrongdoer to account by generating civil liability through the 
characterisation of torts or delicts. By contrast, crime is a public law subject 
where the state, representing the interests of the community, punishes the 
defendant for the wrong he committed. It generates criminal liability. So, torts 
are private wrongs and crimes are public wrongs, insofar as they are the proper 
concern of the public.171  
 
While correct, this distinction is superficial and presents an over-simplified 
account of the relationship between tort and crime; it must therefore be refined. 
A meaningful distinction between tort and crime can and should engage with 
different levels of comparison: procedural, substantive, practical, remedial, 
normative. This analysis identifies various grounds of distinction, all of which 
are in fact found to present contact points.  
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On a procedural level, a major distinction rests on the notion of control of the 
process. It is invariably accepted that the tort process is controlled by the 
claimant, and the criminal one is controlled by the polity.172 In practice, however, 
there exists a class of wrongs that are pursued as criminal, but only with the 
victim’s consent or at her request,173 as is the case for defamation in French 
law.174 What is more, compensation can be awarded in a criminal court and 
limitation periods are not infrequently aligned.175 Finally, there exists in French 
law a bridge between the civil and the criminal process: the action civile 
procedure allows the victim of a criminal wrong to obtain civil damages during 
the course of a criminal process, as if he were bringing a claim before a civil 
court.176 The victim can either join his civil action to a prosecution that has 
already been filed, or file a civil action although no prosecution has been 
instigated, thereby forcing the start of criminal proceedings despite the 
prosecutor’s inaction or decision to close the case.177 It is in essence a civil claim 
for compensation, judged on the basis of civil law rules, but brought before a 
criminal judge. However, the partie civile (civil party) benefits from some 
favourable criminal law rules. For instance, the criminal principle of ‘freedom of 
proof’ is wider than its civil counterpart, allowing the victim to bring more types 
of evidence to the court. Moreover, in a criminal trial the burden of proof is on 
the prosecution; the victim can subsequently substantiate his claim for damages 
by relying on the elements used by the prosecution to prove the crime.178 
 
                                                
172
 Antony Duff, ‘Torts, Crimes and Vindication: Whose Wrong Is It?’ in Matthew Dyson (ed), 
Unravelling Tort and Crime (CUP 2014), 162. 
173
 Ibid, 171. 
174
 Art. 48, 6° of the law of 29 July 1881 requires that the victim make a preliminary complaint 
before the polity can launch the criminal proceedings. The significance of art. 48, 6° is discussed 
in Chapter 5: The remedial aspects of defamation: modes of protecting reputation and their 
functions, IIIB. 
175
 Matthew Dyson, ‘Tort and Crime’ in Mauro Bussani and Antony Sebok (eds), Comparative 
Tort Law: Global Perspectives - Research Handbooks in Comparative Law Series (Edward Elgar 
2015). 
176
 Louis Boré, JCl. Procédure Pénale, Fasc. n°20, 9. 
177
 In the defamation context: Dreyer, Responsabilités Civile et Pénale des Médias (n 133), 762. 
178
 Boré (n 176), 35. 
 74 
C. The relevance of culpability 
 
On a substantive level, Cane notes that mental states are of greater importance in 
criminal law than they are in tort law. It is a standard requirement in the criminal 
law that some form of fault – typically intention – be proven. By contrast, 
tortious liability generally turns on the defendant’s negligence. His mental state 
(specifically, his intention) plays a much less important role in tort law than it 
does in criminal law.179 In cases in which intention justifies the imposition of 
tortious liability where none would arise in its absence (for instance when 
inflicting harm by competitive market activity), Cane notes that the relevant state 
of mind is often very difficult to prove.180 Further, he argues that in cases in 
which intention justifies that a tortious cause of action arise where none would 
exist in its absence (for instance in the tort of deceit) are of little practical 
importance outside of industrial disputes.181 Cane rationalises this finding on the 
basis of the fact that intention and recklessness focus on the defendant’s conduct 
and mental state, at the expense of the interests of those affected by such 
conduct. This focus is, in fact, a distinguishing trait of the criminal law that is 




On a practical level, there exists a considerable discrepancy in the role played by 
insurers in tort and criminal law. Their role is practically non-existent in relation 
to criminal law insofar as criminal wrongs are not risks that can be insured. On 
the other hand, it is of considerable importance in relation to tort law, whether as 
part of a private or a state insurance system. Insurers are often the main drive for 
civil litigation, since they provide the victims with the financial means to bring a 
claim. Further, they are often the main – if not the only – source of 
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compensation, which displaces the responsibility to bear the loss from the 
defendant onto his insurer.183 
 
E. Responses to the wrongs 
 
Finally, the responses to the civil and criminal wrongs differ. Civil remedies are 
primarily compensatory, and criminal sanctions are primarily punitive.184 Their 
focus differs: in tort, the focus is on the claimant and his loss; in criminal law, it 
is on the defendant and his wrong. 
 
Civil wrongs give rise to remedies, which usually consist in an award of 
damages. These remedies serve a variety of goals. The first – and the main one – 
is the payment of monetary damages to the claimant by the wrongdoer.185 The 
claimant receives damages, and the defendant pays damages, as compensation or 
sometimes in excess of compensation. The second is the spreading of loss by 
shifting it from the innocent party onto the blameworthy, or the one who is in a 
better position to bear the cost of harm.186 The third is deterrence:187 it is thought 
that the fear of future liability will prevent the commission of similar wrongs, 
whether by the individual wrongdoer or the general public. The fourth is the 
reinforcement of social norms through public condemnation of those who violate 
them.188 
 
There exist various normative theories that justify the existence of such goals. 
One such theory, which is appealing in that it appropriately describes the 
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principal features of tortious claims, is that of corrective justice.189 Accepting 
that tort law creates norms of conduct, their breach is considered to give rise to a 
duty of repair in order to restore the injured claimant to the position he was in 
prior to the commission of the wrong. This theory explains key features of the 
law of tort, including the payment of damages, and puts the compensatory goal at 
the heart of tort law.190  
 
By contrast, criminal wrongs are sanctioned by criminal penalties, the 
paradigmatic ones being a prison sentence and the payment of a fine. The 
analysis of criminal penalties highlights a variety of goals pursued by the 
criminal law. The first – and the main one, which is also the main distinction 
with tortious claims – is the punishment of the wrongdoer: the state inflicts 
stigma and suffering upon the defendant, which may include his incapacitation. 
Another goal is shared with tort law: it is to reinforce social norms and to deter 
from future wrongdoing through threat of future liability. 191  Finally, it is 
sometimes suggested that criminal law also aims at protecting people from 
criminal offending.192 
 
These goals are justified by reference to normative theories of criminal law. The 
retributive justice theory warrants punishment of the offender on the basis that he 
did something that is morally or (of more interest in the law of defamation) 
socially wrong, in that it creates a risk of breach of the public peace. Punishment 
proportionate to the harm done is considered to be intrinsically good, and 
legitimises the infliction of suffering.193 In parallel to this account of punishment, 
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the communicative theory holds that the value of punishment resides in the 
communication of the censure imposed on the defendant’s act, therefore 
justifying the infliction of stigma and participating in the reinforcement of social 
norms.194 The importance of an effective communication finds its value in 
consequentialist theories of punishment, where the justification of punishment is 
grounded in its beneficial effects, one of which is deterrence. In recent years in 
England, influential writers such as Gardner and Tadros have suggested that 
deterrence is not merely an incidental benefit of punishment’s main goal. They 
have elevated it from a function of the criminal law to a justification of its 
punitive aim.195 
 
F. The relationship between tortious and criminal wrongs 
 
Stevens has developed a normative theory which interprets tort law as the 
embodiment of private rights, and criminal law as the regulation of public 
wrongs.196 This is an interesting analysis because it distinguishes tort and crime 
whilst highlighting the connections that exist between both areas of law. Its 
principal claim is that tort is a legal account of interpersonal wrongs, which 
consist in the infringement of a person’s primary rights.  Stevens analyses tort 
law as a basic category, which the criminal law draws upon. The classic assertion 
that a wrong is a breach of duty197 is followed by the identification of three 
categories of wrongs: personal (moral) wrongs, interpersonal wrongs (mainly 
torts), and public (criminal) wrongs.198 These categories sometimes overlap.  
 
Given that the existence of a duty does not necessarily imply the existence of a 
correlative right, the existence of such a right is verified by the right holder’s 
ability to waive it and his control over whether to enforce it when it has been 
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infringed.199 Interpersonal wrongs are rights based, but public wrongs are not, 
insofar as the enforcement of criminal law duties is conferred upon a public 
official rather than the victim.200 Subject to limited exceptions, criminal law is in 
a relationship of dependence with tort law: wrongs that are classified as criminal 
(nearly) always involve an interpersonal wrong; the contrary is not true. 
Interpersonal wrongs are thus treated as a basic category, which the criminal law 
builds upon in order to determine whether the given wrong is sufficiently serious 
to warrant a public sanction.201 
 
Ultimately, Stevens argues that torts as private rights, because a breach of duty 
in tort involves the infringement of a correlative right, and the claimant chooses 
whether or not to bring a claim against the defendant. By contrast, he analyses 
crimes as public wrongs, because the existence of a correlative right is not 
necessary (hence the vesting of the choice whether to prosecute in the hands of 
the prosecution services). Criminalisation of conduct will depend on the public 
taking an interest in the wrong or on the articulation of a strong public policy 
argument in favour of criminalising conduct.202 
 
This analysis is supported by the way in which English and French courts and 
legislators have approached defamation. As will be seen, the criminal regulation 
of defamation was originally necessary because of the wrong’s potential to create 
disorders in the public arena. But societal changes have limited this potential 
disorder. Their effect has been substantial in England, leading to the abolition of 
criminal libel. It has been more limited in France, where decriminalisation 
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movements have encountered major resistance, leading to a privatisation of some 




This chapter has provided the legal context for the study. It has delimited the 
project, outlined the English and the French laws of defamation, and given a 
brief summary of the tort/crime distinction.  
 
By using the tort/crime framework as the lens through which to examine the law 
of defamation in England and France, the challenge of the comparison can be 
readily identified. The root of the issue of comparability lies in the apparent 
irreconcilability of the nature of the regulation with the current applicable rules. 
This tension is apparent in Chapters 3-5, which reflect on the discrepancy that 
exists between the general principles of tort and crime and their practical 
application in the English and French laws of defamation in light of the analysis 
in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 contrasts the tension between strict liability and fault in 
each system with the general rules on the role of fault in tort and criminal law. 
Chapter 4 notes how the traditional rules on truth are evolving in France, 
marking a departure from criminal law principles of punishment and growing 
closer to the English tortious ones and their compensatory goal. Finally, Chapter 
5 goes beyond the official functions of tort and crime described above. It 
identifies an interpenetration of tortious and criminal remedial goals in English 
and French defamation claims, and establishes the emergence of a shared hybrid 
model of liability. 
 
Throughout the thesis, commonalities in the English and French laws of 
defamation will emerge. These commonalities challenge some general principles 
of tort and criminal law, and ground the argument that England and France share 
a common conceptual approach to defamation. While substantive differences 
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remain, the recognition of a shared conceptual approach suggests that the 
apparent link existing between the nature of the regulation and the substantive 




THE FRAMEWORK OF DEFAMATION LIABILITY IN 




On a cursory view, the way in which the English and French wrongs of 
defamation are constructed appears to differ significantly. The most noticeable 
differences are the nature of the regulation (tortious or criminal) and the 
existence (or absence) of a sub-division of the wrong into oral and written 
defamation. The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the framework of 
defamation liability in England and France, understood to cover the nature of the 
liability, the internal structure of the wrong and its position on the national legal 
maps. I argue that structural differences between the two systems are not 
fundamental ones; to the contrary, I identify a common spirit in the way in which 
the English and French rules on defamation are structured within the areas of tort 
and criminal law. The chapter also has a secondary purpose, which is to preface 
the subsequent comparison by a clear presentation of the English and French 
frameworks of liability. This is necessary because the nature of the regulation 
dictates the relevant terminology and applicable doctrines. In turn, this impacts 
our reasoning since the same concept may have different meanings in tort and in 
crime.1 
 
First, I briefly consider the historical evolution of defamation liability in England 
and France. Second, I examine why each jurisdiction has come to impose civil or 
criminal liability in respect of the wrong of defamation; the historical section will 
inform my analysis of the disparate regulatory features. Finally, I analyse the 
extent to which this disparate regulatory structure has affected the doctrinal 
conceptualisation of the wrong in each system. In my conclusion, I reflect on the 
relevance of my findings for the comparative analysis in the following chapters. 
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II. The historical evolution of the nature of defamation liability 
 
It is uncontroversial to say that comparative law involves an historical element.2 
This is because the historical circumstances under which the legal institutions 
came to be undoubtedly have much to say about the logic underlying the current 
state of affairs. In this section, I offer a brief retrospective of the historical 
evolution of the nature of defamation liability in England and France, as a 
necessary first step towards understanding the regulatory features. 
 
French doctrinal writers have largely ignored this subject, and there is no 
standard work on the history of the law of defamation. What follows is a first 
step towards filling this gap, based on some modern sources,3 foundational 
historical treatises4 and the preliminary works which preceded the adoption of 
the law of 29 July 1881.5 By contrast, various works have meaningfully engaged 
with the historical development of the English wrong.6 However, they have 
tended to approach the subject chronologically; or to focus on a specific aspect of 
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the development of the wrong,7  such as the distinction between libel and 
slander.8 No author has offered an historical retrospective focusing on the nature 
of the regulation. It is from this angle that I present the development of the 
wrong of defamation, in England and France. 
 
A. English law 
 
The origins of the English law of defamation have been traced back to a variety 
of sources as diverse as the Bible, Roman law and the Anglo-Saxons.9 The 
earliest known pieces of regulation are a decree of Alfred the Great in 88010 and 
a provincial Constitution of the Council of Oxford in 1222, Auctoritate dei 
Patris, which provided for the excommunication of any person maliciously 
imputing a crime to another.11 In fact, the coexistence of ecclesiastical and 
secular justice in early Medieval England meant that two levels of jurisdiction 
gave remedies for slander: ecclesiastical courts and local courts, which would 
ultimately be replaced by common law courts.12 The scope of their jurisdiction 
differed,13 and a finding of liability could lead to various outcomes, from harsh 
physical punishments to other remedies such as apologies or awards of damages, 
since the common law action focused on the protection of the economic interests 
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of the claimant.14 The wrong was then underdeveloped as compared to its 
modern version. Commonly labelled ‘slander’, it did not distinguish between oral 
or written, civil or criminal defamation.15 In fact, in some cases before 1600 the 
courts even treated slander as a kind of assault or an element of physical 
trespass.16 This was probably inherited from the Roman law understanding of 
iniuria, which treated the protection of corpus (physical integrity) and fama 
(reputation) on an equal level.17 Thus, words spoken whilst performing an act 
would be treated as defamation committed by gesture. 
 
1. The distinction between civil and criminal defamation 
 
In 1275, the unrest following the Barons’ Wars led to the enactment of the statute 
of Westminster I, also known as de scandalum magnatum (slander of 
magnates).18 Primarily political in nature, it was designed to prevent loss of 
confidence in the government due to discord generated by the spreading of false 
news or slander of the great men of the realm. Seldom used at that point, it would 
later provide the foundations for the development of the law of libel.19 
 
With the invention of printing in the 15th century, breaches of the public peace 
caused by duelling increased dramatically, and the risks of the printed press 
became obvious to the monarchy. In response to this risk, the Tudors established 
a system of prior restraints, granted themselves a power to seize the materials 
and imposed a restriction on the number of presses. As the censorship power 
passed on from the ecclesiastical power to the Crown, the criminal aspect of 
                                                
14
 Local and ecclesiastical courts broadly applied the same law of defamation. However, the 
former approached the wrong as a form of trespass; a successful action would result in a remedial 
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 Law Commission, Working Paper No. 84, Criminal Libel (1982), 2.3. 
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 In this sense: Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, ‘Iniuria and the Common Law’ in Eric 
Descheemaeker and Helen Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common Law (Hart Pub 2013), 14, in 
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 13 Edw 1, c 34. 
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scandalum magnatum became regulated by the Privy Council. From 1559 
onwards, it became the role of the Privy Councillors sitting in the Star Chamber20 
to punish breaches to the public peace and seditious words. Anxious to suppress 
duelling, the court ‘would punish defamatory libels on private citizens who had 
suffered insult thereby, in the hope that this remedy would be more attractive to 
the person insulted than the issue of a challenge to fight.’21 This was in contrast 
with the compensatory goal of civil claims outlined above. 
  
Until the beginning of the 17th century, scandalum magnatum was the main 
resource used by the Star Chamber to fashion the law of libel. In 1606, however, 
the case de libellis famosis marked the creation of a formal offence of criminal 
libel. This offence encompassed various types of libel (seditious, blasphemous 
and defamatory) and was divided into two classes: political libels (posing a threat 
to the security of the state) and private libels (likely to cause private disorders).22 
Partially incorporating the Roman institution of libellus famosus by criminalising 
written statements,23 the case highlights the purpose of the court as being one of 
punishment, with little focus on the damage suffered by the offended person.24 
Thus, the criminal jurisdiction of the Star Chamber in respect of defamation ran 
alongside the civil one of the common law courts, in which the gist of the action 
was the damage suffered by the claimant rather than the threat to the peace.25 
 
                                                
20
 Established in 1488, the court of Star Chamber was a specific session of the Privy Council, 
during which it sat as a court of justice exercising judicial rather than administrative powers, and 
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23
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with the additional principle that a libel is punishable as a crime because it tends to a breach of 
the peace.’ See: Donnelly (n 6), 118. 
24
 Plucknett (n 6), 454, 457. 
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2. The distinction between oral and written defamation 
 
The Star Chamber was abolished by act of Parliament in 1641;26 much of its 
work was then incorporated into the common law. The courts that had developed 
the civil law of defamation thus began to administer the law of criminal libel 
developed by the Star Chamber. This marked the beginning of the creation of 
specific rules for libel. Treated both as a crime and as a tort, its regulation was 
heavily based in the civil rules devised by the common law courts; but, following 
the criminal rules of the Star Chamber, it did not require that special damage be 
proven. Donnelly suggests that this special rule originated in the fact that written 
defamation was a crime threatening the public peace. Establishing a presumption 
of damage effectively added to the pre-existing arsenal of censorship.27 
 
This distinction between spoken and written defamation was first laid down in 
the case of King v Lake,28 and formalised in the later case of Thorley v Kerry.29 
The permanent or transient character of a statement would imply a different 
degree of gravity, thus calling for the application of different rules and remedies: 
the distinction between libel and slander was born.  
 
3. The coexistence of civil and criminal defamation 
 
At that time, civil and criminal defamation coexisted. While it was clear that 
spoken defamatory words could never constitute a crime,30 a written statement 
could constitute either a tort or a crime. Of the two classes of criminal libel, 
political ones became obsolete by the end of the 18th century. By then, the 
function of juries had gradually become so restricted in favour of judges so as to 
be limited to examining the issue of publication. In 1792 Fox’s Libel Act put an 
end to this state of affairs by enabling the jury to give a verdict on the whole 
matter put in issue. Thereafter, prosecutions for political libel rarefied to the 
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point of obsolescence.31 Private libels survived for a longer period of time, until 
the enactment of a series of statutory reforms in the second half of the 19th 
century.32 These were propelled by the pressure of newspaper proprietors and 
editors who opposed first some details of the law (which they alleged was not 
sufficiently protective) and later the very principle of criminal liability. In 1888, 
the Law of Libel Amendment Act made the leave of a judge in chambers a 
prerequisite for a prosecution for libel against anyone; after which prosecutions 
for libel became increasingly infrequent.33 
 
4. The modern wrong 
 
In parallel to the gradual decline of criminal libel, 20th century statutory reform 
in the form of the 1952 and 1996 Defamation Acts was solely concerned with 
civil defamation. By the second half of the 20th century it had become clear that 
proceedings for criminal or defamatory libel were very infrequent.34 The last 
prosecutions for libel were held in the 1970s. Over that period, the Crown 
prosecuted only three offences. Of the three defendants, one received a sentence 
of six months, the other a suspended sentence and the third a conditional 
discharge.35  
 
The reason for this was the existence of serious inadequacies in the law of 
criminal libel. These defects were analysed in detail in the Law Commission’s 
Working Paper on criminal libel.36 They can be classified into three broad 
categories. First, although there existed a threshold of seriousness to criminal 
libel claims, the notion was lacking in clear contours and so was ineffective.37 
Second, some rules of criminal libel were inconsistent with the general principles 
of criminal law. Intention to defame was not always necessary to ground 
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 Ibid, 2.9. 
32
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36
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liability, so that criminal libel was in some respects a crime of strict liability.38 
Further, the presumption of falsity imposed a reverse burden of proof as to truth 
on the defendant, which was unacceptable in a criminal context.39  
 
Finally, there existed unjustifiable discrepancies between the criminal wrong and 
its civil counterpart. Newspaper proprietors were granted special protection 
against criminal proceedings, but were treated as ordinary defendants in the tort 
of defamation. The Civil Evidence Act 1968 only applied to civil actions, with 
the result that fewer matters were admissible in evidence in criminal libel 
prosecutions.40 More fundamentally, the scopes of the criminal and civil wrongs 
did not tally. Slander was only actionable in tort;41 yet, criminal libel had a much 
wider scope than the tort of defamation. There were two reasons for this. First, 
truth was only admissible in criminal libel when coupled with an element of 
public benefit, and did not act as a complete defence.42 Second, the changes 
brought in by the 1952 Act, which broadened the scope of defences in civil 
actions, were not applicable to criminal libel. 43  That state of affairs was 
problematic. It was in direct conflict with the normative distinction between tort 
and crime which I endorsed in the previous chapter.44 According to it, criminal 
law is in a relationship of dependence with tort law: the former builds upon the 
latter when the wrong is sufficiently serious to warrant a public sanction. So as a 
general rule, the tort must be wider than the corresponding crime, because 
punishment is only imposed for the most serious offences. 
 
Overall, these defects rendered the law of criminal libel inappropriate, and posed 
a risk of conflict with the provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.45 The collision between the rules on criminal libel and the promotion of 
freedom of expression, and the consequent risk of creating a ‘chilling effect’ on 
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freedom of expression were highlighted in submissions made to Parliament 
before the passage of the 2013 Act.46 
 
Various attempts were made to reform the offence. In 1982, the Law 
Commission provisionally suggested the abolition of the common law offence of 
criminal defamation and its replacement by a more limited statutory offence.47 In 
1985, it proposed a draft Criminal Defamation Bill, 48  which was never 
implemented. Walker suggests that the neglect in usage of the crime and in any 
determination to modernise it favoured the path of abolition.49 Another factor 
contributing to tilting the balance in favour of abolishing criminal defamation 
was the idea that England should lead by way of example. While criminal libel 
was effectively moribund and unlikely to be resurrected, its preservation gave 
legitimacy to foreign criminal offences of defamation.50 This is attested by the 
comment made by Justice Minister Claire Ward on the day when the Act 
abolishing criminal defamation came into effect:  
 
‘Sedition and seditious and defamatory libel are arcane offences – from a 
bygone era when freedom of expression wasn’t seen as the right it is 
today… Abolishing these offences will allow the UK to take a lead in 
challenging similar laws in other countries, where they are used to 
suppress free speech.’51 
 
The common law offences of criminal libel, including defamatory libel, were 
eventually abolished by section 73 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
Nowadays, although there exist other criminal wrongs which offer ancillary 
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protection to the right to reputation,52 English law solely regulates defamation as 
a tortious wrong. 
 
B. French law 
 
In France, the law of the Ancien Régime derived from two main sources: Roman 
law, as it was rediscovered by the Universities in the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, and barbarian laws53 applied in the Frankish era.54  
 
The word defamation is not found in any barbarian laws, and the concept was 
unfamiliar to most of them.55 However, the best known of these barbarian laws in 
force in the Frankish Empire, the Salic law, contains eight articles dedicated to 
the regulation of what it labels injures (injurious words). 56  These articles 
regulated various imputations and set up a form of monetary compensation.57 
The law also allowed a defence of truth in some (but not all) such instances.58 
!
The complex evolution of the French legal system from the Frankish Empire to 
the Ancien Régime was marked by the dual influence of Christianity and Roman 
law. Canonists studied the works of Catholic theologians, who were influenced 
by the Greco-Latin culture and acknowledged the inheritance of Roman law 
principles. University scholars rediscovered and studied the works of Roman 
jurisconsults. The jurists thus drew on Roman law and remodelled its solutions to 
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integrate Christian values of moral responsibility in their legal rules. 59 
Consequently, the regulation of defamation in the ancien droit mirrors one aspect 
of the Roman law of iniuria.60 A general category of injures (the French 
translation of iniuria) regulated a variety of wrongs including verbal or written 
attacks, médisances (slanderous statements) and calomnies (calumnies, which 
specifically regulated false statements imputing an act to somebody who did not 
commit it).61 The penalty sanctioned attacks to the public peace62 and a person’s 
reputation;63 just as in Roman law, no distinction was made between civil and 
criminal liability.64 
 
1. The distinctions based on the means of commission and the seriousness 
of the injure 
 
As was the case in the Roman law of iniuria,65 the wrong could be committed in 
three different ways: re (by another act), verbis (by spoken words) or litteris (in 
writing, which was in essence an aggravated form of verbis).66 The applicable 
rules were the same regardless of the means by which the wrong was 
committed. 67  However, the law would distinguish injures based on their 
seriousness: they could be minor, serious or atrocious. The two distinctions did 
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not tally; thus, at the end of the 18th century injures committed re would be 
classified as minor, insofar as they had become infrequent.68 The seriousness of 
the wrong was dictated by the factual circumstances of its commission. It was 
assessed by reference to various factors such as the offended person’s social 
standing; the place where and moment when the wrong was committed; the 
means of and motivation for its commission; and any recidivism by the 
offender.69 
 
2. The distinction between civil and criminal defamation 
 
In the absence of any codification of the provisions on injures, in the late 18th 
century doctrinal writers tried to synthesise the existing law. It was set out in a 
section of Jousse’s Traité de la justice criminelle en France in 1771;70 later, 
Dareau dedicated a whole book to the wrong,71 and the law was effectively 
summarised in 1778 in Guyot’s Répertoire universel et raisonné de 
jurisprudence.72 The study of the texts shows that injures, calomnies, médisances 
and diffamations were not distinguished from one another. Dareau’s treatise 
refers to a royal ordinance grounding liability for all statements of a defamatory 
nature,73 and the Répertoire considers that both calomnies and médisances can 
form the basis of a defamation claim.74 While there existed no formal distinction 
between the various wrongs, there are indications that injures were regulated 
both as a private dispute and as a threat to the public peace. Indeed, Dareau notes 
that: 
 
‘L’action pour fait d’injures est de deux 
sortes : l’une civile, quand on en vient 
par simple assignation devant le juge ; 
The claim for injures is of two sorts: 
one is civil, when one appears by 
summons before the judge; and the 
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& l’autre criminelle, lorsqu’on prend 
la voie de la plainte et de 
l’information.’ 75 
other criminal, when the chosen route 
is that of complaint and judicial 
inquiry. 
 
The choice was left to the claimant, although there are indications that spoken 
injures were generally considered to be a private matter unless the difference in 
the parties’ social standing threatened the public order. This was because from 
the beginning of the 16th century onwards, one’s honour would often be restored 
through a duel.76 Conversely, in the case of injures committed re, physical harm 
was the primary concern of the judge; since it was often minor, it would generate 
little (if any) compensatory awards, thus making the criminal option more 
attractive than its civil counterpart. The available remedies differed. A successful 
civil claim would often result in an amende honorable. This procedure aimed at 
restoring the claimant’s honour; it often took the form of an apology, oral or 
written, and had the dual aim of punishing the defendant and vindicating the 
claimant’s reputation. 77  This was sometimes coupled with compensatory 
damages that could also be awarded independently of any other remedy, but 
focused on the claimant’s economic losses – often consequential to his physical 
injuries, in cases of injures committed re. Criminal claims would result in a 
sanction consisting of a fine and costs.78 
 
3. The 19th century prevalence of criminalisation 
 
On 26 August 1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was 
adopted, proclaiming freedom of opinion and of expression in articles 10 and 11. 
Under the laws that were adopted immediately after the Revolution (droit 
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intermédiaire), cases suggest a prevalence of civil claims over criminal ones.79 
The regulation of defamation was existent but imperfect; because its scope was 
unclear and extremely complicated, many instances of defamation actually fell 
outside the scope of the legal regulation.80 
 
In the fifth year of the Republican era (1796-1797), the Council of Five Hundred 
adopted a project on the civil wrongs committed through the press. It first used 
the word diffamation to describe the concept as it is known today, defining it a 
contrario by opposing it to that of calumny. Following the rejection of the 
project, the concept of defamation only appeared in an enacted text in the 1810 
Criminal code (although it was still not named as such). Article 367 punished the 
public imputation of criminal wrongs or defamatory facts, the truth of which 
could not be proven, and which could expose the subject of the statement to 
criminal proceedings or generally to the contempt or hatred of society. The only 
aim of article 367 proceedings was to punish the breaches of the public peace. 
 
The criticism voiced against such a regulation81 resulted in the enactment of the 
three lois de Serres of 17 May, 26 May and 9 June 1819, which aimed at 
liberalising the rules applicable to the press.82 Indeed, they replaced the pre-
existing preventative system of authorisation by a repressive regime: the control 
was made from an ex post rather than an ex ante perspective. From that moment 
onwards, by reason of a combination of factual circumstances rather than 
through a reasoned normative choice, the law of defamation merged with the law 
on the press. 
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The lois de Serres were the first to define diffamation as a standalone wrong, 
distinct from the other category of injures, as: 
 
‘[Une] allégation ou imputation d’un 
fait qui porte atteinte à l’honneur ou à 
la considération de la personne.’83 
Any allegation or imputation of a fact 
which undermines the honour or 
esteem of the person. 
 
Central to this definition are the notions of honneur and considération. The 
distinction between both is uncertain, although le Poittevin’s argument that 
honneur is what the claimant thinks he is, by contrast with considération which 
is what others think the claimant is,84 has been endorsed by contemporary 
doctrinal writers. 85  Others have argued that honneur is the source of 
considération.86 Regardless of this semantic debate, what is certain is that the 
terminology carries with it notions of rank and status, 87  and consequently 
designates defamation as a societal wrong. It therefore confirms that defamation 
is thought to be a wrong that has consequences for the public as a whole, which 
warrant criminalisation.88 
 
The lois de Serres considered that liability attached to the offender’s intention in 
committing the act, regardless of the means employed to do so. Therefore, they 
did not differentiate between oral and written defamation. 89  However, a 
distinction was established between public and private defamation. Under the 
law of 17 May 1819 (as would ultimately be the case in the 1881 law),90 the 
concept of publication was not understood in a literal sense. Rather, article 1 
listed the ‘means’ by which publication was characterised for the purposes of the 
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law. Because they threatened public peace, these public statements were 
considered to be dangerous and to consequently require severe treatment.91 As a 
result, whereas non-public statements were regulated by the ordinary provisions 
of the 1810 Criminal code, public statements were regulated by the special 
provisions of the 1819 laws. The applicable penalties were imprisonment and/or 
a fine. As is the case in the 1881 law, instances of defamation directed at public 
institutions or public officials were punished more severely than simple cases of 
defamation of private individuals. The duration of imprisonment varied from five 
days to eighteen months, and the amount of the fine ranged from twenty to four 
thousand francs.92 In parallel to the public action, the victim could bring an 
action civile in order to obtain civil damages during the criminal process.93  
 
4. The modern wrong 
 
The soundness of the analytical framework of the 1819 laws preserved their 
definition of defamation throughout the 19th century legislative changes and led 
to its enactment in article 29 of the law of 29 July 1881, which established a new 
administrative and criminal regime for the regulation of the press. 
 
The application of article 1382 of the Civil code, the central provision grounding 
civil liability in French law, was not excluded by the laws of 1819 or by that of 
29 July 1881. Under the regime established by the laws of 1819, and for about a 
century after the enactment of the 1881 law, criminal and civil responsibility 
coexisted peacefully. 94  However, the general principle of responsibility 
formulated in article 1382 was at odds with the special regime established by the 
1881 law, and was bound to conflict with it. Indeed, the civil law gives a very 
broad definition of what constitutes a civil wrong; by contrast the criminal law is 
obliged by the principe de légalité criminelle (principle of legality) to always 
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give a precise definition of the wrong and its constituent elements. As such, the 
law on the press established a set of precise rules providing a regime favourable 
to the defendant, with a short limitation period and special provisions in respect 
of invalidity proceedings and defences. The parallel application of article 1382 
with its broad definition threatened to render the 1881 law empty of substance by 
circumventing the application of its special provisions.95 
 
A preference for the rules of the law of 29 July 1881 
 
The first signs of a preference for the specific rules of the law of 29 July 1881 
appeared when the Cour de cassation ruled that the law of 23 December 1980 
would not apply to the press wrongs. Up until then, according to the principe de 
solidarité des prescriptions civile et pénale, a victim’s action civile remained 
time-barred according to the public prosecution limitation period. The 1980 law, 
codified in article 10 of the Criminal procedure code, put an end to this rule. As a 
principle, actions civiles are now time-barred according to the civil law 
limitation periods, rather than the criminal law ones. Since the 1980 law was 
designed to be of general application, its effect in respect of press wrongs should 
have been to apply different limitation rules to the prosecution and the victim’s 
action civile. Therefore, the action civile would not have been subjected to the 
short three-month prescription period established in article 65 of the 1881 law. 
 
Contrary to this, shortly after the enactment of the 1980 law, the Cour de 
cassation considered that it would not apply to the press wrongs. Therefore, an 
action civile attaching to a press wrong remains time-barred according to article 
65 of the law of 1881.96 The judges grounded their reasoning in the wording of 
article 65, which provides that the short limitation period applies to both the 
action civile and the prosecution. Dreyer notes that this reasoning is absurd. The 
original purpose of article 65 was simply to recall the principe de solidarité 
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which was in force at the time the 1881 law was enacted, but has since been 
repealed by the 1980 law itself.97  
 
The Cour de cassation’s interpretation was nonetheless followed and extended. 
Later cases declared that article 65 is not the only procedural rule of the 1881 
regime that applies to actions civiles attaching to press wrongs.98 To the contrary, 
these actions civiles are subjected to all the procedural rules of the 1881 law. The 
first civil chamber of the Cour de cassation has recently formalised this state of 
affairs by ruling that any action civile attaching to a press wrong must be based 
exclusively on the law of 29 July 1881 rather than on article 1382 of the Civil 
code.99 This ensures the systematic application of the entirety of its defendant-
friendly procedural rules. 
 
Total exclusion of article 1382 at the beginning of the 21st century 
 
A movement to exclude the civil liability based on article 1382 for press wrongs 
then followed in substantive law. A trend in doctrinal opinion convinced the 
judges that the conflict between the scopes of the law on the press and article 
1382 required the latter to become inapplicable in the context of press wrongs in 
order to protect freedom of expression and freedom of the press.100 The earliest 
cases to exclude civil liability considered that the application of the 1881 law 
depended on whether the actus reus of a press wrong was characterised, 
regardless of the defendant’s means rea (specifically, intention). If it did, the 
application of article 1382 was excluded,101 potentially leaving the claimant 
without a remedy when the mens rea was not characterised.102 In later cases, 
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however, the basis for such exclusion changed. These cases considered that the 
article 1382 regime of civil responsibility was inapplicable to any (and all) cases 
involving abuses of freedom of expression against private individuals.103 They 
did not refer to the law of 1881 and were therefore further restricting the scope of 
article 1382 beyond the scope of press wrongs. Although later cases alternatively 
relied one justification or the other, the consensus was that in relation to press 
wrongs (including defamation), civil liability arising on the basis of article 1382 
of the Civil code should be excluded. 
 
A potential return of civil liability rules through the doctrine of abus de droit 
 
A recent case of the Cour de cassation raises further difficulties, and suggests a 
potential return of civil liability rules, to the detriment of the law on the press. 
The claimants were appealing a Court of Appeal case approving a compensatory 
award based on article 1382 for the wrongful online diffusion of false 
information and rigged images. The claimants argued that abuses of freedom of 
expression can only be regulated on the basis of the law of 29 July 1881. 
Consequently, they contended that an award of damages of the basis of article 
1382 of the Civil code breached this same article, as well as article 29 of the law 
of 29 July 1881 and article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The first civil chamber of the Cour de cassation quashed the appellate 
case on the sole basis of article 10 ECHR, implicitly dismissing article 29. 
Rejecting the appeal, it argued that abuses of freedom of expression are only 
characterised in specific instances laid down by the law, and that false statements 
did not fall within the scope of either article 1382 or article 29 of the law on the 
press.104 Commenting on the case, Viney identifies a change in method. Contrary 
to past cases, the Cour uses the law of civil responsibility to limit the scope of 
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freedom of expression; but in doing so it relinquishes the use of article 1382, 
preferring to rely on the doctrine of abus de droit (abuse of rights).105 This 
concept has often been used in the context of abuses of freedom of expression, 
and in this case the Cour de cassation is using it despite the fact that the alleged 
misconduct falls within the scope of the law on the press.106 
 
The impact of this case on the pre-existing case law considering the respective 
scopes of article 1382 and of the 1881 law is uncertain.107 The Cour de cassation 
is divided into chambers, including five civil ones108 and one criminal. The case 
was delivered by the first civil chamber, and it is not clear that the other 
chambers will accept it. Further, a few months later the same chamber gave 
another judgment excluding the application of article 1382 in respect of a 
statement adversely affecting a person’s reputation, on the basis of the 1881 
law.109 Viney, commenting on this case, notes that no reference was made to 
article 10 ECHR and the doctrine of abus de droit. While this judgment was not 
published – a sure sign of its lesser importance – it does question the significance 
and binding character of the earlier case. Viney also contrasts it with the first 
case on the basis of the legal sources grounding the claimant’s action. Indeed, in 
the second case the claimants did not base their appeal on article 10 ECHR. They 
classically relied on article 1382 and the 1881 law. In her opinion, this suggests 
that the approach adopted in the first case will prevail in all cases in which article 
10 ECHR is invoked, at the very least before the first civil chamber. If she is 
right, the issue is whether civil claims for abuses of the right to freedom of 
expression will be based on the 1881 law or on the doctrine of abus de droit. The 
respective scopes of civil and criminal liability rules in cases involving abuses of 
the right to freedom of expression (including defamation) have yet to be clearly 
defined. 
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III. Justifying tortious and criminal liability 
 
The previous section noted that in the present day, the regulatory features in 
respect of defamation differ as between England and France. While the former 
chose a solely tortious approach, up until recently the latter preferred to rely 
exclusively on criminal law rules (although in light of one recent case mentioned 
above this issue has yet to be settled). This section analyses the reasoning that led 
to these regulatory outcomes, and considers the factors which have shaped the 
current laws of defamation in England and France. 
 
Authors have paid due attention to this subject in England.110 However, French 
doctrinal writers have largely ignored this subject. They have confined their 
analysis to the legislative and case law developments, without considering their 
underlying justifications. This section summarises the work of the English 
writers and fills the gap existing in the French doctrine by engaging in a similar 
type of analysis in relation to the French law of defamation. Further, it builds on 
these analyses and compares the English and French regulatory features by 
reference to each system’s method of structuring rules. 
 
A. English law: crime as an instrument of repression 
 
As mentioned previously, the criminal wrong of defamation established in the 
case de libellis famosis was sub-divided into two categories: public (or political) 
and private (or personal) libels.111 This distinction had become well established 
by the mid-17th century, at the time when the Star Chamber was abolished. 
Private or personal libels were ‘instituted by or on behalf of private persons in 
order to protect their personal reputation’, while public or political libels were an 
instrument used ‘by the state for political reasons’.112 In this context, the criminal 
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regulation of libel acquired a negative reputation for two main reasons. First, 
criminal prosecutions for public libel had an ‘overtly political’ character.113 
Second, the development of the two parallel distinctions between libel and 
slander, and criminal and tortious defamation led to an inevitable understanding 
of the criminal offence of private libel as an instrument muzzling the press.  
 
1. The arbitrariness of political libels 
 
Political libels were characterised by an ‘arbitrary mode of initiating a 
prosecution’. 114  Indeed, they began on the Attorney General’s ex officio 
information;115 this contrasted with the rules on criminal information for private 
libels, for which private individuals needed to apply for the discretionary leave of 
the court.  
 
This had numerous negative consequences for defendants. A major procedural 
disadvantage was that they had limited access to the evidence relied on by the 
Crown.116 In practice, this meant that they would only discover the reasons for 
their prosecution in court, when the charges were read, and therefore had very 
little time to prepare their defence.117 Further, the process proved extremely 
costly for the defendants. They could be required to post securities for good 
behaviour before being admitted to bail, and could not recover the legal costs 
incurred, regardless of the outcome of the case.118 It is also clear that the jury was 
biased in favour of the prosecution. The procedure of selection of the jurors 
depended on their support of the Government; lacking such support jurors were 
stricken from the list before the beginning of the trial.119  
 
As such, political libels effectively acted as an instrument of political censorship 
for the government. In the words of Harling: ‘there was an arbitrariness in the 
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exemplary prosecutions under the law of libel that made it a formidable 
instrument of harassment, if ultimately not an efficient instrument of 
repression’.120 
 
2. Private libels and the stifling of freedom of expression: severe treatment 
of writings and prevalence of criminal actions against newspapers 
 
A second factor leading to criminal defamation’s disrepute is the fact that the 
criminalisation of the wrong became commonly associated with a muzzling of 
the press. There are two main causes for this. Written defamation was treated 
more severely than oral defamation, at a time when newspapers were the main 
source of writing. Further, libel claims against newspapers commonly chose the 
path of criminal, rather than civil, liability. 
 
When the Star Chamber was abolished, its criminal jurisdiction was passed on to 
the common law courts. Consequently, it is before these courts that criminal 
proceedings had to be brought. Since the same courts administered the crime and 
the tort of libel, each doctrine influenced the development of the other. Thus, the 
common law courts introduced a rule (inherited from the Star Chamber) that 
libel, contrary to slander, would be actionable without proof of special damage. 
This rule facilitated actions for libels; written defamation was therefore treated 
more severely than oral defamation. Further, spoken defamatory words could 
never amount to a criminal offence. So the criminal regulation of defamation 
inevitably became associated with instances of written defamation. At a time 
when most writings emanated from press organs which did not necessarily share 
the government’s views, the severe treatment of writings led to the view that 
libel acted as an instrument of censorship.121 In spite of the practical recognition 
of freedom of the press in 1679 when the Parliament allowed the Licensing Act 
1662 to lapse, and no prior restraints on publication subsisted, libel was de facto 
allowing the government to exercise control over newspapers.  
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Further, despite the fact that an action for libel could be tortious or criminal, 
claims against newspapers generally took the form of private libel prosecutions. 
This was for a variety of reasons. One major reason was the fact that political 
news and social gossip concerned primarily the aristocracy. The aristocrats 
generally opposed newspapers; they looked down on a civil action as they did 
not need the compensatory award; and overall preferred a criminal action which 
shared some characteristics with political libels, none the least its more public 
character.122  
 
These factors resulted in a growing dissatisfaction with criminal libel, which was 
widely seen as an instrument of repression. Legislative changes in the second 
half of the 19th century resulted in the gradual decline of criminal libel, until it 
was formally abolished in 2009. 
 
B. French law: a rights-based philosophy of criminal law 
 
In France, the advent of the Third Republic in 1870 brought about a significant 
movement of liberalisation for the press. Supervision was loosened, costs of 
entrance reduced and the left to the centre Radicaux lobbied to obtain less 
stringent press laws. Following the Radicaux’s victory in the 1876 elections, a 
press reform project was entrusted to a commission of twenty-two members. 
 
1. The rejection of article 1382 of the Civil code as a basis for liability 
 
The nature of the regulation was considered a preliminary issue by the 
commission; its main focus was to record and give content to the freedoms of 
expression and of the press.123 Proclaimed in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen, they had had a troubled history over the course of the 
19th century.124  In order to realise them, the President of the commission 
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suggested that the general principle of liberty to be proclaimed in article 1 of the 
law be limited by only two rules. The proposed limitations were the obligation to 
sign any written statement, and that of repairing any harm caused when 
exercising such freedoms on the basis of article 1382 of the Civil code.125  
 
However, the commission rejected this approach, which favoured a purely civil 
form of liability. It noted that réparation126 of harm (legal redress) could be 
either civil or criminal in nature, mirroring the civil and criminal frameworks of 
liability.127 Their purposes differed, focusing respectively on private interests and 
the public interest. Civil and criminal liability could coexist. Indeed, within the 
French system a victim can join criminal proceedings as a partie civile in order 
to claim compensation on the basis of article 1382 for the harm caused by the 
criminal offence.128 Therefore, the existence of article 1382 of the Civil code did 
not preclude the enactment of a criminal law on the press.129  
 
It went on to assess, and ultimately assert, the necessity for a criminal law 
regulating press wrongs. Three factors were invoked to reject a system of purely 
civil responsibility. First, under a framework of civil liability, claims would be 
brought against individual authors. Their likely insolvency would in most cases 
result in an illusory framework of liability, de facto creating immunity from 
liability.130 To the contrary, the 1881 law aimed at establishing a regime whereby 
the primary defendant was not the author, but rather the publisher or editor who 
were more likely to be solvent. Second, the fundamentally public character of 
press wrongs, threatening public peace, was considered incompatible with the 
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private character of article 1382’s civil reparation in the form of damage 
awards.131  
 
Finally, establishing a system of civil liability for press wrongs was found to be 
contradictory with other, pre-existing provisions of the Criminal code due to the 
existence of a distinction between public and non-public statements.132 The lois 
de Serres only regulated statements characterised as public under article 1 of the 
law of 17 May 1819; non-public statements fell outside their scope and were 
regulated by the ordinary provisions of the 1810 Criminal code. The press reform 
project aimed at replacing all pre-existing laws regulating the press (including 
the 1819 laws). In that context, the implementation of a purely civil regulation in 
lieu of the previous laws would have created an illogical state of affairs. 
Following articles 222 to 224 of the 1810 Criminal code (which was left 
untouched by the press reform project), non-public statements would have 
generated criminal liability. Public statements, which were not regulated by that 
code, would have fallen within the scope of article 1382 and generated civil 
liability. So in practice, the law would have been more severe in relation to 
statements that did not meet the requirement of publicity. Despite the fact that 
they represented a lesser threat to public peace, they would have been treated as a 
criminal rather than a civil wrong. The law would even have treated oral 
statements more harshly than written ones if the former was public and the latter 
was not.133  
 
The commission therefore took the view that abuses of freedom of expression 
and of the press should generate criminal liability, which in the French system is 
compatible with a form of compensation awarded on the basis of the victim’s 
action civile.134 
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2. The protection of freedom of expression within the criminal law 
framework 
 
In fact, the criminal regulation of defamation was an undisputed state of affairs. 
When the commission’s projet de loi (Bill) reached the Senate, its opponents did 
not prescribe a complete abandonment of the criminal law. Rather, their 
proposed amendment recommended that press wrongs be regulated by a 
combination of article 1382 of the Civil code and article 60 of the Criminal code, 
which dealt with complicity.135 
 
This is probably because press wrongs (including defamation) had always been 
seen as a threat to public peace,136 which the criminal law was designed to 
regulate. The commission noted that criminal law did not discriminate on the 
basis of the means through which the act was committed.137 Now at the very 
roots of the creation of a regime specific to the press in the 1819 laws was the 
idea that wrongs committed through the press were not a specific category of 
wrongs. They were ordinary criminal wrongs; the press was merely a means of 
committing them.138 As such, they called for a criminal regulation. 
 
It is clear that, just as was the case in England, the instrumental use of the 
criminal law as a censorship tool was considered an issue. However, this did not 
lead to a genuine debate on the decriminalisation of press wrongs, including 
defamation. Rather, the reflection focused on whether press wrongs should be 
regulated under ordinary criminal law or under a special regime, derogatory to 
the general criminal law rules. 139  Although the importance of freedom of 
expression and of the press had long been recognised, it had never been fully or 
lastingly implemented. The law of 29 July 1881 sought to effectively establish it, 
marking a split with the years gone by since the French Revolution. In a context 
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in which the criminalisation of defamation was not questioned, it was felt that a 
derogatory regime would allow for a better protection of such freedoms. 
 
This derogatory regime took the form of a unique procedural framework 
accounting for the specificities of press wrongs. One of its best-known 
procedural guarantees is the three-month limitation period established in article 
65 (contrary to the ordinary prescription period for délits which is of three 
years).140 Such short prescription period is justified on the basis that the impact 
of the wrong on the claimant’s reputation or on the public order is often short-
lived. As such, it would be unfair to allow a claim to be brought when the 
negative effects of a statement are no longer felt.141 It has important practical 
consequences on the evidential level, not the least that of acting as a liability 
limiting mechanism. With this in mind, three months is considered to be a 
reasonable period of time for which a person making a living out of his freedom 
of expression, such as a journalist, can be expected to be held accountable.142  
 
As a result of this process, the law of 29 July 1881 regulates press wrongs as 
criminal wrongs. They possess the ordinary criminal wrongs’ basic definitional 
characteristics – they require a specific type of intention, involve societal harm, 
and their definition is sufficiently precise so as to not leave space for arbitrary 
decisions.  143 In fact, despite their regulation under a special law on the press 
rather than in the Criminal code, they are considered to be ordinary criminal 
wrongs.144 However, they are characterised by a specific procedural framework 
that strives to guarantee freedom of expression and of the press.145 
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C. Path dependence in the English and French regulatory features 
 
In the previous sub-sections I have respectively summarised and analysed the 
reasoning underlying the regulatory features in England and France, against the 
historical background of the development of defamation liability. In what 
follows, I build on the previous analysis to identify which factors have shaped 
the current law and more specifically the nature of the regulation. 
 
1. Signs of similarity 
 
The reasoning processes that preceded the regulatory outcomes in England and 
France diverge significantly. At different times in the 19th century, each system 
was pressured by a combination of historical and social factors to reconsider the 
nature of defamation liability. Both systems strove to protect fundamental 
freedoms (that of expression and, relatedly, that of the press); in doing so, one 
rejected the criminal framework while the other adopted and adapted it. 
Nevertheless, to quote from Weir who was comparing the English common law 
with the French doctrine of abuse of rights: 
 
‘At first sight, then, at the level of labels, the systems are completely 
opposed; but when we look at the results, they are, with important 
exceptions, not so divergent.’146 
 
Indeed, the English and French laws of defamation share two fundamental 
characteristics. First, they have both brought the regulation of defamation within 
a framework of precise legal rules. In doing so, they rejected any general 
principle of liability, whether in the form of the tort of negligence147 or in that of 
article 1382 of the Civil code. Second, owing to this framework, there is a direct 
correspondence in the way in which the wrong is positioned on national legal 
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maps. Each system is self-contained within a given area of law,148 and each 
wrong presents peculiarities departing from ordinary English tort or French 
criminal law principles. 
 
This is very clear in French law, where the ordinary criminal procedure is not 
applicable to press wrongs. Rather, as has been noted above, they benefit from a 
specific procedural framework.149  
 
It is less self-evident but still true in English law. In 2007, Justice Ipp gave a 
speech at the Judges’ Review Conference in Sydney.150 Reflecting on trends in 
the development of the law of torts over the preceding eighty years, he 
characterised defamation as ‘the Galapagos Islands Division of the law of 
torts’.151 What he was affirming by drawing an analogy with a geographically 
isolated group of islands was, of course, the distinctive nature of the tort of 
defamation. The question that must then be asked is: what is the place of 
defamation in the framework of tortious liability? In this context, Justice Ipp’s 
characterisation of defamation as a fully isolated tort is too extreme. Defamation 
is by no means an isolated tort. Nevertheless, it does possess unique features 
which distinguish it from other torts. 
 
Defamation is not a fully isolated tort, because it shares some of the general 
characteristics of tortious wrongs, on the theoretical, structural and substantive 
levels. In the previous chapter, I referred to Stevens’ rights-based account of tort 
law. According to it, there is a direct link between the existence of a specific tort 
and the protection of a given right. Indeed, most torts can be classified by 
reference to the right which they protect.152 This is also true of defamation 
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 111 
claims, which require the prior infringement of a person’s right to reputation 
before a civil action can be brought. From a theoretical perspective, defamation 
is therefore as much a part of tort law as any other tortious cause of action. 
 
With respect to sources of law, defamation is characterised by a high level of 
statutory intervention. Statutes have markedly influenced the development of the 
law of defamation. The landscape of defamation defences owes much to 
legislative intervention, which has both amended pre-existing defences and 
established new ones. 153  Further, statutes have engaged with definitional 
elements of the wrong. As such, it has been noted earlier in the thesis that section 
1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 has effectively amended the notion of 
defamatoriness by establishing a threshold of seriousness to defamation claims. 
However, legislative engagement is not peculiar to the tort of defamation. It is 
true that tort is commonly described as the archetype of common law 
methodology, with legal development being largely case-based.154 But case law 
is by no means the only source of tort law. In a recent collection of essays 
considering the role of statutes in shaping tort law, Lee notes that the law of civil 
wrongs possesses three main sources: statute, the common law, and equity.155 
The editors of the collection argue that scant attention has been paid to the 
interaction of statutes and cases in shaping tort law. In their view, this neglect is 
at the source of an incomplete and misleading account of the law of tort.156 
Overall, the book – which predates the Defamation Act 2013 – acknowledges 
and illustrates the pivotal role of legislation in shaping diverse areas of tort 
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law.157 So while defamation is one of the areas in which statute law plays a 
significant role, this is not a distinguishing trait of the wrong. It is rather a factor 
of inclusion among other tortious wrongs. From a structural perspective, statutes 
shape defamation in the same way as they shape other torts.  
 
It is uncontroversial to say that the law of defamation features legal forms and 
practices unknown in other parts of tort law. Some such practices – including 
jury trials and the extremely high quantum of damages – have recently been 
abandoned. Defamation law is no longer devoted to jury trials since section 11 of 
the Defamation Act 2013 abolished the presumption for jury trials, which now 
have to be specifically ordered by the court. Further, although damages are still 
higher than in other categories of cases, Mullis and Scott note a substantial 
reduction in the quantum of damages over the past twenty years.158 However, 
other lasting characteristics of the wrong preserve its individuality within tort 
law. Thus, some of the practices in the law of defamation are infrequently 
encountered in other torts (as is the case for the taking into account of the 
defendant’s motive)159 or are peculiar to defamation (as is the case for instance in 
relation to the one year limitation period, 160  which seeks to preserve the 
competing right to freedom of expression, and in relation to the defences of truth, 
privilege and honest opinion). But these characteristics must not be over-
exaggerated. In relation to the former, the emphasis should be on the word 
infrequently. Consideration of malice is in fact encountered in other torts, for 
instance in malicious falsehood of which, as its name indicates, it is a constituent 
element. In relation to the latter, defamation is not the only tort which features 
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specific limitation periods of defences. There are a number of other statutes that 
establish special periods of limitation for individual torts, including the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA).161 A paramount example of the existence of individual 
defences is found in the torts of trespass to the person, which have a long list of 
trespass-specific defences.162 Finally, it is worth noting that since defamation is 
formally a tortious wrong, some of the general principles of tort law apply to it. 
Thus, there exist no independent rules of causation and remoteness applicable to 
defamation, and some of the general tort defences such as consent, release, res 
judicata and limitation may be relevant to a defamation claim.163 From a 
substantive perspective, defamation therefore does not appear to be starkly 
distinguishable from other heads of tortious liability. 
 
Adopting three different perspectives (theoretical, structural and substantive), I 
have argued that defamation cannot be described as being fully isolated from the 
other civil wrongs of the law of tort. Indeed, it protects a primary private right, 
shares the same sources of law as other civil wrongs, and the idea that its 
practices are unknown in other torts is only partly true. So, how is defamation 
nonetheless a distinctive tort? In light of the preceding analysis, an answer that 
would probably generate little disagreement is that defamation is distinctive 
because it is an extremely complex wrong, even in light of the common law 
methodology which does not tend to rely on general principles.  
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The complexity of defamation claims is widely recognised. In the Australian 
case of Burrows v Knightley,164 Hunt J famously described defamation lawyers 
as ‘tripping one another upon precedents, groping knee-deep in technicalities 
[and making] mountains of costly nonsense’.165 While this observation comes 
from Australia, it is equally applicable in England. In his own time, Diplock LJ 
was highly critical of the overtly technical character of English defamation law. 
In Boston v Bagshaw,166 he commented that ‘the law of defamation… [has] 
become bogged down in … a mass of technicalities’.167 More recently, the 
complexity of defamation by comparison with other torts was recognised in the 
doctrine,168 including in Gatley’s seminal work on defamation. The multitude of 
‘categories’ in defamation was contrasted with the relatively few concepts of 
negligence (although it was recognised that some of them are difficult to define 
and apply).169  
 
Beyond the sheer number of technical requirements which must be addressed 
over the course of a defamation claim, a fundamental ground of distinction with 
other torts rests on the way in which some of these requirements are weighed. 
For instance, while malice is encountered in some other torts, it plays a much 
greater role in defamation. It is not a constituent element of the tort, but as will 
be seen in the next chapter it defeats numerous defences. These include honest 
opinion, qualified privilege, the website operators’ defence in section 5, and truth 
in the limited circumstances covered by section 8 of the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act.  
 
Further, and perhaps more fundamentally, the role played by defences in 
defamation is incomparable to that which they play in other torts. The tort of 
defamation is notoriously broad, even with the new threshold of seriousness 
introduced by section 1(1) of the 2013 Act. The reason for this is that malice is 
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no longer a constituent element of the wrong. In the past, malice used to impose 
a high threshold for the imposition of civil liability in defamation cases, which 
acted as a barrier to liability.170 In fact, the introduction of section 1(1) is an 
attempt to curb the number of defamation claims by rejecting trivial claims at the 
outset, since they might constitute an undue interference with freedom of 
expression.171 Defences therefore play a key role in limiting the imposition of 
liability, to the point that Descheemaeker argues that some of them are better 
interpreted as denials of a fault element rather than defences.172  
 
Overall, defamation is therefore not fully isolated from the rest of tort law and so 
is not accurately described as the Galapagos Islands. But it can perhaps be seen 
as the island of Corsica, closer to the mainland and nevertheless separate from it. 
It remains a self-contained wrong in the framework of tortious liability, just as 
the French wrong of defamation remains self-contained in the framework of 
criminal liability. 
 
2. A difference in method 
 
As a matter of fact, the divergence in the reasoning underlying the regulatory 
features owes much to each system’s tradition of structuring legal rules. In 
rejecting the regulation of press wrongs under article 1382 of the Civil code, and 
preferring the criminal law framework, the French legislator was striving to 
accommodate the specific challenges and difficulties they raised. In order to treat 
each case on its facts, he was effectively departing from the traditional system of 
civil liability whereby press wrongs would have been treated as illustrations of a 
general principle of responsibility.  
 
This method corresponds to the English tradition of structuring legal rules, which 
does not accommodate a similar clausula generalis; tort law has historically 
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tended to define rights in precise terms. To some extent, the modern law of tort 
has departed from this traditional Blackstonian common law view of liability as a 
list of distinct nominate torts protecting specific rights. Indeed, the tort of 
negligence has abandoned tort law’s fragmentary approach in favour of a fault-
based standard of liability; consequently, it may protect a variety of legal 
interests. Nevertheless, it is submitted that while this may have had an impact 
upon the common law tradition by introducing a new approach to liability, it has 
come to complement rather than replace the previous one. Indeed, it is only in 
rare instances that the introduction of a tort of negligence has made other causes 
of action redundant. Rather, aspects of negligence have infiltrated individual 
torts.173 Therefore, insofar as English tort law has become bifocal by recognising 
both a broad tort of negligence based on fault and individual torts protecting 
particular rights,174 the definition of nominate torts in precise terms is still a 
characteristic feature of the common law tradition. 
 
Further, one author’s reasoning suggests that the regulatory features reflect 
different ideologies found in the English and the French legal systems. Mahoney, 
discussing the comparative economic growth of common and civil law countries, 
thus notes that: 
 
‘Quite apart from the substance of legal rules, there is a sharp difference 
between the ideologies underlying common and civil law, with the latter 
notably more comfortable with a centralized and activist government.’175 
 
As compared to the English common law system, the French civilian system is 
better used to governmental intervention. Consequently, it is less opposed to a 
type of regulation involving the public system of criminal justice. 
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So, although in both England and France the criminal regulation of speech had 
historically been used as an instrument of repression, the characteristics of each 
legal system have led them to address this issue in different ways. In England, 
criminal libel fell into disuse and was later abolished; in France the legislator 
created procedural safeguards within the criminal law system. In other words, the 
current state of affairs in which legal systems are opposed at the level of labels 
but not in their general approach to the wrong results from a difference in 
method.176 
 
3. An illustration of path dependence: the internal dynamic of the law 
 
In that sense, the English and French regulatory features in respect of defamation 
owe a great deal to the mould of legal history and more importantly, legal 
culture. This reveals that they are symptomatic of path dependence. John Bell 
examined the importance of this concept for the comparative lawyer in a recent 
article, in which he defined it as follows: 
 
‘[Path dependence] suggests that established legal approaches to the 
solution of issues will determine the way in which new situations or new 
problems are handled in the present and in the future. Legal development 
is explained … by the internal dynamic of the law, the pressure of 
established ways of dealing with issues.’177 
 
The different regulatory features are the result of the internal characteristics of 
the common law and the civilian traditions in the way they structure legal rules. 
For this reason, their development in England and France is a telling illustration 
of path dependence in legal development. 
 
                                                
176
 This endorses Weir’s conclusion: see Catala and Weir (n 105), 237. 
177
 John Bell, ‘Path Dependence and Legal Development’ (2013) 87 Tul L Rev 787, 787-88. 
 118 
IV. Assessing the impact of the English and French regulatory 
features on the structure and conceptualisation of the wrong 
 
In the previous sections I have examined how England and France came to 
regulate defamation respectively in tort and in criminal law. In this section, I 
consider whether there exists a link between the nature of the regulation and the 
internal structures of the wrong of defamation in each jurisdiction. My argument 
is that no such link can be identified; however in analysing the structure of the 
wrongs I build on other existing doctrinal works to identify a common (and 
incorrect) focus on the means of committing the wrong. 
 
A. The distinction between spoken and written words 
 
Traditionally, the same rules applied to oral and written defamation in both 
England 178 and France.179  However, contrary to its French counterpart, the 
English law of defamation has come to differentiate the treatment of libel and 
slander. So the question arises whether the presence of this distinction in English 
law can be rationalised on the basis of its tortious regulation of the wrong of 
defamation.  
 
The reason for focusing on English law is that the traditional approach – the one 
that existed in both jurisdictions before they had any awareness of the nature of 
the regulation – was to recognise a single tort of defamation without 
distinguishing between oral and written defamation. But once England and 
France came to distinguish between tortious and criminal liability, only the 
former departed from the established principle. Since such a distinction between 
civil and criminal liability did not provoke any change to the French approach, 
there is little interest in studying it. It is rather more interesting to consider 
whether these distinct regulatory features influenced the English departure from 
the established principle.  
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1. Denying the existence of a link between the libel/slander distinction and 
the regulatory features 
 
The first case that appears to differentiate between spoken and written words is 
that of King v Lake, in 1667.180 The facts of this case originate in the previous 
dispute of Lake v King.181 In the earlier case Lake, an official to the Bishop and 
Archdeacon of Lincoln, was claiming in defamation against King, a barrister. 
King had sent a petition to the House of Commons, in which he accused Lake 
and other parties of committing ‘high offences against His Majesty’s laws, 
Crown, and dignity’. Lake claimed that this statement had harmed his reputation, 
hindered the execution of his office and that he had incurred expenses while 
trying to prove his innocence. Lake’s claim failed on account of the statement 
being absolutely privileged. The court of King’s Bench extended the privilege 
applicable to judicial proceedings to parliamentary grievances. Once the petition 
was formally presented to the House of Commons, it became part of the 
proceedings of the house and provided King with immunity against civil liability. 
 
In the later case, King was claiming against Lake in defamation on the basis of 
two separate statements: Lake’s written answer to King’s parliamentary petition, 
and his public utterance of words in the consistory court of Lincolnshire. The 
case report is very concise. On this occasion the Court of Exchequer did not 
consider the issue of privilege. It found for the claimant and Hale CB held that: 
 
‘Although such general words spoken once, without writing or publishing 
them, would not be actionable; yet here they being writ and published, 
which contains more malice, than if they had but been once spoken, they 
are actionable’.182  
 
Seen as elaborating a distinction between spoken and written words, this decision 
was confirmed in the later cases of Harman v Delany183 and (though reluctantly) 
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in Thorley v Kerry.184  
  
The interpretation of King v Lake was a popular subject amongst 20th century 
doctrinal writers.185 The idea that the regulatory features may have influenced the 
establishment of the distinction between libel and slander arises from the fact 
that the court was borrowing the criminal law formulation of libel in a civil 
context.186 In fact, when the modern distinction between libel and slander was 
established in the 1769 case of Villers v Monsley,187 the judges were arguably 
influenced by the principles applicable in the criminal law of defamation. Their 
‘ridicule’ test188 echoes the criminal law approach, which ‘punished anything 
which tended to take away a man’s reputation or make him the object of 
ridicule’.189 Further, Mitchell suggests that Bathurst and Gould JJ’s references to 
punishment190 are a direct indication that ‘both had drawn inspiration from the 
law of criminal libel.’191 
 
However, there are two fundamental issues which indicate that no link can exist 
between the distinction between libel and slander and England’s regulatory 
features. The first is a chronological difficulty. While the judgement in King v 
Lake was given in 1667, it is only in the 19th and 20th centuries that awareness of 
the nature of liability led to a reflection around the content and value of the 
nature of the regulation of defamation. Second, and more importantly, the court 
in King v Lake was borrowing from criminal principles to apply them in a civil 
law context. It would therefore be illogical to assume that the English preference 
                                                
184
 See above, n 29. On pieces confirming that the distinction is the same as that which was made 
145 years earlier: Donnelly (n 6); Milsom (n 6). 
185
 See, for instance: Joseph R Fisher, ‘A Chapter in the History of the Law of Libel’ (1894) 10 
LQR 158; Frank Carr, ‘The English Law of Defamation, Part II’ (1902) 18 LQR 388; W S 
Holdsworth, ‘The English Law of Defamation’ (1902) 18 LQR 255; Van Vechten, ‘The History 
and Theory of the Law of Defamation. I’ (n 6); J M Kaye, ‘Libel and Slander - Two Torts or 
One?’ (1975) 91 LQR 524; David J Ibbetson, A historical introduction to the law of obligations 
(OUP 1999), 124. 
186
 Mitchell (n 6), 29. 
187
 Villers v Monsley (1769) 95 ER 886, (1769) 2 Wils KB 403. 
188
 Ibid, 404: ‘anything which tends to make a man ridiculous or infamous ought to be punished’. 
189
 Kaye (n 185), 530. 
190
 Villers (n 187), 404. 
191
 Mitchell (n 6), 8. 
 121 
for a civil regulation dictated the judges’ decision to distinguish between libel 
and slander. 
 
Mitchell has comprehensively reviewed the historical origins of the 
distinction.192 In his retrospective, he argues that the historical context of press 
censorship calls for a focus on Hale CB’s reference to the words being written 
and printed rather than on the element of malice.193 Such emphasis is justified by 
the fact that Hale CB was responding to the then well-established defence that 
words too vague or general would not be actionable. Indeed, Hale CB considered 
that this argument was not available when the words were written.194 This is a 
convincing interpretation. It coheres with the late 17th century tendency to reject 
previously established rules limiting the availability of defamation actions, as 
was the case in relation to the rule against general words.195  
 
More importantly, Mitchell’s interpretation coincides with the historical and 
societal background of the dispute between King and Lake. As was seen above, 
the late 17th century was marked by governmental censorship, as embodied in the 
Licensing Act 1662.196 In this context, Mitchell argues that the existence of a 
distinct set of rules for spoken and written words (and consequently, of a 
mistaken focus on the means of committing the wrong) in English law flowed 
from the judicial concern to establish a strict regulation of speech. Indeed, its 
consequence was to introduce harsher rules for publishers than for mere 
speakers. In fact, 
 
‘[Such] judicial sympathy with press censorship can be seen from the fact 
that after the expiry of the Licensing act in 1679 common law judges 
were quick to recognise the criminal offence of seditious libel.’197 
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2. An(other) illustration of path dependence 
 
In a legal system that adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis as is the case in 
England, a ‘seamless web’198 of interconnections exists between the present law 
and the past. The role of history in shaping the current legal institutions is 
especially important. Mitchell stresses the random origin of the distinction and 
the role of precedent in maintaining it: ‘the court that formally ratified the 
distinction [in Thorley v Kerry] … only did so because it felt that the authorities 
left it no choice.’199 In other words, the court felt forced to rely on binding 
precedents despite the absence of a principled basis for such a distinction. And 
so, in the words of Holmes: 
 
‘Somewhere in the past, … in the absence of generalized ideas, we find 
out the practical motive for what now best is justified by the mere fact of 
its acceptance and that men are accustomed to it.’200 
 
In that sense, although Mitchell does not use the expression of ‘path dependence’ 
he does give a good example of it in denying the existence of any principled 
basis for a solution that has persisted until the present day. As a result, it is 
impossible to link the difference in the internal structures of the English and the 
French wrong with each jurisdiction’s regulatory features. 
 
B. Shared focus on the means of committing the wrong 
 
Despite the absence of a distinction between libel and slander in France, it is 
interesting to note that the 1881 law does appear to recognise the existence of 
different means of committing the wrong. ‘Loi sur la liberté de la presse’ (law 
on the freedom of the press): the title seems to refer to a means of committing a 
wrong (through the press) and therefore to regulate wrongs committed through 
the media. This ambiguous label has led some authors to misinterpret it and to 
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rationalise its application on the basis of the means of committing a wrong,201 
much in the same way as the English judges did in King v Lake. 
 
Doctrinal works, however, point out that the shared characteristic of the wrongs 
regulated by the 1881 law is not the fact that they are committed through the 
media; it is the fact that they are ‘public’ for the purpose of article 23.202 Lacking 
such publicity, none of the wrongs regulated by the law on the press are 
characterised.203 It just so happens that the publicity requirement is always 
characterised when the wrongs are committed through the media. 
 
The goals of the law on the press and its predecessors support this view. At the 
inception of the laws of 1819, the framework of which was adopted by the law of 
1881, was the idea that there exist no wrongs specific to the press. Rather, the 
press was used as an instrument permitting to commit some ‘ordinary’ wrongs.204 
The goal of this set of laws was to regulate the wrongs committed through the 
press and to assimilate to it any other means of publication that would 
consequently fall within their scope. Thus, the law of 17 May 1819 amended the 
articles of the 1810 Criminal code regulating the predecessor of defamation, 
calomnie. This brought the wrong of defamation within the scope of the law on 
the press. It is clear, however, that defamation can be committed outside a media 
context. For instance, it will be characterised when a poster containing a 
defamatory statement is displayed in the entrance hall of a public location, such 
as a school or a town hall.205 
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enactment of the 1819 laws: ‘des crimes et des délits commis avec publicité, et qui n’existent que 
par cette publicité même’ (cited by Lécuyer at 242). 
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 Celliez and Le Senne (n 5), 31; Gustave Le Poittevin, Traité de la Presse, vol 1 (Larose & 
Forcel 1901), 873. This aspect of the 1819 laws mirrored the regulation in the 1810 Criminal 
code. It is explained by the fact that at the time the 1810 Code was enacted, a décret (decree) of 5 
February 1810 established a system of censorship whereby all the publications were subjected to 
a preliminary examination. Therefore, there was no reason to establish a specific framework for 
press wrongs in the Criminal code; such framework already existed outside the code. See: Claude 
Bellanger, Histoire Générale de la Presse Française, vol 2 (PUF 1969), 6. 
205
 Rassat (n 201), 577-78. 
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Beignier et al note that the law on the press was labelled as such at a time when 
the concept of ‘press’ referred not only newspapers (la presse), but also to 
printing machines (une presse). Coincidentally, in a misleading fashion, 
newspapers were the major mode of publishing when the law was enacted at the 
end of the 19th century. So most cases relying on the provisions of the 1881 law 
in fact involved newspaper entities (la presse). Nevertheless, the authors 
emphasise that it is indisputable that the law was designed to describe any public 
mode of expression, rather than the use of the media to commit a wrong. It must 





This chapter has considered the historical justifications offered for tortious or 
criminal liability in defamation in the English and French legal systems. Though 
there are divergences in labels, a comparison of the framework of liability 
highlights common structural features: a similar preference for precise rules to 
the detriment of general principles of liability, the creation of a self-contained 
system for defamation law, a shared (mistaken) focus on the means of 
committing the wrong. While path dependence has determined the different 
regulatory outcomes of each jurisdiction’s reasoning process, in many ways the 
English and French frameworks of defamation liability are very similar. 
Considering the significant differences between the English and the French legal 
systems, which are emblematic of the common law and civilian traditions, this 
similarity is interesting. It highlights how a similar result can be achieved 
through different means, adapting to ‘the style of legislation as well as its 
construction.’207 
 
This argument will inform the rest of the thesis. By rejecting the idea that the 
structures of the English and French laws of defamation reveal fundamentally 
                                                
206
 See Beignier et al (n 3), 8. Beignier, Lamy and Dreyer highlight the fact that the law of 29 
July 1881 is not applicable only to the media, but to any statement that has been published within 
the meaning of the law.  
207
 Catala and Weir (n 105), 237. 
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different approaches to the right to reputation, I submit that they are comparable 
despite their different regulatory features. In turn, this leaves open the possibility 
of finding substantive commonalities, and even – I argue – of uncovering a 




THE ROLE OF FAULT IN THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAWS OF 





In the previous chapter, I argued that path dependence has determined the 
different regulatory outcomes in England and France. This suggests that the link 
between the nature of the regulation and the rules on defamation may not be as 
strong as it would have been had it resulted from a conscious and reasoned 
choice. The purpose is now to put this suggestion to the test. 
 
The nature of the regulation (tortious or criminal) has the capacity to affect not 
only the structure of the wrong, as was the focus in the previous chapter, but also 
the substantive content of legal rules. In that context, the purpose of this chapter 
is to engage in a comparative analysis of the standards of liability (that is, of the 
role of fault) in the English and French laws of defamation. At first sight, these 
are grounded in the general rules regulating fault in tort and criminal law and so 
are irreconcilable. In England, defamation is typically described as a tort of strict 
liability; in other words, the defendant’s fault is irrelevant to the imposition of 
liability. By contrast, in France a form of fault – intention – is necessary to 
impose liability. Contrary to this, the chapter argues that the nature of the 
regulation has had a limited influence on the standards of liability in the English 
and French laws of defamation. On closer analysis, the rules on fault are 
comparable in England and France, and in fact share the same conceptual 
approach.  
 
First, I consider the official standards of liability in the English and French laws 
of defamation and their link with the nature of the regulation in each jurisdiction. 
Second, I assess adherence to the official standards of liability. I disprove the 
existence of any such link in practice, and argue that the standards of liability are 
in fact similar in the English and French laws on defamation. Finally, I 
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rationalise this finding on the basis of path dependence and justify the 
persistence of what I argue are no longer the most appropriate standards of 
liability on account of notions of embeddedness1 and societal factors. Specific 
attention will be paid in this last section to the continued relevance, in both 
England and France, of the concern to promote media accountability which 
reveals a shared conceptual approach to the role of fault. 
 
II. A direct correspondence between the regulatory features and the 
official standards of liability 
 
The purpose of the chapter, as set out in the introduction, mandates the 
examination of two preliminary points. The inquiry focuses on the link between 
the English and French regulatory features and the standards of liability which 
they implement in their laws of defamation. I therefore start by outlining the 
official standards of liability. I then build on existing works considering the role 
of fault in tort and crime to demonstrate how the official standards of liability in 
the English and French laws of defamation relate to the general rules on fault in 
English tort and French criminal law. 
 
A. The official standards of liability in the English and French laws of 
defamation 
 
As a general rule, liability is imposed for wrongful acts. Descheemaeker notes 
that such wrongfulness may be characterised on the basis of elements of fault 
which concern the defendant’s state of mind, or on the basis of other elements 
external to the defendant.2 This chapter is exclusively concerned with the first set 
of factors – namely, those which relate to the defendant’s fault. In what follows, I 
define the fault elements relevant to the law of defamation and consider how they 
fit in the English and French frameworks of liability. 
 
                                                
1
 Bell’s word. See: John Bell, ‘Path Dependence and Legal Development’ (2013) 87 Tul L Rev 
787, 797. 
2
 Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Mapping Defamation Defences’ (2015) 78 MLR 641. 
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There is no single definition of the notion of fault; it is commonly used as a 
general concept designating a range of mental states, from subjective to objective 
ones (including intention, knowledge, dishonesty, risk-taking, negligence). The 
difficulty lies in the fact that the precise definition of the given fault element 
depends on the relevant area of law (civil or criminal). In this sub-section, I 
outline the standards of liability relevant to the law of defamation, and their 
definitions in the context of tortious and criminal liability. 
 
For the purposes of the law of defamation, there are at least two relevant 
standards of liability: intention and negligence.3 Broadly speaking, intention 
covers ‘everything which is part of one’s plan, whether as purpose or as way of 
effecting one’s purpose(s) – everything which is part of one’s reason for 
behaving as one does.’4 In tort, a requirement of intention may require that the 
defendant intend a consequence which is not an injury (injury being the normal 
focus in criminal law), or even that he only intend the act and not the 
consequence.5 On the other hand, negligence is generally described in both tort 
and crime as a behaviour creating unreasonable foreseeable risks of injury.6 It is 
predicated upon the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, which is 
determined by reference to an objective standard. Failure to live up to that 
standard triggers liability, irrespective of the defendant’s motives (good or bad), 
of his habitual exercise of due care, or of external circumstances which would 
have similarly induced a lesser degree of care being exercised by the very person 
upon whom the objective standard is predicated. 
 
In the English law of defamation, the prima facie cause of action consists in 
proving the publication of a defamatory statement which designates the claimant 
and has a tendency to harm his reputation, subject to any defences. Remarkably, 
this cause of action is exempt from any of the fault elements described above. 
                                                
3
 Recklessness, while officially relevant, is of little practical significance and is therefore not 
examined in this section. It is mentioned in passing below, in sections IIB and IIIA3. 
4
 John Finnis, ‘Intention in Tort Law’ in David G Owen (ed), The Philosophical Foundations of 
Tort Law (OUP 1997), 229. 
5
 Matthew Dyson, ‘Tortious Apples and Criminal Oranges’ in Matthew Dyson (ed), Comparing 
Tort and Crime (CUP 2015), 440. 
6
 Richard W Wright, ‘Standards of Care’ in David G Owen (ed), The Philosophical Foundations 
of Tort Law (OUP 1997), 251. 
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Thus, defamation is commonly described as a tort of strict liability, both in the 
case law7 and in doctrinal works.8 In other words, liability is imposed in the 
wrong of defamation without the claimant having to prove that the defendant was 
at fault. 
 
The cause of action is broadly similar in French law. However, in the French 
wrong of defamation the imposition of liability requires proof of an additional 
element – the defendant’s intention.9 Thus, fault is officially required to ground 
liability in the French law of defamation. 
 
B. The link between the official standards of liability and the rules on 
fault in tort and crime 
 
At first sight, the standards of liability for defamation in England and France are 
aligned with each jurisdiction’s regulatory features. This apparent link is further 
reinforced by two parallel developments in the English and French laws of 
defamation. 
 
In England, civil liability has historically been disconnected from considerations 
of fault. Under the writ system there was no need to plead the state of mind or 
culpability of the defendant and there existed no freestanding principle of 
liability for fault. Once the writs were abolished at the end of the 19th century, 
such a principle became embodied in the tort of negligence. Nevertheless, despite 
the importance that the wrong of negligence acquired, the nature of tort liability 
never became rationalised on the basis of fault. Rather, civil wrongs are 
                                                
7
 The strict liability doctrine is commonly understood to have its roots in the English case of E 
Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20, [1908-10] All ER Rep 29. It has been endorsed in other 
common law jurisdictions: e.g. in Grant v Tortstar Corp [2009] SCC 61; (2009) 3 SCR 640, the 
Supreme Court of Canada considered that the common law of defamation is ‘in effect a regime of 
strict liability’.  
8
 See, for instance: Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007): ‘Although not traditionally 
classified as such, the “intentional torts” [including defamation] are torts of strict liability’; 
Richard Parkes et al, Gatley on Libel and Slander (Sweet & Maxwell 2013), 1.8. 
9
 Bernard Beignier et al, Traité de Droit de la Presse et des Médias (Litec 2009), 743. 
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commonly characterised as a breach of duty. 10  Thus, there is no general 
requirement for civil liability to arise that the claimant be at fault.  
 
Tort law can consequently ground liability for conduct that was not intentional, 
negligent, or sometimes even deliberate: these are instances of strict liability.11 
There exist various categories of strict liability. Defamation is generally 
understood to fall within the conduct-based category of strict liability, where 
liability attaches to the voluntary doing of an act: the publication of a statement. 
Thus, Cane’s analysis of the wrong is that ‘the basic rule … is that a person can 
be liable for defamation even if they did not know and had no reason to suspect 
that they were publishing a defamatory statement or even that the defamed 
person existed.’12 
 
The same solution cannot be adopted in respect of criminal law. The severity of 
criminal liability warrants the principle that all criminal offences should contain 
a fault element.13 Therefore, the general rule is that criminal liability only arises 
where both the actus reus and the mens rea elements are characterised.14 
Glanville Williams considers that the actus reus ‘includes not merely the whole 
objective situation that has to be proved by the prosecution, but also the absence 
of any ground of justification or excuse.’15 By contrast, the mens rea designates 
the relevant fault element.16 To each class of criminal wrongs corresponds a 
given mental element. 
 
In France, criminal law rests on a tripartite classification of wrongs, based on 
their seriousness. Crimes are the most serious offences, délits are major offences 
                                                
10
 Peter Birks, ‘The Concept of a Civil Wrong’ in David G Owen (ed), The Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (OUP 1995), 33, 37. 
11




 Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to the 
tort/crime distinction, VC. Contra: John Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the 
Philosophy of Criminal Law (OUP 2007), 227. 
14
 D C Ormerod, Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (OUP 2009), 116. Note 
that French law does not commonly use the terms of actus reus and mens rea; rather, it refers to a 
‘material’ and a ‘mental’ element. 
15
 Glanville Llewelyn Williams, Criminal Law: the General Part (2nd edn, Stevens 1961), 20. 
16
 Law Commission, Report No. 177, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales 
(1989). 
 131 
and contraventions are minor ones.17 The principle laid out in article 121-3 of the 
Criminal code is that the most serious offences (all crimes and most délits) 
require intention. Other wrongs (including some délits) may be committed 
unintentionally. In these cases, the mens rea element is characterised by a lesser 
degree of fault: either faute d’imprudence (negligence, carelessness, 
recklessness) or faute contraventionnelle (which is characterised by the mere 
violation of a law or regulation, with no regard to the defendant’s state of mind; 
to that extent it is questionable whether this warrants the label of fault at all). 
 
In French criminal law, defamation is a délit, and is generally understood to be 
an intentional wrong, requiring both general and special intent. The former 
consists in the will or consciousness that the statement may adversely affect 
someone’s reputation (intention coupable, or culpable intent), and the latter in 
the intention to publish the defamatory statement.18 This is not a contentious 
point. Since the approach is objective, doctrinal writers consider that the 
defendant is necessarily aware of the defamatory nature of the statement and 
consequently of its potential to cause harm.19 
 
On the face of it, the fault requirements in the English and French wrongs of 
defamation are therefore aligned with those generally required in the context of 
tortious and criminal liability. This apparent correspondence is reinforced by two 
parallel developments in each English and French law.  
 
In England, malice (understood as intention to injure) was historically a 
constituent element of both the tort of defamation and the criminal wrong of 
defamatory libel. Malice as a constituent element of the tort was abandoned in 
the early 20th century. 20  On the other hand, up until its abolition the 
characterisation of the crime of defamatory libel required proof of malice as the 
relevant mens rea element. In doing away with the requirement of malice, the 
tort of defamation distanced itself from its criminal counterpart. Thus, the link 
                                                
17
 Art. 111-1 of the Criminal code.  
18
 Beignier et al (n 9), 744. 
19
 Ibid, 745-48. 
20
 See below, IIIA1. 
 132 
between the tortious nature of liability and the English wrong of defamation was 
reinforced. The wrong is characterised by the intentional act of publication, 
rather than by the typically criminal notion of intending to bring about the 
harmful consequences of the act.  
 
In France, the Cour de cassation declared that any action civile for defamation 
must be based on the 1881 law.21 This is a peculiar approach; the common 
practice is to ground these civil compensatory claims on article 1382 of the Civil 
code.22 The result is that France has rejected the use of the civil notion of fault in 
the context of press wrongs. In doing so, it has further entrenched the wrong of 
defamation in the realm of criminal liability. 
 
These developments reinforce the link between the official standards of liability 
in the English and French laws of defamation and each jurisdiction’s regulatory 
features. Overall, this suggests that the rules on fault in the English and French 
laws of defamation are dictated by the nature of the regulation found in each 
jurisdiction. 
 
III. The standards of liability in practice: elements of similarity  
 
Adherence to these official standards of liability, however, is not strict. The 
purpose of this section is to analyse the extent to which England and France 
depart from the official standards of liability in the law of defamation. As will be 
seen, at various points the English regime incorporates elements of fault; 
conversely, the French regime seems to be best rationalised on the basis of strict 
liability. Overall, the assessment carried out in this section disproves the 
existence of a link between the regulatory features and the standard of liability in 
each jurisdiction. To the contrary, the comparative analysis highlights the 
existence of comparable standards of liability. 
 
                                                
21
 Cass civ (2), 10 March 2004, Bull civ 2004, n°114; Cass civ (1), 11 February 2010, n°08-
22111. See also Chapter 2: The framework of defamation liability in comparative historical 
perspective, IIB4. 
22
 Louis Boré, JCl. Procédure Pénale, Fasc. n°20, 9. 
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A. The questionable strictness of liability of the English tort of 
defamation 
 
There exists a hierarchy of responsibility in the English law of defamation, with 
two categories of defendants. Primary defendants are those who intend to publish 
the defamatory statement; this category includes the author, editor and 
commercial publisher.23 Their liability is commonly described as strict. By 
contrast, secondary defendants are those who did not create the defamation. 
Their actions vary from repetition or distribution to the omission to prevent 
publication, and their liability can only be engaged when the court is satisfied 
that it is not reasonably practicable for an action to be brought against one of 
those primarily responsible persons.24 The liability of secondary defendants turns 
on a fault-based standard of liability: negligence. Section 1 of the 1996 Act 
allows them to escape liability if they can prove that they did not know and, 
having taken all reasonable care, had no reason to believe that their acts caused 
or contributed to the publication of a statement defamatory of the claimant.25 
 
In this section, I analyse the standard of liability applied to primary defendants. I 
start by outlining the gradual progression from a clear fault-based standard to one 
of strict liability. To a large extent, this historical retrospective focuses on the 
role of malice in the law of defamation and summarises Mitchell’s work on this 
                                                
23
 This category is defined a contrario in s. 1 of the Defamation Act 1996: ‘In defamation 
proceedings a person has a defence if he shows that (a) he was not the author, editor or publisher 
of the statement complained of.’ 
24
 S. 10 of the Defamation Act 2013. 
25
 The fact that s. 1(1) of the 1996 Act is formulated as a defence and that the burden of proof of 
reasonable care consequently rests on the defendant is noteworthy, but does not disrupt the 
overall argument. Indeed, s. 1(1) originates in common law rules developed in the 19th century 
(the first formulation being found in Emmens v Pottle (1885) 16 QBD 354, 50 JP 228), at a time 
when the framework of defamation liability was completely different to that which is in place 
today. Putting the onus of proof on the defendant was in line with the fact that this rule impacted 
the way in which the defendant was allowed to rebut the (then applicable) presumption of malice. 
Its preservation in the 1996 Act, and in the 1952 one before it, is a consequence of the fact that 
these statutes merely codified the common law rules without amending them. Parliament thus 
failed to recognise that the abandonment of the notion of malice within the modern framework of 
defamation liability would have logically required the burden of proof to be reserved (in this 
sense, see: Goldsmiths v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 566, [1977] 1 WLR 478, 487). For an in-
depth reflection on the historical development of the rule, see: Paul Mitchell, The Making of the 
Modern Law of Defamation (Hart Pub 2005), Chapter 6.  
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issue.26 In the following sub-sections I develop my own analysis, sometimes 
supported by the works of other authors, regarding what fault elements can be 
found in what is typically characterised as a strict liability regime.  
 
1. From fault to strict liability in the tort of defamation 
 
Up until the 19th century, the wrong of defamation had four constituent elements: 
(1) publication of (2) defamatory matter (3) referring to the claimant (4) with 
malice. Although there existed other elements of fault in the cause of action,27 
malice was the main source of fault in the law of defamation. From early in the 
history of the common law of defamation, the concept of malice was understood 
as ill will or the intent to injure the claimant; it was rebuttably presumed upon 
proof of publication of a defamatory statement.28 So the type of intent covered by 
this requirement of malice corresponded to modern notions of criminal, rather 
than tortious liability. Indeed, it was clear that the defendant needed to intend an 
injury (although a presumption of intention arose upon proof that the defendant 
had uttered the defamatory words).29 
 
Subsequent developments blurred the status of malice by introducing a 
distinction between legal malice and malice in fact. Under the Bromage 
principle,30 ordinary liability only required proof of legal malice, defined as ‘a 
wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse.’31 Malice in law 
could be presumed: it was an objective standard. By contrast, cases involving the 
defence of qualified privilege required proof of actual malice, defined as ill will 
against a person.32 This involved the consideration of the defendant’s motive and 
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 Mitchell (n 25), Chapter 5. Another fundamental source is David J Ibbetson, A Historical 
Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 1999), 115ff. 
27
 Notably in relation to publication; this fault standard persists today as is noted below: see 
IIIA2. 
28
 Mitchell (n 25), 102; Ibbetson (n 26), 115. 
29
 Mitchell (n 25), 102. 
30
 Bromage v Prosser (1824) 1 C & P 673, (1825) 4 B & C 24. On the development of the 
distinction between malice in law and malice in fact, see Paul Mitchell, ‘Malice in Defamation’ 
(1998) 114 LQR 639, who argues that the distinction is ‘based on the confusion of two separate 
principles’ (at 640-41): the fact that judges typically decided questions of law and juries 
questions of fact, and the content of the malice requirement in the law of defamation. 
31




was therefore close to criminal concepts of malice. It was not presumed and 
needed to be proven by the claimant: it was a subjective standard. Mitchell notes 
that legal malice was still firmly rooted in ideas of fault, since the (rebuttable)33 
presumption34 only arose upon proof that the defendant could foresee the harmful 
consequences of his actions.35 
 
The early 20th century case of Jones did away with the requirement of malice. 
The defendant publishers were sued for libel on the basis of an article describing 
fictional events involving an Artemus Jones. The question was whether an author 
could be liable for a statement involving a fictional character sharing some 
attributes (in this case, a name) with a defendant. The Bromage principles on 
malice supported previous dicta suggesting that no liability could arise in such 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the defendants’ counsel failed to address this issue 
at first instance: he solely argued that since the person referred to in the article 
was fictional, the words could not be read as referring to the claimant. This was 
considered to be a question of fact for the jury to decide; and on the basis of the 
evidence, the jury found that they did refer to the claimant. The defendants were 
therefore found liable at first instance, any issue of malice being disregarded. 
 
Mitchell rightly suggests that the abandoning of the requirement of malice in 
Jones is the result of a mistake. He notes that when the case got to the Court of 
Appeal, the defendants’ counsel did address the issue of malice, but not its 
rebuttal. The appellate judges also failed to consider this issue, unconsciously 
departing from the (then applicable) Bromage principle. They alternatively 
suggested that malice was irrelevant to the establishment of a cause of action36 or 
that it was automatically deduced in those situations where the ordinary meaning 
                                                
33
 In this sense: Day v Bream (1837) 174 ER 212, (1837) 2 M & Rob 54, 56; Harrison v Smith  
(1869) 20 LT 713, 714-15; Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v George Henty & Sons 7 App Cas 
741, 47 JP 214, 772. 
34
 That malice could be established through a presumption is apparent from the cases of Haire v 
Wilson (1829) 109 ER 239, (1829) 9 B & C 643, 645; Fisher v Clement (1830) 109 ER 526, 
(1830) 10 B & C 472, 476. The presumption in fact arose in relation to all defamatory 
imputations, whether or not they were obviously defamatory: Capital and Counties Bank Ltd (n 
33), 767, 772, 790. 
35
 Mitchell (n 25), 109. 
36
 Jones v E Hulton & Co [1909] 2 KB 444, 78 LJKB 937, 455 per Alverstone CJ: ‘the intention 
or motive with which the words are used is immaterial, and … if in fact the article does refer, or 
would be deemed by reasonable people to refer, to the claimant, the action can be maintained’. 
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of the words was defamatory.37 By doing so, the court was more or less 
drastically relinquishing the requirement of malice. Ultimately, the House of 
Lords upheld the appellate judgement, and endorsed the more radical view that 
malice was irrelevant to the cause of action.38 That this is a mistake based on an 
oversight is the only possible explanation, given that no such solution had 
previously been adopted or even considered in earlier cases. Yet, it was adopted 
and extended in the later case of Newstead v London Express.39 
 
Jones is generally recognised as being at the inception of the strict liability 
doctrine in defamation law. 40  Various factors have strengthened the 
interpretation of defamation as a strict liability tort. Two main such factors are 
the irrelevance of the defendant’s due care in the cause of action and 
defamation’s structural similarity with other no-fault torts such as trespass 
(where the defendant need only intend the act rather than its consequences for 
liability to arise). A third factor is the disappearance of other elements of 
subjective fault. The innocent publication defence, enacted in section 4 of the 
Defamation Act 1952, used to provide a defence to the defendant who was 
unaware that the claimant would be identified in the statement. Section 16 of the 
1996 Act repealed this defence, thereby rejecting the fault criterion in relation to 
the issue of identification of the claimant. It should be noted, however, that 
section 2 of the Act introduced a new defence of offer of amends which could be 
used by a defendant who had innocently defamed the claimant. 
 
2. A tortious standard of fault in the cause of action 
 
Under the modern law of defamation, for the wrong to be actionable, the 
claimant must establish: (1) publication of (2) defamatory matter (3) referring to 
                                                
37
 Ibid, 478 per Farwell LJ: ‘the true intention of the writer of any document… is that which is 
apparent from the natural and ordinary interpretation of the written words; and this, when applied 
to the description of an individual, means the interpretation that would be reasonably put upon 
those words by persons who know the claimant and the circumstances.’ 
38
 But note that the speeches of Lords Atkinson and Gorrell are ambiguous, endorsing both the 
views of Alverstone CJ and those of Farwell LJ: see Mitchell (n 25), 111. 
39
 Newstead v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 1 KB 377, [1939] 4 All ER 319. 
40
 See, for instance: Arno Reifenberg, ‘Libel and Slander: Hidden Defamatory Meaning’ (1947) 
35 Cal L Rev 462, 462. 
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the claimant (4) likely to cause serious harm. 
 
Fault plays a less important role in the cause of action than in the past. The 
repealing of section 4 of the Defamation Act 1952 by its 1996 successor has not 
only eliminated the existence of a fault standard in relation to the identification 
of the claimant, but also another one. Indeed, section 4 set a precondition to an 
offer of amends that the defendant had exercised ‘all reasonable care in relation 
to the publication of the statement’.41 
 
The extent of the withering of the role of fault in the cause of action, however, 
must not be over-exaggerated. The argument that defamation is a tort of strict 
liability overlooks the existence of a long-standing fault standard in relation to 
publication. Indeed, the relevant question is whether the defendant intended, 
‘knew or ought to have known, or might have expected’ that the matter would be 
published.42 As noted by Brown, ‘apart from the possible exception of the issue 
of publication, the innocence, good faith, motive, belief, reasonableness or 
intention of the defendant is generally irrelevant to the question of liability.’43 
This passage constitutes an indirect recognition that the listed factors may be 
(and the case law shows that they in fact are) relevant to the issue of publication. 
While this issue is not the main source of conflict in defamation claims, the 
negligence-like standard affirmed in Huth v Huth has been occasionally 
reaffirmed.44 
 
3. Tortious and criminal standards of fault in the defences 
 
Fault elements are also found in the defences available to a defamation 
defendant. Before I engage into such analysis, I will explain why this is relevant 
to a section which discusses the strictness of defamation liability in England. 
                                                
41
 See s. 4(5) of the Defamation Act 1952: ‘… and in either case that the publisher exercised all 
reasonable care in relation to the publication’. 
42
 Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32, [1914-15] All ER Rep 242, 38. 
43
 Raymond E Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada (Carswell Co 1987), 23-4 (emphasis 
added). 
44
 See, for instance: Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 All ER 229, [1962] 1 WLR 151. 
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One objection which may be raised in this context is that the presence of fault 
elements in the defences does not negate the strict liability nature of a wrong, 
since that fundamentally depends on the existence of fault elements in the cause 
of action. Indeed, if we endorse the view that defences are analytically separate 
from the tort,45 the consequence is that a claimant escaping liability on the basis 
of a defence will nonetheless be held to have committed a tort. Under this view, 
any fault elements in the defences will be irrelevant to the characterisation of a 
tort as one of strict liability.  
 
Contrary to this, there are two reasons why it is relevant to consider defences 
when assessing the role of fault in English defamation law. The first reason is 
theoretical. It is that the view outlined above is challenged. Descheemaeker 
doubts that defences are separate from torts, arguing that such an approach 
generates uncertainty in the determination of what can be categorised as a 
defence.46 He illustrates his argument by reference to the defamation defence of 
truth, which he considers to be ‘a good test case because procedurally it can 
plausibly be placed on either side of the divide’: ‘it could either be for the 
defendant to prove truth or for the claimant to prove untruth’.47 Analysing the 
influential definitions of defamatoriness found in the case law, he identifies 
conflicting statements. Some do not mention truth, implying that truth is a 
defence; others incorporate an element of falsity in the definition of 
defamatoriness.48 The difficulty in determining what should count as a defence 
can be illustrated by reference to Goudkamp’s categorisation of defences in a 
book chapter published in 2011, where he referred to the existence of ‘absent 
element defences’.49 Although in 2013 he rejected this view because it obscured 
                                                
45
 See: James Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Hart Pub 2013), 5-7, who defines defences as 
‘liability-defeating rules that are external to the elements of the claimant’s action’. 
46
 See generally: Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Tort Law Defences: A Defence of Conventionalism’ 
(2014) 77 MLR 493. 
47
 Ibid, 501. On the burden of proof in the context of the defence of truth, see below Chapter 4: A 
similar doctrine of truth across the tortious and criminal wrongs of defamation, IVA1. 
48
 Ibid, 502. 
49
 James Goudkamp, ‘A Taxonomy of Tort Law Defences’ in Simone Degeling and James 
Edelman (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters 2011), 467. 
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the distinction between defences and denials,50 this definition is noteworthy in 
that it evidences the link that exists between the constituent elements of a tort 
and its defences. Now if defences are not separate from a tort’s constituent 
elements, or in other words if torts are understood to be committed subject to 
defences, then the elements of fault found in defamation defences warrant as 
much consideration as those found in the cause of action. This view, which I 
endorse, is in line with William’s definition of an actus reus as comprising the 
whole objective situation and ‘the absence of any ground of justification or 
excuse.’51 It is the reason why defamation is sometimes understood to impose 
liability for false statements.52  
 
Besides this theoretical argument, there is also a practical reason for which fault 
elements found in defamation defences must be examined in this chapter. It is 
that defences play a more important role in the law of defamation than they do in 
other areas of tort law. According to Descheemaeker, the reason for this is that 
since malice is no longer a definitional element of defamation, the scope of the 
wrong is extremely large.53 The boundaries of liability are therefore primarily set 
by its defences. Thus, the substance of the tort cannot be grasped without 
considering its constituent elements along with its defences. While this is true, 
the relinquishing of malice is not the only element that makes defamation an 
extremely broad tort. From a comparative perspective, the broad scope of the 
English tort of defamation also owes to the definition of what counts as 
defamatory. It was noted in Chapter 1 that in France, defamatoriness does not 
solely depend on whether the statement harms the claimant’s reputation. It also 
depends on the disputed statement’s degree of precision.54 This is a much more 
restrictive definition of defamatoriness than that which is in place in England. A 
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 Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (n 45), 48. 
51
 Williams (n 15), 20. 
52
 See for instance Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581, 584, defining 
defamatoriness as ‘a false statement about a man to his discredit’; Michael Jones et al, Clerk & 
Lindsell on Torts (21st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014), 22-01: ‘A person who communicates to a 
third party matter which is untrue and likely in the course of things substantially to damage the 
reputation of a third person is, on the face of it, guilty of a legal wrong for which the remedy is a 
claim in tort for defamation.’ 
53
 In this sense, see: Descheemaeker, ‘Mapping Defamation Defences’ (n 2), 669-70. 
54
 Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to the 
tort/crime distinction, IVA. 
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logical consequence is that the role of defences is correspondingly more 
important in shaping defamation liability in English law. 
 
A study of defences is therefore relevant for our purposes, and defamation 
defences in fact feature various fault elements. Interestingly, their analysis shows 
that while some adhere to the paradigmatic tortious standard of negligence, other 
forms of fault are closer to the criminal understanding of intention. 
 
The most obvious example of a negligence-like standard of fault has traditionally 
been that of the now abolished ‘Reynolds privilege’.55 Based on a duty/interest 
analysis, the availability of the defence depended on the existence of a public 
interest in the disclosure of the subject matter of the statement, and on the level 
of care taken by the defendant in the process of such disclosure.56 A list of 
factors taken into account to assess this level of care57 determined whether the 
author of the statement had met a standard of ‘responsible journalism’.58 This 
standard was comparatively similar to the negligence one. This is apparent in 
Lord Cooke’s use of general negligence terminology (‘reasonable care and skill 
in all the circumstances’),59 as well as in his suggestion that general negligence 
standards may be relevant to the media. 60  The Reynolds privilege could 
reasonably be analysed as a subset of the negligence standard, applicable in the 
media context; and authors have noted the analogous character of both.61  
 
With the enactment of the Defamation Act 2013, the Reynolds privilege has 
officially been abolished and replaced by a defence of publication on a matter of 
                                                
55
 See: Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127, [1999] 4 All ER 609. 
56
 Ibid, 177-78. 
57
 Ibid, 205. 
58
 Ibid, 202. The direct inspiration for this reasonableness standard is the High Court of 
Australia’s case of Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. For a 
consideration of the development of Reynolds and the influence of Lange, see Eric 
Descheemaeker, ‘"A man must take care not to defame his neighbour"’: The Origins and 
Significance of the Reynolds Defence’ (2013)   
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2217139> accessed 22 September 2015. 
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 See, for instance: Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (OUP 2008), 188ff; David 
Howarth, ‘Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ (2011) 74 MLR 845, 868; Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Three 
Errors in the Defamation Act 2013’ (2015) 6 JETL 24, 35. 
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public interest. 62  This change in wording appeared at a late stage in the 
legislative process, and its impact is unclear.63 Descheemaeker, commenting on 
the new landscape introduced by the 2013 Act, thus notes that the wording of 
section 4 shifts the perspective from that of responsible (or reasonable) 
journalism to that of reasonable belief that the publication was, in fact, in the 
public interest.64 He argues that the substitution of one standard for another, very 
different one, is the result of Parliament’s eagerness to include in the new Act the 
relatively new defence of reportage. The clumsy interpretation of the defence 
emerging from the Flood case65 (allowing the defendant to escape liability where 
he was reporting, in the public interest, statements made by a third party) thus led 
to the unfortunate blending of two different defences. The result is that the 
preservation of the objective standard of fault that the Reynolds defence had 
introduced will depend on the interpretation that is made of the new section 4 
defence. Nevertheless, Mullis and Scott note that the plain intention of 
Parliament when passing the Act was that section 4 would involve the same 
analysis as that which developed under the Reynolds privilege.66 When this issue 
goes to court, it is therefore likely that section 4 will preserve the negligence-like 
standard of the responsible journalism test.  
 
Other defences are defeated upon proof of malice, which is an elusive concept. 
Fridman notes that the courts traditionally used it in the two senses outlined 
above,67 distinguishing between malice in law (broadly corresponding to actual 
or constructive intention) and malice in fact (which designates ill will against a 
person, echoing criminal concepts of intention).68 Indeed, the types of malice 
encountered in defamation defences differ. 
 
                                                
62
 Defamation Act 2013, s. 4. 
63
 A good reflection on this change of wording is found in Descheemaeker, ‘Three Errors in the 
Defamation Act 2013’ (n 61), 33ff. 
64
 Ibid, 37. 
65
 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273. 
66
 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Tilting at the Windmills: the Defamation Act 2013’ (2014) 
77 MLR 87, 90. 
67
 Above, IIIA1. 
68
 GHL Fridman, ‘Malice in the Law of Torts’ (1958) 21 MLR 484, 487.  
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The first defence that is defeated upon proof of malice is that of honest opinion. 
However, in Joseph v Spiller,69 the Supreme Court approved Lord Nicholls’ 
reasoning in Tse Wai Chun Paul v Albert Chen70 which defined malice as the 
defendant’s absence of reasonable belief in the truth of the statement.71 In that 
sense, malice is far from either of its historical definitions. 
 
Nevertheless, there are at least three defences – offer of amends, truth and 
qualified privilege – which still rely on a historical understanding of malice. The 
offer of amends procedure in sections 2-4 of the Defamation Act 1996 allows a 
defendant to admit his wrong, offer a correction and/or apology and pay the 
complainant an agreed sum of money.72 It is only if the claimant refuses the 
defendant’s offer of amends that the defendant can escape liability, unless he 
knew or had reason to believe that the words complained of (1) referred to the 
claimant or were likely to be understood as referring to him, and (2) were both 
false and defamatory of him.73 In other words, the defendant will be immune 
from liability unless the claimant can prove that he maliciously published the 
defamatory statement. In this context, Eady J described the circumstances in 
which malice would characterised as follows: ‘[the defendant] has chosen to 
ignore or shut his mind to information which should have led him to believe, not 
merely suspect, that the allegation is false.’74 This echoes the historical definition 
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 Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 All ER 947. 
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 Tse Wai Chun Paul v Albert Chen [2001] EMLR 777, at [41] per Lord Nicholls (in the Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeal): ‘The purpose for which the defence of fair comment exists is to 
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73
 S. 4(3) of the Defamation Act 1996. 
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 Milne v Express Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 2564, [2003] 1 All ER 482, [41], as endorsed 
and clarified by Lord Justice May in the Court of Appeal (Milne v Express Newspapers plc 
[2005] 1 All ER 1021, [2005] 1 WLR 772, [35]-[36]). 
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of malice in law: ‘a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or 
excuse.’75 
 
Reliance on the historical understanding of malice as ill will is even more 
apparent in the defences of truth and qualified privilege. In these situations, 
malice acts as a defence to a defence (which Descheemaeker labels 
‘replicationes’):76 where proven by the claimant, it prevents the defendant from 
relying on the relevant defence. According to section 8 of the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act 1974, the truth defence is unavailable to malicious disclosures of 
spent convictions.77 In Horrocks v Lowe,78 Lord Diplock noted that in this 
context, lack of belief in the truthful character is not enough to characterise 
malice. Rather, what is needed is for ‘the desire to injure [to] be the dominant 
motive for the defamatory publication’. 79  Likewise, the availability of the 
defence of qualified privilege is conditioned by the defendant’s motive in making 
the statement.80 In Loutchansky, Lord Phillips defined malice as ‘consist[ing] 
either of recklessness, i.e. not believing the statement to be true or being 
indifferent as to its truth, or of making it with the dominant motive of injuring 
the claimant.’81  
 
In the latter two defences (truth and qualified privilege), echoing criminal 
notions of intention, the understanding of malice clearly designates the intent to 
injure the claimant. In other words, the definition is grounded in the defendant’s 
intention in relation to a particular outcome. This notion, which is primarily 
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encountered in criminal law,82 corresponds to the law of defamation’s historic 
requirement of malice in fact. But the role ascribed to malice has changed, and 
this is reflected in the stage of the claim at which the issue arises. Whereas 
initially malice was a constituent element of the cause of action, it is now 
relevant to various defences.  
 
B. Negligence and strict liability in the French criminal wrong of 
defamation 
 
It has been argued that fault elements are found in the officially strict liability 
regime of English defamation law. Likewise, elements of strict liability are found 
in the officially fault-based regime of French defamation law. This is a subject 
that has been given little (if any) attention by French doctrinal writers. The strict 
liability standard applied to publishers is commonly recognised,83 but is typically 
not questioned. In the rare cases in which it is questioned, the inquiry is 
extremely superficial.84 
 
The argument in this section is that there are at least two senses in which the 
French law of defamation departs from the general defamation law requirement 
that fault in the form of intention be proven, in relation to three categories of 
defendants, which correspond to those studied in the previous section:85 authors, 
and so called directeurs de publication (commercial publishers)86 and editors. In 
turn, this is a departure from the general criminal rule that délits require intention 
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as the fault element and that mere negligence (and by extension, the absence of 
fault) are normally insufficient to ground liability. 
 
1. The author: a presumption of intention and no mens rea negating 
defence 
 
Intention coupable is officially a constituent element of the wrong of defamation. 
It characterises one part of the defendant’s mens rea (the second being intent to 
publish). However, intention coupable need not be proven: it is presumed upon 
proof of publication of the material. Surprisingly for a country that follows a 
tradition of codification, there is no written basis for this presumption, which was 
first affirmed by the Cour de cassation in 1894.87 It is crucial to appreciate the 
nature of this presumption in order to assess the actual role of fault in the French 
law of defamation.  
 
The presumption can be analysed in one of two ways. It can be interpreted as the 
(unofficial) abandonment of intention as a constituent element of the wrong, or 
as a mechanism of indirect proof in order to facilitate the bringing of a claim. It 
is the indirect proof analysis that is the official interpretation: theoretically, the 
presumption can be rebutted.88 Consequently, while it has been challenged both 
on conventional and on constitutional grounds, it has never been struck down 
insofar as it complies with the criminal rules on fault.89  
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art. 35 bis as amended by the ordinance of 6 May 1944, but Beignier criticises this view. See: 
Bernard Beignier, L'Honneur et le Droit (LGDJ 1995), 161. 
88
 Emmanuel Dreyer, JCl. Pénal Code, Fasc. n°80, 54. 
89
 The Cour de cassation considers it compatible with arts. 6 and 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights since the presumption is rebuttable (Cass crim, 16 March 1993, Bull crim 
1993, n°115). These arguments have also justified a refusal to refer the question of its 
constitutionality to the Conseil constitutionnel (Cass crim, 13 March 2012, n°11-90123). Such a 
refusal is well established, though its justification changes. The Cour de cassation has argued 
that the question does not relate to the constitutional validity of the rule, but rather concerns the 
interpretation that has been made of it (Cass crim, 31 May 2010, n°09-87578). Further, it was 
pointed out that the question does not meet the threshold of ‘seriousness’ required for it to be 
presented to the Conseil constitutionnel since the presumption is rebuttable and therefore does 
not go against the principles of a fair trial (Cass crim, 21 June 2011, n°11-90046). 
 146 
Nevertheless, in practice two factors suggest that rebutting the presumption is not 
straightforward. The first is that the issue is raised on a very infrequent basis; in 
fact judges are not even bound to refer to it in their judgement.90 The second is 
that the official way to rebut the presumption is by raising the defence of bonne 
foi (good faith). However, the defence of bonne foi only allows for an indirect 
rebuttal of the presumption. Indeed, it does not require that intention be 
disproved, but rather sets an objective negligence standard-like defence.91 This 
defence is available where the defendant can prove: (1) the existence of a 
legitimate goal, (2) the existence of prior research, (3) the absence of hostility 
towards the claimant, and (4) caution in the wording of the statement.92 What is 
striking in this definition is that proving the absence of mens rea alone does not 
defeat the presumption. Accordingly, the standard of liability in respect of the 
author of the statement may be described as aggravated. This is a first element 
distancing the law of defamation from the general principles of French criminal 
law and nuancing the link between the standards of liability and the French 
regulatory features. Nevertheless, although the author’s standard of liability 
departs from the general principles of French criminal law, it does not draw on 
civil law principles. 
 
2. The publisher: an impossible rationalisation of (strict) liability  
 
More interesting is the analysis of the role of fault in relation to the publisher’s 
liability (publisher being understood in the commercial sense throughout the 
section), where it appears that criminal notions of fault have been abandoned in 
favour of tortious ones. This reasoning can be extended to the editor, whose 
liability is established on the basis of the same rules as those applicable to 
publishers.93 
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The highly subjective nature of criminal law justifies the rule of article 121-1 of 
the Criminal code, according to which ‘no one is criminally liable except for 
their own conduct’. On the basis of this rule, the primary defendant should 
logically be the author of the defamatory statement. However, contrary to this, 
article 42 of the 1881 establishes a system of responsabilité en cascade (literally: 
cascading responsibility). This means that there is a hierarchical order in which 
one’s liability will be engaged as the principal author of the offence: (1) the 
(commercial) publisher or editor, (2) the author, (3) the printer, (4) the vendor or 
distributor.94 According to article 43, the author is treated as an accomplice. 
There are various ways in which this rule can be rationalised on the basis of 
general criminal law principles. However, none of these explicative theories is 
fully satisfactory. This ultimately suggests that the publisher’s liability can only 
be strict, and consequently that the law of defamation relies on an understanding 
of the role of fault that is closer to tortious than to criminal principles. 
 
a) Liability based on the author’s statement  
 
At first sight, article 42 appears to attribute liability for the disputed statement to 
the commercial publisher, rather than the natural perpetrator of the criminal 
wrong – the author. So the publisher’s wrong is directly attached to, and 
dependent on, the author’s. His responsibility could therefore be rationalised on 




While in theory the rule of article 121-1 of the Criminal code precludes the 
existence of vicarious liability in criminal law, there exist exceptions to this 
principle. The most important is the liability of the chef d’entreprise (head of the 
                                                
94
 This a rule whose mechanism mirrors that introduced by ss. 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 and 
10 of the Defamation Act 2013, except that the hierarchy of responsibilities differs. 
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undertaking), who is liable for a wrong committed by a third party on the basis of 
his own (presumed) negligence in preventing the wrong from being committed.95  
 
However, this interpretation is problematic in that the law of defamation does not 
fully conform to the principles of criminal vicarious liability. In order to 
counterbalance the severity of the presumption of the chef d’entreprise’s 
negligence, French criminal law allows him to escape liability where he can 
prove that he had delegated control or power to another person.96 This delegation 
is characterised where it is proven that the surveillance of part or all of the 
material or technical process has been entrusted to a third party. 97  This 
possibility, however, is absent for publishers under the 1881 law. They are liable 
for the wrong of defamation although they may not have been aware of the 
article’s insertion in the newspaper, or even been in a position to read it or to 




More promising is the theory of accessory liability. Prior to the law of 1881, the 
author was primarily liable for the wrong of defamation, with printers being 
subject to the rules of accessory liability.99 This theory was therefore discussed at 
length in the run up to the enactment of the law of 1881.100 However, it cannot 
explain the publisher’s primary liability under the current law of defamation. 
Accessory liability as defined in article 121-7 of the Criminal code requires (1) 
an illegal primary wrong (a crime or délit), (2) a positive act of participation and 
(3) the necessary mental element: the positive act of assistance in the 
commission of a criminal wrong must be done knowingly. Now it is clear that in 
various instances of defamation, the required mens rea element will be absent. In 
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cases where the publisher did not read the article or was not aware of its insertion 
in the newspaper, the mental element necessary to characterise accessory liability 
will be lacking. So the rules relating to the publisher’s liability do not comply 
with the general principles of accessory liability. 
 
b) Liability based on the publisher’s conduct 
 
A second possible interpretation is that the publisher’s liability is not grounded in 
the author’s act, but rather in another wrong, which is conceptually separate from 
that of the author but receives the same legal classification. This wrong may be 
characterised by the publisher’s failure to fulfil his official duties; this would 
imply a lower level fault, mere negligence being sufficient to characterise mens 
rea. Alternatively, the wrong may be characterised by the publisher’s act of 
publication analysed as a consequential wrong.  
 
Negligent failure to fulfil official duties 
 
The publisher’s responsibility may be interpreted as being functional and based 
on his negligent failure to comply with his official duties of control over the 
content of the publication. This lower level of fault corresponds to one of the 
official exceptions to the requirements that liability for délits requires intent on 
the defendant’s part:101 it is a faute non intentionnelle (fault of carelessness or 
negligence), grounded in article 121-3 alinéa 3 of the Criminal code. Following 
this analysis, the actus reus is the publisher’s act of publication; and the mens rea 
is the publisher’s negligence in the performance of his duties of control.  
 
The first difficulty with this explicative theory is that there is a discrepancy 
between the elements of the wrong and its classification. The characterisation of 
defamation requires proof of general and special intent; if the publisher’s wrong 
is unintentional, it is illogical to ground liability in the law of defamation.  
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More importantly, this interpretation cannot be reconciled with the accepted 
definition of faute non intentionnelle. According to article 121-3, alinéa 3 of the 
Criminal code, 
 
Il y a également délit, lorsque la loi le 
prévoit, en cas de faute d'imprudence, 
de négligence ou de manquement à une 
obligation de prudence ou de sécurité 
prévue par la loi ou le règlement, s'il 
est établi que l'auteur des faits n'a pas 
accompli les diligences normales 
compte tenu, le cas échéant, de la 
nature de ses missions ou de ses 
fonctions, de ses compétences ainsi que 
du pouvoir et des moyens dont il 
disposait. 
A délit also exists, where the law so 
provides, in cases of recklessness, 
negligence, or failure to observe an 
obligation of due care or precaution 
imposed by any statute or regulation, 
where it is established that the offender 
has failed to show normal diligence, 
taking into consideration where 
appropriate the nature of his role or 
functions, of his capacities and powers 
and of the means then available to 
him.102 
 
The wording of the provision suggests that the publisher can only be liable when 
he has been proven not to have acted with due care.103 But contrary to this rule, 
under the law of defamation the publisher is automatically liable upon 
publication: due care thus becomes irrelevant because his liability is 
automatic. 104  This fault-based interpretation of the publisher’s liability is 
therefore not sustainable. 
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Infraction de conséquence 
 
Dreyer has suggested another interpretation, which recognises publication as an 
independent wrong committed by the publisher, but highlights its link with the 
wrong committed by the author.105 He suggests that the publisher’s liability 
under article 29 may be an infraction de conséquence (a consequential wrong). 
This theory distinguishes between two separate criminal wrongs, the first being a 
necessary prerequisite for the second. Under this interpretation of defamation, 
the author’s statement characterises the necessary preliminary wrong; and the 
publisher’s publication of that statement constitutes the consequential wrong. 
This theory relies on a specific understanding of the publication process. 
Specifically, it argues that it is the publisher rather than the author who commits 
the act of publication for the purposes of article 23. In Dreyer’s opinion, the 
author’s statement is better characterised as an instance of non-public 
defamation, which falls short of the requirement of publicity in article 23 and 
therefore falls within the scope of articles R621-1-R621-4 of the Criminal 
code. 106  This is an attractive theory, because it is based on an accurate 
description of the situation, in which the actus reus is the publisher’s act of 
publication and the mens rea is his intent to publish. 
 
However, there are various issues with this explicative theory. Dreyer 
acknowledges and responds to two of them. The first is the requirement that 
there exist a preliminary criminal wrong. Unlike defamation and injures, not all 
press wrongs possess a corresponding offence in the Criminal code for the 
instances in which the publicity requirement of the 1881 law is not met. For 
those wrongs, it is impossible to characterise the required preliminary criminal 
wrong. Dreyer counters this criticism by noting that there exist exceptions to this 
requirement, and that there is no reason not to treat these other press wrongs as 
falling within the scope of these exceptions.107 
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 Emmanuel Dreyer, ‘L'Auteur de l'Infraction de Presse: Auteur Naturel ou Artificiel?’ (2008) 9 
Droit pénal étude n°18. 
106
 See Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to 
the tort/crime distinction, IVA2. 
107
 Dreyer, ‘L'Auteur de l'Infraction de Presse’ (n 105), 9. 
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The second issue arises in relation to the rule according to which the person who 
committed the preliminary wrong should also be held liable independently for his 
actions. When publishers are held liable on the basis of article 29, authors are not 
necessarily prosecuted on the basis of articles R621-1-R621-4 of the Criminal 
code. Dreyer notes that this can be explained on the basis of the special rules 
contained in the 1881 law. According to article 43, the author of a statement is 
automatically treated as the publisher’s accomplice. Making him liable for the 
preliminary wrong as well would contravene the principle of non bis in idem.108 
 
Overall, his justifications rely on treating press wrongs as a unique type of 
infraction de conséquence, justifying that exceptional rules be applied to them. It 
is a reasoning that is directly linked to that which led to the adoption of a unique 
procedural framework for press wrongs. To that extent, it is in line with the 
doctrinal understanding of press wrongs and so is convincing. 
 
Nevertheless, two more fundamental critiques can be made against this 
interpretation. The first is the same that was made in relation to the publisher’s 
negligent failure to comply with his official duties in relation to the necessary 
mental element of the wrong of defamation. It is that the publisher’s actions do 
not meet the definitional elements of defamation, and that his liability should 
consequently not be based on the wrong of defamation. Indeed, the moral 
element of the offence of defamation is characterised by proof of intent. This 
intent is often reduced to its general element (intention coupable), when in fact it 
also covers a special element, intent to publish.109 But one should avoid moving 
from one extreme to the other: if the necessary mens rea in the law of defamation 
is not characterised solely by the intention coupable, it is equally not 
characterised solely by the intention to publish. In theory, both are needed to 
ground liability. In that sense, the analysis proposed above is not satisfactory. A 
mens rea limited to intent to publish does not reflect the constituent elements of 
the French wrong of defamation. 




 See above, IIB. 
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More fundamentally, Dreyer appears to be missing a step in his approach to 
publication. While it is true that the characterisation of press wrongs depends on 
their publication, it is not clear why the author’s statement should automatically 
fail to meet this standard. Indeed, the definition of publication in article 23 of the 
1881 law is extremely broad. It is not limited to the actual physical publication of 
materials. Rather, it covers speech, cries and threats uttered in public places as 
well any other medium of communication covering writings, images and speech 
that are sold, distributed or displayed in public places, or transmitted online. In 
this context, any communication of a statement to a third party constitutes 
publication for the purposes of article 23. The publisher’s act is simply one of 
publication in the commercial sense, which also characterises publication in the 
broader ‘legal’ sense of article 23. And so it is unclear why Dreyer does not 
acknowledge the communication of the disputed statement by the author to the 
publisher as an act of publication, in the legal sense. It may be the case that there 
are various instances of publication; however it is incorrect to assume that there 
is no publication on the author’s part. Therefore, the publisher’s liability for 
press wrongs cannot properly be understood as an infraction de conséquence.  
 
c) Strict liability 
 
The current rules applicable to (commercial) publishers under the law of 1881 
are impossible to rationalise on the basis of general criminal law principles. In 
fact, this is due to a discrepancy between the constituent elements of wrong of 
defamation (publication coupled with intent to publish and intention coupable: 
thus requiring a fault element in the form of intention, understood in a criminal 
sense) and the publisher’s primary liability. Despite the fact that the mens rea 
element of defamation is not characterised in respect of the publisher, he is liable 
as a primary defendant. This suggests that while he is responsible for his own 
actions (and not those of the author), his liability is strict. This view is further 
supported by the fact that although the author’s responsibility is only secondary, 
the defence of bonne foi is assessed in relation to him, regardless of the fact that 
the claim is brought against the publisher. This may be seen as an implicit 
recognition of the fact that the commercial publisher’s liability is not based on 
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fault, since the absence of any fault on his part will not allow him to escape 
liability. By recognising a regime of strict liability in respect of publishers, the 
criminal law departs from its general rule that délits require intention as the fault 
element. In doing so, it appears to move closer to tortious principles which 
recognise that liability can arise in the absence of fault on the defendant’s part. 
 
C. Comparative assessment of the role of fault 
 
Relying on the above analysis, a basic analytical table comparing the rules 
applicable to authors and other defendants in English and French defamation 
proceedings can be drawn. The chosen categories of defendants (authors/other 
defendants) relies on the intuitive understanding that authors play a fundamental 
role in the defamation process. This comparative table would look as follows: 
 
 England France 
Author Conduct-based strict liability in tort, 
attenuated by: 
! Negligence standard in relation to 
publication 
! Various defences (involving the 
consideration of various types of 
malice) 
 
Note: these rules are also applicable to 
editors and publishers 
Officially outcome-based 
intentional conduct, generating 
criminal liability 
! Aggravated by a presumption 
of intention 
! Attenuated by a wide-ranging 
defence of absence of 




Fault-based liability in tort on the basis of 
a negligence standard (except for editors 
and publishers) 
Criminal strict liability 
 
It is interesting to note the permeation, in both jurisdictions, of notions of fault 
that span across the areas of tort and criminal law. Thus, English law relies on 
notions of malice which are typically encountered in criminal law; and French 
law relies on the typically tortious strict standard of liability. This is an indication 
that the link between the regulatory features and the standard of liability is a 
weak one. Beyond this shared feature, the table initially suggests that the role of 
fault offers little grounds for comparison between England and France. Authors 
are subjected to a strict liability standard in English law, and a negligence-like 
one in French law; the situation is reversed for other defendants, whose liability 
is based on a negligence standard in England and a strict liability one in France.  
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However, one fundamental problem arises in relation to this classification. It is 
that in England, contrary to France, authors do not constitute a distinct category 
of defendants. The rules outlined above in section IIIA are in fact applicable not 
only to authors, but also to editors and publishers.110 
 
The comparability of the regimes appears when the terms of the table are 
amended to reflect the hierarchical lines along which responsibility for 
defamation is organised in English and French law. In a comparatively similar 
fashion to the law of accessory liability, each jurisdiction recognises that there is 
one type or class of defendants whose responsibility is sought in the first place; 
other defendants’ liability is only secondary. In order to reflect this factual 
situation, the comparators change from author/other defendants to 
principal/secondary wrongdoers.111 In England, reflecting the fact that they do 
not represent distinct categories of defendants, the principal wrongdoers are the 
author, the publisher and the editor; in France the sole primary responsibility 
falls upon the publisher or editor. Secondary wrongdoers in England only cover 
third parties with a lesser degree of involvement in the wrong; the category is 
wider in France since it includes not only those with such lesser involvement, but 
also the author.  
 
 England France 
Principal 
wrongdoer 
Conduct-based strict liability in tort, 
attenuated by: 
! Negligence standard in relation to 
publication 
! Various defences (involving the 
consideration of various types of 
malice) 
Criminal strict liability 
                                                
110
 Following s. 1(1) of the Defamation Act 1996 and s. 10 of the Defamation Act 2013, these 
defendants all fall within the same category of what I will label in the following paragraph 
‘principal wrongdoers’. 
111
 The term ‘principal’ is used in a literal sense, independently of the connotations it carries in 
the law of accessory liability. These categories broadly correspond to Mitchell’s categories of 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ publishers (Mitchell (n 25), Chapter 6). The choice not to use this 
terminology is intended to circumvent the ambiguity generated by the existence of two types of 
‘publishers’ in English law (in the common law and the commercial sense), as noted above (n 
86). 
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 England France 
Secondary 
wrongdoer 
Fault-based liability in tort on the basis 
of a negligence standard 
Officially intentional conduct,  
! Aggravated by a presumption 
of intention  
! Attenuated by a wide ranging 
defence of absence of 
negligence 
 
By changing the terms of the comparison, a common feature appears: England 
and France adopt comparable standards of liability. Indeed, in both England and 
France principal wrongdoers are held strictly liable; secondary wrongdoers are 
subjected to a negligence standard, whether in the cause of action or as part of a 
defence. Of course, differences subsist: in France, the principal wrongdoer is 
afforded no defence,112 and while the secondary wrongdoer’s liability is fault-
based, the burden of proof is reversed as compared to England. 
 
The two major findings of the preceding comparative analysis relate to the 
hierarchy of responsibility and the standards of liability. Although the hierarchy 
of responsibility differs as between the two countries, the standards of liability 
applied to primary and secondary wrongdoers are comparable. Beyond the 
simple recognition that each jurisdiction relies in part on notions of fault that do 
not correspond to their regulatory features, this finding fundamentally rejects the 
possibility of a link between the nature of the regulation and the standard of 
liability. Indeed, it becomes clear that English and French law share the same 
distinctive approach to the standard of liability in defamation regardless of the 
nature of their regulation. 
 
IV. A shared conceptual approach to fault based on media 
accountability 
 
The comparative analysis of the rules on fault in England and France in the 
previous section yields two important findings that require an explanation: the 
existence of a different hierarchy of responsibility and of comparable standards 
of liability. In this section, I rationalise the existence of these rules on the basis of 
                                                
112
 Note that there are indications that the courts will in some instances allow a defendant 
publisher to escape liability: see below, n 153. It therefore remains appropriate to label their 
liability as strict, rather than absolute. 
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path dependence. I also justify their persistence on account of notions of 
embeddedness and societal factors. Throughout the section, it will become 
apparent that the concern to promote media accountability has historically been, 
and still is of fundamental importance. This reveals the existence of a shared 
conceptual approach to fault in the English and French laws of defamation. 
 
A. Path dependence in the allocation and standards of liability 
 
Against the historical background of the newspaper revolution,113 the common 
standards of responsibility are best explained on the basis of the theory of path 
dependence. Building on the historical analysis developed by Mitchell in relation 
to the English wrong, I extend his reasoning to the French wrong. I therefore 
argue that the different hierarchies of responsibility in England and France are 
the result of the different practical implementation of a shared underlying 
concern to hold media defendants accountable, which arose in the context of the 
newspaper revolution. 
 
It has been noted that England and France share comparable standards of 
liability. Liability is strict for primary defendants, and fault-based for secondary 
defendants. While the latter standard is in line with the general rules on fault in 
tort and crime, the standards of liability for primary defendants are atypical. 
Indeed, in English tort law objective liability is the norm, with some points of 
strict liability; in French criminal law, according to article 121-3 of the Criminal 
code liability is fault-based, either in the form of intention or negligence. In fact, 
the shared choice of a strict liability standard for primary defendants owes much 
to the historical development of the law of defamation. It can be justified by the 
effect of social pressures at a time when the press was expanding rapidly.  
 
Mitchell argues that in England, the emergence of strict liability for principal 
wrongdoers does not have a historically principled basis.114 He offers a robust 
argument, backed by his analysis of the case law. According to him, while 
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 This expression was borrowed from Mitchell (n 25), 120. 
114
 See more generally: Mitchell (n 25), specifically Chapter 4. 
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malice was originally a constituent element of the law of defamation, it was 
mistakenly abandoned in the case of Jones in relation to words explicitly 
defamatory.115 The ruling was extended in Cassidy116 to words not explicitly 
defamatory. In that 1929 case, Mr Cassidy’s engagement was announced and 
accompanied by a photograph of the said Mr Cassidy and a woman. However, 
Mr Cassidy was already married to another woman and his wife sued the 
publishers, alleging that the statement was defamatory toward her in that it 
insinuated she was living in sin. Though the statement was not prima facie 
defamatory, the newspaper was found liable on the basis of an innuendo, in the 
absence of any fault on the part of the defendant. Cassidy thus marked the final 
step in the ‘transition from fault-based to strict liability’.117 
 
By 1930, defamation had therefore become structurally similar to intentional 
torts; contrary to those, however, it had transitioned to such a structure. Indeed, 
the Lords’ decisions in Jones and Cassidy did not trace the historical 
development of the legal rule in order to uncover past underlying policies which 
could justify its modern development in a given direction. Having examined the 
historical development of the notion of malice in the law of defamation, Mitchell 
notes that there are no such underlying justifications which could justify the 
development of Jones and Cassidy. Rather, he interprets the departure from the 
fault-based standard as a policy choice at a time when the popular press was 
expanding rapidly.118 The behaviour of some newspapers called for a stricter 
standard of liability so as to improve media accountability. 
 
This argument is convincing, particularly so in light of the parallel development 
of the strict liability standard applicable to publishers and editors in France. In 
that jurisdiction, the 19th century was characterised by the swift development of 
the press. Following the proclamation of the rights to freedom of opinion and of 
expression in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the number 
of newspapers flourished. However, no system of responsibility had been 
                                                
115
 See above, IIIA1. 
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 Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929] 2 KB 331, [1929] All ER Rep 117. 
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 Mitchell (n 25), 112. 
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 Ibid, 120. 
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established to regulate the abuses of these rights. The realisation that newspapers 
were committing wrongs that were left unpunished generated a sudden wave of 
repression.119 Subsequently, between the Revolution and the advent of the Third 
Republic in 1870, laws succeeded each other rapidly, subject to the rulers’ will to 
limit the scope of the right to freedom of expression and to contain the pressure 
of public opinion.120 By the time the Constitution of 4 November 1848 was 
enacted, the press was no longer seen as the object and beneficiary of a 
fundamental right; it had become a competitor for power.121 In the words of 
Avenel, 
 
‘À aucun moment de notre histoire, la 
presse n’a joué un plus grand rôle, et 
n’a mieux mérité d’être appelée un 
quatrième pouvoir dans l’État.’122 
At no point in our history did the press 
play a more important role, and 
deserve to be called a fourth branch of 
the state. 
 
In order to contain this power, strict standards of liability were needed so as to 
ensure that media defendants would be held accountable. The focus was 
therefore less on the risk of duels caused by the publication of defamatory 
statements, but rather on the seditious character of the materials printed by 
powerful newspaper defendants.123 Beignier notes that damage caused by press 
wrongs could be severely assessed, 124  to the detriment of the newspaper 
defendant. The choice of no-fault liability, rather than an intermediate negligence 
standard, was justified by two practical difficulties arising in relation to the 
imposition of liability on the publisher or the editor (whose primary liability is 
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explained below). Requiring them to be aware of the entirety of the contents of 
the newspaper was not feasible, and the claimant lacked the means to establish 
the director of publication or editor’s knowledge or negligence. 
 
Mitchell notes that by the time the English cases of Jones and Cassidy 
abandoned the criteria of fault, judges primarily saw libel as part of media rather 
than tort law.125 The strict standard was designed to apply to all those related to 
the press organs, whether they be authors (journalists), publishers or editors. The 
consequence of these cases is that this rule also came to be applied outside the 
newspaper context, in the law of tort, to private individual defendants. It has 
been preserved to this day (although it is arguable that statutory intervention in 
relation to defences has attenuated the strictness of liability).126 
 
Likewise, France shared this idea of a law ‘for’ the press. Indeed, by the 19th 
century the large majority of defendants were newspapers.127 However, this led 
the legislator to introduce in the 1881 law a hierarchy of responsibilities different 
from that found in the English tort of defamation. The author lost his position of 
primary defendant, as had traditionally been the case under the law of 17 May 
1819.128 The logic was that the difficulty in identifying the author of the 
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statement129 and the increased financial guarantees that a newspaper could offer a 
defamed claimant justified that it be liable in lieu of a private defendant.130 
However, the introduction of such a standard was not directed to the whole of the 
newspaper entity. Rather, it is the publisher and the editor who became the 
primary defendants because of their increased responsibilities in the publication 
process;131 the newspaper entity as a whole remained liable only for the payment 
of damages under article 44. 
 
So, in both England and France, historical factors led to the choice of a strict 
standard of liability. Nevertheless, although both sought to regulate the activity 
of newspapers, England and France introduced a distinct hierarchy of 
responsibility. Interestingly, this focus on newspapers and the concern to 
promote media accountability evidences an important change in the law of 
defamation. The law of defamation as it developed in the English royal courts 
was originally focussed on the claimant’s economic losses; in France it focussed 
on the risk of breaches to the public peace caused by duelling.132 The fact that it 
distanced itself from this exclusive focus is due to changes in historical and 
social circumstances: partly because the practice of duelling was dying out,133 
and partly because defamation no longer only involved private parties but also 
entities which were seen as competitors for power. This would, in time, have 
practical consequences. By no longer solely focusing on compensating economic 
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losses and on punishing the (risk of) breaches to the public peace, the law was 
making a first step towards the recognition of other modes of protecting 
reputation. What these are, and their appropriateness in the modern law of 
defamation, will be the subject of further analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
The English and French standards of liability applicable to primary defendants, 
which do not comply with the general rules on fault in tort and crime, were 
shaped by historical circumstances. They can be rationalised on the basis of path 
dependence. However, they illustrate another facet of path dependence than the 
one referred to in Chapter 2 to justify the English and French regulatory features. 
We can again rely on Bell’s explanation of path dependence, but focusing on 
another part of his statement, which was previously omitted. 
 
‘[Path dependence] suggests that established legal approaches to the 
solution of issues will determine the way in which new situations or new 
problems are handled in the present and in the future. Legal development 
is explained … by the effect of social and economic pressures operating 
on the law from the outside at the current time’.134 
 
The choice of a no-fault regime for primary defendants originated in historical 
and social factors. These arguably put pressure on the law to establish a stricter 
regime of liability for newspapers. In that sense, the standards of liability are a 
good example of another facet of the theory of path dependence. 
 
B. A shared approach to fault 
 
It is questionable whether these rules are still appropriate today. But, in both 
England and France, there are indications of resistance to change in relation to 
the standards of liability. There are two reasons for this: not only are the rules on 
fault embedded in the law, but societal factors calling for greater media 
accountability have prevented any possible legal development despite the 
existence of impetuses for change. 
                                                
134
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1. Questionable appropriateness of traditional standards of liability 
 
The current standards of liability are at odds with the general rules on fault in tort 
and criminal law. Whether they are still appropriate in the current legal landscape 
is questionable, both in England and in France. 
 
In England, the principle is that professional responsibility now turns on lack of 
reasonable care; the strict liability standard of defamation is an exception.135 
Indeed, some law firms refer to this practice area as ‘professional negligence’, 
clearly linking both concepts.  
 
In France, the conceptual approach to the law on the press has been corrected by 
doctrinal writers, and is no longer centred on media defendants. Scholars 
emphasise the law’s original spirit and meaning, focusing on the regulation of 
any and all abusive statements meeting the requirement of publicity in article 
23.136 These abuses may be committed through the media, but it is not the only 
way that they can be characterised, and media defendants are no longer the 
primary focus of the law of defamation.137 This suggests that the strict standard 
established at a time when, and based on the fact that, primary defendants were 
in the great majority of cases newspapers is no longer the most appropriate. 
 
Yet, while the English and French rules on fault applicable to primary defendants 
are no longer the most appropriate ones, they are resistant to change. This is both 
because they have become incorporated in the legal infrastructure of defamation, 
and because any potential impetuses for change have succumbed to societal 
factors favouring the maintaining of the status quo.  
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2. Path dependence and embeddedness of concepts 
 
Bell notes that ‘path dependence is connected with notions of embeddedness.’138 
While existing solutions might be inefficient, they persist because they are 
embedded in the legal system. Such a proposition is illustrated by reference to 
the distinction between libel and slander. It is not of ‘great policy 
significance’,139 and in fact lacks a principled basis.140 Yet, it is a distinction that 
survives to this day. Libel and slander constitute two separate torts with distinct 
rules applicable to each. This reasoning is equally applicable to the English and 
French rules on fault applicable to primary defendants. They are at odds with the 
general rules on fault in tort and criminal law; however legal change, if at all 
existent, has been carried out within the existing framework. 
 
In England, the Defamation Act 2013 has failed to positively introduce or 
appropriately recognise a fault-based standard, despite earlier recommendations. 
As early as 2005, Mitchell suggested that the English standard of strict liability 
was no longer appropriate.141 As a tool facilitating the imposition of liability on 
media defendants, it did not comply with the modern trend which is to make 
professional liability turn on the absence of reasonable care.142 It was also 
illogical to apply it to non-media defendants, since it had always been drafted in 
order to impose a stricter standard of liability on newspapers. Therefore, Mitchell 
recommended the introduction, in the constituent elements of the tort, of a fault 
standard applicable to both media and non-media defendants. 143  His 
recommendation is not isolated; various actors of the libel reform movement also 
suggested a shift in the paradigm of liability.144 This alternative approach would 
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have implemented, in England, a duty of care not to defame another person when 
exercising the right to freedom of expression.145 However, the Defamation Act 
2013 has failed to introduce such a fault-based standard of liability. 
 
This is not to say that there has been no relaxation of the strict liability standard 
in defamation. In fact, the two decades preceding the introduction of the 2013 
Act featured a distinct pro-media revision of English defamation law. Mullis and 
Scott summarised the changes to common law and practice as follows: 
 
‘The most obvious changes in libel law have come in relation to the 
curtailment of damages and the development of Reynolds “public 
interest” privilege… The Court of Appeal now exercises considerable 
control over the level of damages, with the effective maximum now just 
over £200k. Moreover, the award of even half that amount is a rare 
occurrence… The development of Reynolds privilege and the related 
“reportage” defence have widened substantially the room for error 
afforded to the media when reporting on matters of public interest… The 
defence of “fair comment” [now honest opinion] has been revitalised and 
is more accommodating of free speech than previously. Certain legal 
entities have been found to lack the capacity to bring a claim for 
defamation, and others treated as effectively libel proof. The enactment 
of the “offer of amends” procedure enables a media defendant that “has 
got something wrong” to apologise, and for so doing to get a substantial 
reduction on the damages that it would otherwise have to pay. The 
“summary disposal” procedure under section 8 of the Defamation Act 
1996 allows a court, in practice usually on application by the defendant, 
to weed out weak cases at a relatively early stage.’146 
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 Descheemaeker notes that the introduction of this standard of liability is not unknown in 
common law jurisdictions. It was proposed as early as 1909 in Australia in the context of the 
Defamation (Amendment) Act 1909 (NSW). See: Descheemaeker, ‘Mapping Defamation 
Defences’ (n 2), 662. 
146
 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Something Rotten in the State of English Libel Law?’ 
(2009) 14 Comms L 173, 174-75. 
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The result of these changes is that a new balance was found between the 
conflicting rights to reputation and to freedom of expression. This new balance is 
more favourable to defamation defendants; yet, when these changes came along, 
the existing standards of liability were not questioned. Rather, they were carried 
out within the pre-existing framework. Thus, the reason for which a negligence 
standard of liability was not introduced is due – at least in part – to the fact that 
there is a habit of dealing with the defamation standard of liability in a particular 
way. In that sense, the rule is embedded in English defamation law.  
 
In France, there has been no change in legal rules despite the fact that their 
current content is problematic. The major problem is that there is a discrepancy 
between the allocation of primary liability, which falls on the publisher, and the 
maintaining of intention coupable as an official constituent element of the 
wrong. This situation necessarily and directly conflicts with the provisions of the 
Criminal code.147  
 
Yet, when considering potential reforms of the law of defamation, the Guinchard 
Commission did not suggest any changes to the rules on fault. 148  One 
conceivable alternative to the current system could have been to change the 
hierarchy of responsibility. On the model of the lois de Serres, the list of 
principal defendants for the offence could be organised as follows: (1) the author, 
(2) the publisher or editor, (3) the printer, (4) the vendor or distributor. This 
regime would reflect the reality of the wrong, in which the author is the primary 
wrongdoer. It would be compatible with the current provisions of the law, 
including the permanence of the requirement of intention coupable, the 
assessment of bonne foi in relation to the author, and the fault requirements of 
article 121-3 of the Criminal code. Finally, it would maintain the strengths of the 
current system. The current system of cascading responsibility was thought to 
present a major advantage in that it remedied identification issues.149 Where the 
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 See above, IIIB2. 
148
 Commission sur la répartition des contentieux présidée par Serge Guinchard, L'Ambition 
Raisonnée d'une Justice Apaisée (La documentation française: Rapports officiels 2008), 290ff 
only recommends the decriminalisation of defamation. 
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 Cons constit decision n°2011-164 QPC of 16 September 2011, Mr Antoine J [Responsibility 
of the ‘producer’ of an online website]. 
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author of an article was anonymous or writing under a pen name, the victim 
could seek the responsibility of the publisher, whose name and coordinates are 
always printed in the newspaper. But no specific identification issues would arise 
under the proposed new system. In cases where the author could not be 
identified, the publisher would automatically become liable on the basis of the 
system of responsabilité en cascade. Further, it would not raise any 
compensation issues in relation to the author’s potential insolvency.150 Indeed, 
article 44 of the 1881 law provides that it is the newspaper owner (rather than the 
actual defendant) who pays compensatory damages awarded on the basis of the 
victim’s action civile. This rule would remain unchanged, and thus the victim’s 
compensatory rights would not be affected. 
 
A second realistic change to the current system could have been to maintain the 
current hierarchy of responsibility but to introduce a no-fault defence in relation 
to publishers. I noted above two practical difficulties which were advanced to 
justify the choice of a no-fault standard for publishers: that of requiring the 
publisher to be aware of the entirety of the contents of the newspaper, and of 
establishing the publisher’s knowledge or negligence. These arguments are easily 
rejected. Together with the help of the workforce that is meant to assist the 
publisher in his supervisory duties, he can be held to have actual or constructive 
knowledge of the contents of the newspaper. Further, the evidential difficulties 
could simply be remedied by reversing the burden of proof (thus requiring the 
publisher to prove he was not negligent), which is in essence what has been done 
in respect of authors in the context of the defence of bonne foi. Besides rejecting 
the reasons which grounded the choice of a strict standard of liability, there are at 
least two positive reasons justifying the introduction of a wide-ranging defence 
based on negligence. The first reason is that such a proposed regime would align 
the rules applicable to newspaper publishers with those applicable to online 
publishers. Currently, under article 93-3 of the law of 29 July 1982 on online 
communications as amended by the law HADOPI 2,151 although the online 
                                                
150
 On the defendant’s insolvency being a concern of the legislator, see Chapter 2: The 
framework of defamation liability in comparative historical perspective, IIIB1. 
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 Art. 27 of the loi n°2009-1311 du 28 octobre 2009 relative à la protection pénale de la 
propriété littéraire et artistique sur internet. 
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publisher is presumed liable for defamatory content, he can rebut the 
presumption by showing that (1) he did not know of the message or that (2) if he 
did know, he acted quickly to remove the message. The second reason is that the 
introduction of a negligence standard as a defence would allow a rationalisation 
of the rules applicable to publishers on the basis of general principles of criminal 
liability. Both elements of the criminal wrong would be characterised: the 
publisher’s actus reus would be the act of publication, and the mens rea would 
indeed be his negligence. And so this would not conflict with article 121-3 of the 
Criminal code. 
 
Besides the Guinchard Commission’s passivity in proposing changes in relation 
to the standards of liability, resistance to legal change has also come from the 
legislator. The law of 9 March 2004 removed the principle according to which 
corporations could only be criminally liable in cases provided for by law or 
regulation. In theory, its effect on defamation should have been to make the 
newspaper corporation liable instead of the publisher. However, this law was 
held not to apply to press wrongs,152 and no specific justification was given. The 
publisher, who represents the corporation, remains the sole primary defendant.  
 
There have been indications that the standards of liability might on occasions be 
relaxed. Thus, in 2001 one case in the Cour de cassation allowed a publisher 
who could prove that it was impossible for him to read the article containing the 
defamatory statement to escape liability.153 However, the contrast between this 
willingness to make the standards of liability less stringent and the French 
legislator’s reluctance to change the system established in the law on the press is 
illustrative of the fact that the rules on fault are embedded in the law of 
defamation. 
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 Art. 43-1 of the law of 29 July 1881. On the incoherence of this rule with those applicable to 
non-public defamation and injures, for which corporations can be made liable, see: Emmanuel 
Dreyer, Responsabilités civile et pénale des médias, 795. 
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 Agathe Lepage, ‘Vigilance d'un Directeur de Publication Prise en Défaut’ (2002) 2002(3) 
CCE comm. 48. Note, however, that this is an isolated case in the French Supreme Court. 
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According to Bell, there exist two levels of embeddedness. One is superficial, 
and only involves a special rule which expresses a habit of dealing with an issue 
in a particular way. The other one is deep; it involves not only a customary way 
of addressing an issue but also signs of interconnectedness to other parts of the 
law.154 The degree of embeddedness is directly correlated to the facility in 
bringing legal change. When a rule is deeply embedded, change is difficult 
because it also involves changing institutional arrangements.  
 
No specific structural or organisational aspects of the system underpin the 
English and French rules on fault. In theory therefore, because they are not 
deeply embedded, change should be easier to bring about (though it may need to 
be prompted by an external impetus).155 Yet, despite the presence of impetuses 
for change, the rules on fault have resisted reform in both England and France. 
What this suggests is that there exist other factors, external to the law itself, 
which have prevented legal change. 
 
3. Media regulation and greater media accountability 
 
In both England and France, the persistence of the traditional standards of 
liability must be read against the perceived need to increase the accountability of 
media defendants. The result of the renewed relevance of the concern to hold 
media defendants accountable is the emergence of a shared conceptual approach 
to the rules on fault in England and France. 
 
In England, the phone hacking scandal of the past decades revived a debate about 
privacy and media freedom which led the government to establish inquiry led by 
Lord Justice Leveson into the culture, practices, and ethics of the press.156 In its 
executive summary, the Report concluded that: 
 
‘The press is given significant and special rights in this country… With 
these rights, however, come responsibilities to the public interest… In 
                                                
154
 Bell (n 1), 805. 
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 Ibid, 795.  
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 Brian Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (TSO 2012). 
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short, to honour the very principles proclaimed and articulated by the 
industry itself (and to a large degree reflected in the Editors’ Code of 
Practice). The evidence placed before the Inquiry has demonstrated, 
beyond any doubt, that there have been far too many occasions over the 
last decade and more… when these responsibilities, on which the public 
so heavily rely, have simply been ignored… This has caused real 
hardship… This is not just the famous but ordinary members of the 
public, caught up in events… far larger than they could cope with but 
made much, much worse by press behaviour that, at times, can only be 
described as outrageous.’157 
 
Defamation reform as enacted in the 2013 Act must be read against this 
background. The reform movement was prompted by a public debate which 
characterised the law of defamation as it then stood as unduly restrictive of 
freedom of expression.158 But the timing of this debate coincided with the 
Leveson inquiry, which originated in the unethical practices of some parts of the 
press. So the reason for which a negligence standard of liability was not 
introduced in the 2013 Act is not only due to the fact that there is a habit of 
dealing with the defamation standard of liability in a particular way. It is also due 
to the societal context in which reform was carried out, and which made it 
impossible to invert the paradigm of liability. 
 
By contrast in France, the press had traditionally been reluctant to publish stories 
on the private lives of individuals. This is famously attested by the refusal to 
publish materials relating to President Mitterrand’s extramarital affairs.159 But 
the Leveson inquiry Report noted that: 
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‘Increasingly French newspapers and, particularly, celebrity gossip 
magazines are challenging this traditional reluctance to publish content 
that may be regarded as private and such stories are increasingly the norm 
in France. The recent publication of the photographs of the Duchess of 
Cambridge may be part of this trend.’160 
 
Indeed, the change in trends is perhaps most evident when considering the media 
coverage offered to President Hollande’s affair with famous French actress Julie 
Gayet in 2014. The media were faced with a factual situation resembling that 
described above in relation to President Mitterrand. Yet, their attitudes were 
completely different, and the coverage of the affair was extensive.161 
 
It is important to keep this change in the French press culture in mind when 
considering the French system of press regulation. Contrary to most countries, 
France does not have a Press Council. Media regulation results from both 
informal systems of self-regulation and the application of the existing legal 
provisions regulating the press.162 These provisions are primarily found in the 
law of 29 July 1881 and article 9 of the Civil code, which protects an 
individual’s right to privacy. So any impetus for legal change must originate in 
the modification of these provisions. I explained above that no such change has 
happened in the context of the 1881 law. The possibility to relax the strict 
liability standard is presumably frustrated due to the fact that unethical practices 
are becoming more and more common. This is not to say that the persistence of 
the inappropriate French standards of liability owes exclusively to this change in 
press culture. It is difficult to make this assertion because, contrary to the English 
situation, there is no direct correspondence in the timings of (proposed) legal 
change and the evolution of press culture. But it is undoubtedly a factor which, in 
addition to the embeddedness of the current standards, has contributed to a lack 
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of discussion on this subject. The result is that the current standards of liability, 
despite being inappropriate, are ossifying in the law on the press. 
 
Thus, the concern to promote media accountability has recently been renewed. 
At the time of the newspaper revolution, it justified in both jurisdictions the 
introduction of strict liability standards for primary wrongdoers. It also explains 
why recent changes to the rules on fault, if at all existent, had to be implemented 
within the pre-existing frameworks of liability. This reveals an enduring shared 
conceptual approach to the rules on fault in England and France, which 




This chapter has sought to shed light on the current rules on fault in the English 
and French laws of defamation, which are at odds with the most common fault 
standards in tort and criminal law. 
 
One obvious conclusion of the preceding analysis is that England and France’s 
regulatory features have had a limited influence on their standards of liability. 
Indeed, a comparison reflecting each system’s distinct hierarchy of responsibility 
suggests that they implement comparable standards of liability in order to 
regulate the activities of the media. The explanation for this is found in the 
theory of path dependence: social circumstances called for the implementation of 
a strict standard of liability. However, the outcome of the social pressures 
operating on the law from the outside differed. Each system found a different 
balance between the responsibility of the individual wrongdoer and the financial 
guarantees sought to secure compensation for the claimant. These models of 
liability are no longer the most appropriate ones. Yet, because the rules are 
embedded in the English and French systems, and because the societal context 
calls for greater media accountability, they have resisted legal change.  
 
Overall, the analysis of the rules on fault supports the argument formulated in the 
Introduction, that despite substantive differences owing to their different 
regulatory features, England and France adopt a shared conceptual approach to 
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defamation. Indeed, they implement comparable standards of liability and feature 





A SIMILAR DOCTRINE OF TRUTH ACROSS THE TORTIOUS AND 




We saw in the previous chapter that historical factors led to a similar model of 
liability being established in England and France. Despite substantive 
differences, a clear pattern was identified in each jurisdiction’s rules on fault. 
This finding supports the proposition formulated in the Introduction, that despite 
their distinct regulatory features the English and the French laws of defamation 
possess common features which reveal the existence of a shared conceptual 
approach. 
 
The consideration of the defence of truth in the law of defamation is of 
paramount importance to determine whether or not England and France have a 
similar conception of the wrong. Indeed, the role of truth is directly linked to the 
nature of the regulation (tortious or criminal). In tort, the purpose is to 
compensate the claimant for his lost reputation. A recognised public policy 
principle considers the exposure of truth as the paramount interest, superior to 
that of protecting reputation. Consequently, liability only arises in relation to the 
publication of statements which cannot be proved to be true. On the other hand, 
it will be argued that in criminal law the purpose is to preserve the social peace. 
Punishment1 is justified by the fact that the published statement disrupts the 
public order; consequently, truth is an irrelevant consideration and is not 
recognised as a defence. Therefore, at first sight, the nature of the wrong and the 
consequent purpose of the regulation dictate a distinct treatment of the notion of 
truth in each jurisdiction. Contrary to this, the present chapter establishes that 
there has been a gradual convergence in the conceptualisation of truth, to the 
point that its treatment has become practically analogous in England and France. 
                                                
1
 On the proposition that tort primarily compensates the claimant and criminal law primarily 
punishes the defendant, see Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an 
overview and introduction to the tort/crime distinction, VE. 
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First, I give an overview of the historical development of the defence of truth in 
the two legal systems, as a foundation for the analysis in the following sections. 
Second, I analyse the fading link between the nature of the regulation (tortious or 
criminal) and the substantive rules on truth. Finally, I positively identify a similar 
doctrine of truth, exemplified by a shared value system and a common policy of 
promoting social cohesion. 
 
II. The historical evolution of the defence of truth 
 
It is impossible to understand the extent to which the English and the French 
rules on truth have grown similar without retracing their development. The 
present section therefore considers the historical evolution of the role of truth in 
the English and French laws, in the context of their tortious and criminal wrongs 
of defamation. This will provide the foundations for the subsequent sections, 
which analyse the implications of these developments.  
 
The treatment of truth in the English civil law of defamation has already been the 
subject of extensive analysis.2 It will therefore be dealt with succinctly, and more 
attention will be paid to the changes introduced by the Defamation Act 2013 and 
to its treatment in the (now abolished) law of criminal libel. There exist a few 
surveys of the French history of the principle, but their analysis is limited to 
certain periods of time.3 The following analysis is more extensive: it considers 
the origins of the defence before 1881 and is informed by recent case law 
developments. 
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 See: Eric Descheemaeker, ‘"Veritas Non Est Defamatio?" Truth as a Defence in the Law of 
Defamation’ (2011) 31 LS 1. 
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2009), 785ff; Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Truth and Truthfulness in the Law of Defamation’ in Anne-
Sophie Hulin et al (eds), Les Apparences en Droit Civil (Yvon Blais 2015). Both confine their 
analysis to the law of 29 July 1881, and for reasons of timing they do not account for the more 
recent developments. 
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A. English law 
 
English law traditionally distinguished the treatment of truth in the civil and 
criminal laws of defamation. Contrary to its criminal counterpart, the civil wrong 
has always recognised an absolute defence of truth to defamation claims. 
 
1. The distinct treatment of truth in the tortious and criminal wrongs 
 
For the purposes of the tort of defamation, the truth of the defamatory statement 
is a complete defence. This rule is well established. It was already invoked in 
slander cases in the early 16th century.4 By the beginning of the 19th century, the 
proposition that the truth of the charge also acted as a complete defence in libel 
cases was widely accepted. Stated in Lord Holt’s Law of Libel in 1812,5 for a 
long time it was officially grounded in the 1829 case of M’Pherson v Daniels.6 
This principle was maintained throughout the 20th century legislative changes, 
although the defence was put on a statutory basis (to encourage a more liberal 
interpretation)7 and its name was changed (from justification to truth).8 
 
According to the Explanatory Notes to the Defamation Act 2013, the recasting of 
the defence of truth ‘is intended broadly to reflect the current law while 
simplifying and clarifying certain elements.’9 Section 2(1) restates the law as 
established in the case of Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd,10 and provides 
that ‘[i]t is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that 
the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially true.’ 
                                                
4
 Richard H Helmholz (ed) Select Cases on Defamation to 1600, vol 101 (Selden Society 1985), 
lxxii; in fact the defence was already invoked in 1521: Reymond v Lord Fitzwauter 6 October 
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6
 M'Pherson v Daniels (1829) 10 B & C 263, (1829) 109 ER 448. 
7
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Defamation Act 1952, which introduced a concept of partial justification. 
8
 S. 2 of the Defamation Act 2013. 
9
 Explanatory notes to the Defamation Act 2013, [13]. 
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 Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, [2003] EMLR 218. 
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The rest of the section abolishes the old defence of justification,11 and provides a 
new version of the rule found in section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952 in relation 
to statements which convey more than one imputation. Presumably, the intention 
of Parliament was essentially to restate the existing law,12 so the changes are 
minor. Changes worth noting relate to the terminology used13 and to pleading 
practice, with the determination of meaning now being established as a 
preliminary issue.14 
 
By contrast, criminal libel did not originally recognise a defence of truth. In the 
case de libellis famosis, which formally established the offence of criminal libel, 
Coke remarked that ‘it is not material whether the libel be true’.15 This rule was 
preserved when the common law courts inherited the Star Chamber’s jurisdiction 
in criminal libel.16 It was in fact one of the practical elements of the criminal 
offence that the newspapers contested and which prompted the 19th century 
legislative changes. This resulted in the enactment of section 6 of the Libel Act 
1843, according to which: 
 
‘The truth of the matters charged may be inquired into, but shall not 
amount to a defence, unless it was for the public benefit that the said 
matters charged should be published’. 
 
The basic principle of the criminal law of defamation therefore became that the 
truth of the statement could provide a defence only if it was published for the 
benefit of the community. This rule remained valid until the common law 
offence of criminal libel was abolished by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
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 S. 2(4) of the Defamation Act 2013. 
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 See: Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Worth the Candle? The Government's Draft 
Defamation Bill’ (2011) 3 JML 1, 7; Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Lord Lester's 
Defamation Bill 2010: a Distorted View of the Public Interest?’ (2011) 16 Comms L 6, 12; 
Richard Parkes et al, Gatley on Libel and Slander (Sweet & Maxwell 2013), 11.2. 
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Parkes et al (n 12), 11.2. 
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 See, for instance: Rufus v Elliott [2015] EWHC 807. 
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 De Libellis Famosis (1606) 5 Co Rep125a, 125b, 77 ER 250, 251. 
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 Law Commission, Working Paper No. 84, Criminal Libel (1982), 2.7. 
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Repeated efforts to extend this principle to civil defamation cases were 
unsuccessful. The Report of the Select Committee preparing the 1843 Act had 
recommended the extension of the rule that truth alone is not a defence to the 
civil law of defamation.17 Although the principle was incorporated in the draft 
Bill, the House of Commons rejected it.18 This suggestion was revived in the 20th 
century. An effort was made to convince the Porter Committee to make a 
recommendation that this rule be adopted in respect of the tort of defamation. 
However, the Committee again rejected it.19 It considered that such a rule would 
impose an undue burden on the press by requiring it to guess whether or not a 
given subject was, in fact, in the public interest.20 In 1975, the Faulks Committee 
also rejected this rule by arguing that the notion of public interest was too vague, 
and that it would be wrong to allow a defendant to benefit from his own 
wrongdoing.21 
 
2. The modern defence: particulars of the pleadings 
 
In direct line with the historical approach to the role of truth in civil defamation 
cases, the accepted rule in the tort of defamation is that truth justifies in and of 
itself. There exists one notable exception to this principle: under section 8(5) of 
the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, a publication referring to a spent 
conviction will not benefit from the defence of truth when actuated by malice.22 
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 Porter Committee, Report of the Committee on the Law of Defamation (Cmd 7536, 1948), ss. 
74-78. The Committee’s reasoning was that it would make the authors’ and journalists’ work 
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extended analysis of Leyman v Latimer can be found in Descheemaeker, ‘Veritas non est 
defamatio’ (n 2), 9 (specially fn 47). 
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The modern approach to a plea of truth has been usefully summed up in the case 
of Karpov v Browder:23 
 
‘(1) Defamatory allegations of fact are presumed to be false: the 
“Presumption of Falsity.” 
… 
(4) What matters is that the substance or sting of the libel is proved. 
Inaccuracies, which do not materially affect the seriousness of the charge 
need not be justified. This common law principle is expressly recognised 
by the words “substantially true” in the new statutory defence of Truth set 
out in s.2(1) of the Defamation Act 2013.’24 
 
The basic principle is therefore that the burden of proof is on the defendant to 
prove the truth of the defamatory sting of the publication, rather than the literal 
truth of every fact.25 The defence can only succeed where the meaning proved to 
be true is not materially less serious than the one that the words would 
reasonably have been held to bear.26 Finally, if the defendant can only prove that 
part but not all of what he said was substantially true, under the rules of partial 
justification it must be considered whether the part of the defamatory statement 
which is not shown to be substantially true has or would be likely to cause 
serious harm.27  
 
If the defamatory statement was merely repeated, attributing it to another person 
cannot allow the defendant to escape liability.28 Should the defence of truth fail, 
the defendant may try to avail an alternative defence based on the privileged 
character of the statement. The classical defence relied on is that of qualified 
privilege, whether based on statutory provisions29 or on the historical common 
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law defence. The latter defence focuses on the circumstances in which the 
information was disclosed (rather than on the content of the information, as is the 
case for the truth defence) and rests on a duty/interest analysis. Lord Atkinson 
thus defined privileged occasions in Adam v Ward30 as occasions 
 
‘Where the person who makes the communication has an interest or a 
duty, legal, social or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, 
and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty 
to receive it. This reciprocity is essential.’31 
 
The defence has been expanded by section 7 of the Defamation Act 2013 to 
cover reports of matters in which the public has a legitimate interest. As will be 
seen below, this balancing approach finds an echo in the way in which the 
defence of truth would be approached if Lord Steyn’s rights compliant 
‘balancing test’ were to be adopted in the defamation context.32 
 
B. French law 
 
Contrary to English law, much has changed in France since a very limited 
defence of truth (commonly labelled exceptio veritatis) was first recognised in 
the lois de Serres. An historical overview indicates a gradual acceptance, and 
widening of the scope, of the truth defence in defamation cases. 
 
1. The traditional approach: irrelevance of truth 
 
Mirroring the Roman law of iniuria, the ancien droit did not ordinarily recognise 
a defence of truth.33 In the absence of any reference to the distinction between 
civil and criminal defamation, it is arguable that this rule applied to both the civil 
                                                
30
 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309, [1916-17] All ER Rep 157. 
31
 Ibid, 334. 
32
 See below, IVB3. 
33
 Dareau seems to recognise a single exception, of limited scope: the truth of the statement 
would provide a complete defence where the defamatory statement was made verbis and 
consisted in a defence to an earlier provocative statement. See: François Dareau, Traité des 
Injures dans l'Ordre Judiciaire: Ouvrage qui Renferme Particulièrement la Jurisprudence du 
Petit-Criminel (Prault père 1775), 458. 
 181 
and the criminal wrong. The principle that the truth of the statement was 
irrelevant to the defendant’s liability was preserved in the 19th century, when the 
wrong of defamation was first recognised and given a tailored regulation in the 
1819 lois de Serres.  
 
However, this principle was not absolute. It was accepted that in some limited 
circumstances, the public interest in knowing the truth outweighed the need to 
protect an individual’s reputation. Significantly, in contrast with its English 
counterpart, the French legislator did not admit that truth would act as a defence 
in any situation in which a public interest was identified. Rather, it identified two 
instances where this public interest would be recognised. First, as established in 
the law of 17 May 1819, the defence of truth was allowed in relation to 
statements directed at public or quasi-public officials in the exercise of their 
functions.34 Indeed, in the interest of promoting a democratic society, it was 
necessary to be free to criticise public officials in the exercise of their function 
and to denounce state malfunctions.35 Second, the law of 29 July 1881 broadened 
the scope of the exceptio veritatis to cover publications concerning directors or 
managers of companies having recourse to public offering.36 Discussions on 
company managers’ activities were felt to be crucial because of the existence of 
repeated financial scandals in 19th century France.37 Overall, the French law of 
defamation thus adopted a more restrictive approach to the notion of public 
interest than its English counterpart.  
 
2. Incremental development: the recognition of, and changing rules on 
truth 
 
A major change to the regulation of the exceptio veritatis came in 1944, at a time 
when it was feared that some individuals may be found criminally liable in 
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defamation for truthfully denouncing acts of collaborations with the Nazi 
occupier.38 The ordinance of 6 May 194439 consequently laid down the principle 
that the defence of truth would be available in all defamation cases, except in the 
specific circumstances listed in article 35, alinéa 3 of the law on the press. These 
circumstances covered statements that (a) related to the claimant’s private life; 
(b) referred to facts which were over ten years old; or (c) had been pardoned, had 
been the subject of a judicial revision or were covered by the rules on 
limitations.40 
 
In recent years, however, two decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel have 
deemed paragraphs b) and c) of article 35, alinéa 3 to be unconstitutional. The 
grounds for challenging the provisions of the law of 1881 were articles 11 and 16 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. These provisions 
guarantee, respectively, the right to freedom of expression and the right to a fair 
trial and to the respect of the rights of the defence. In both cases, the Conseil 
constitutionnel considered that the wording of the 1881 law violated these 
provisions. Indeed, ‘due to [their] general and absolute nature’, alinéas 3 b) and 
c) were held to violate freedom of expression ‘in a manner that is not 
proportionate with the goal pursued.’41 They have therefore been abolished. 
 
3. The modern defence 
 
Nowadays, the truth of the statement is therefore a complete defence in all 
defamation cases unless the statement relates to the claimant’s private life. 
Defamatory statements are presumed false, and it is for the defendant to prove 
that they were true to escape liability.42 The formal rules regulating the adducing 
of evidence in a formal plea of truth are contained in articles 55 and 56 of the law 
of 29 July 1881, whose complexity has been described as ‘a route filled with 
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pitfalls.’43 Article 55 requires the defendant to formally inform the other parties 
of his intention to prove the truth of his allegations, and to share the evidence 
that he will use for this purpose. Article 56 sets out similar requirements for the 
responding party. Strict formal requirements must be complied with in relation to 
the timeframe and content of the production of evidence.44 Failure to respect 
these formal rules results in the defence failing. The major difference with the 
English pleading is that the defendant must prove the complete and absolute truth 
of the statement;45 the standard is therefore more stringent than in English law, 
where truth must be substantial rather than literal, and can be partial. But as is the 
case in English law, in cases where the defendant who reported a defamatory 
statement cannot avail the exceptio veritatis, other defences based on privilege 
may be relied on to evade liability.46 
 
On a cursory view, the great differences in the rules on truth are not found 
between the two legal systems (England and France), but rather between two 
areas of law (tort and crime). Indeed, it is accepted in tort that truth justifies per 
se. On the other hand, in criminal law both jurisdictions traditionally required an 
added element of public benefit, although the scope of this public benefit differed 
in England and France. The implications of these provisional findings are set out 
below. 
 
III. The declining influence of the regulatory features on the 
conceptualisation of truth 
 
In this section I argue that although there originally existed a link between the 
nature of the regulation and the rules on truth, this link is fading. I start by 
considering how the nature of the regulation dictated different rules on truth in 
each jurisdiction. I then analyse recent developments in the French law of 
defamation and argue that they have introduced a shift in the paradigm of 
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liability. As a consequence, both English and French law can now be said to 
protect reputation against false statements. 
 
A. The original link between the nature of the regulation and the 
content of the rules 
 
The original approaches to the role of truth in tort and crime can be rationalised 
very clearly if we consider the suggestion that torts are private wrongs and 
crimes are public wrongs.47 Indeed, the different goals pursued by tort and crime 
dictate a distinct treatment of truth in each area of law. 
 
The tort of defamation is designed to protect an individual’s right in his 
reputation. It is, in itself, a limit placed on the right to freedom of expression to 
protect a private interest. The difficulty consists in scoping the wrong so as to 
appropriately reflect the importance of the right to freedom of expression. The 
main device for balancing these competing interests is found in defamation 
defences. 
 
As was seen above, truth is one such defence. It is usually justified by reference 
to the principle stated in M’Pherson v Daniels, according to which ‘the law will 
not permit a man to recover damages in respect of an injury to a character which 
he either does not, or ought not, to possess.’48 But Tugendhat and Christie note 
that this does not justify refusing all defamation claimants a remedy because the 
information about them is true. Indeed, they point out that not all true 
information is relevant to an individual’s reputation. For instance, true facts 
about a person’s private life may not be relevant, especially if his reputation is 
based on his public acts.49  
                                                
47
 See Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to 
the tort/crime distinction, VA. 
48
 M’Pherson v Daniels (n 6), 451 (per Littledale J). 
49
 Michael Tugendhat and Iain Christie, The Law of Privacy and the Media (OUP 2011), 7.33. 
They illustrate their reasoning by reference to Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 
581, where a Princess complained about an allegation that she had been raped. This was deemed 
defamatory in that it led people to shun, avoid or ridicule her; but it did not impute any 




Despite this, truth in the tortious wrong of defamation remains an absolute 
defence. This is because the public interest in discovering and knowing the truth 
has historically underlined the right to freedom of expression. Truth is 
alternatively ‘regarded as an autonomous and fundamental good, or its value may 
be supported by utilitarian considerations concerning progress and the 
development of society’.50 Consequently, while the protection of one’s private 
interest in reputation is a valid limit to the right to freedom of expression, the 
value of truth justifies that its exposure be considered the paramount interest.51 
 
By contrast, the issue of truth or falsity of the defamatory statement was largely 
irrelevant to the criminal law of defamation. The criminalisation of defamation 
was originally grounded in the harmful consequences that a defamatory 
statement could have for the public: namely, the disruptions to the public peace. 
In England, the development of criminal libel by the court of Star Chamber 
aimed at punishing various instances of libel, including those ‘which were likely 
to cause private disorder or a breach of the peace.’52 The hope was that the legal 
remedy would be more appealing to a claimant than a challenge to fight.53 
Similarly in France, the wrongful interference with the victim’s honour and 
consideration, which characterises the French wrong of defamation, had harmful 
consequences on the claimant’s social standing.54 This type of injury commonly 
provoked duels, over the course of which the defamed person tried to restore his 
reputation.55 
 
Significantly, the interests protected by the criminal wrong therefore differed from 
those protected by the tortious wrong, as set out in the previous sub-section. The 
focus was not on the injury to the claimant, but rather on the potentially harmful 
                                                                                                                               
person’s private and personal life’ should be relevant – ‘is it relevant, for example, to a prominent 
person’s reputation that he has HIV or AIDS?’ (Tugendhat and Christie, 7.34). 
50
 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP 2005), 7. 
51
 Tugendhat and Christie (n 49), 7.34. 
52
 Working Paper No. 84, Criminal Libel (n 16), 2.5. 
53
 W S Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 5 (3rd edn, Methuen 1945), 210. 
54
 Michèle-Laure Rassat, Droit Pénal Spécial (6th edn, Dalloz 2011), 515; Beignier et al (n 3), 
785. 
55
 Henri Morel, ‘La Fin du Duel Judiciaire en France et la Naissance du Point d'Honneur’ (1964) 
19 RHD 574. 
 186 
consequences for the public order. So, in that context, the paramount interest was 
the preservation of the public peace rather than the exposure of the truth. 
Consequently, the issue of falsity was generally disregarded by the criminal law of 
defamation. This justifies the original attitude of the English and French legislators 
to the defence of truth: treating it as an exception kept within strict bounds. 
 
On a cursory view, there are great differences between England and France on 
the issue of the role of truth. In the English tort of defamation, the paramount 
importance of truth justifies treating it as an absolute defence. On the other hand, 
in the French criminal wrong of defamation the traditional (and, I argue below, 
out-dated) understanding is that due to the action’s focus on preserving the 
public peace, the truth or falsity of the statement is largely irrelevant. 
 
B. The modern change in the French paradigm: a shared focus on 
protecting reputation against false statements 
 
The initial view outlined above is deceptive. On closer analysis, it appears that 
the two systems are becoming rather more similar than was originally the case. 
Indeed, recent developments in the French law of defamation illustrate a 
paradigmatic change in the rules on truth, which is bringing the French approach 
to truth closer to the English one. 
 
1. From the exception to the principle 
 
We have seen that for a long time the truth of the statement did not prevent 
liability from arising in the French law of defamation, except in limited 
circumstances. The indifference to the truth or falsity of the statement was 
addressed in the parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of the lois de 
Serres. These laws were the first to establish a wrong of defamation, which 
replaced the wrong of calumny that had existed until then in the 1810 Criminal 
code.56 The core of the distinction between defamation and calumny was based 
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on the (ir)relevance of the truth or falsity of the disputed statement, as is evident 
in the following abstract of the parliamentary debates: 
 
‘Un seul point dans ce chapitre nous 
paraît exiger quelques observations 
particulières, c’est la substitution du mot 
diffamation au mot calomnie jusqu’ici 
employé par nos lois. Les motifs qui nous 
y ont déterminé sont simples. Le terme de 
calomnie, dans son sens vulgaire, qu’il 
est impossible d’effacer dans l’esprit des 
hommes, emporte avec soi l’idée de la 
fausseté des faits imputés. Une 
publication n’est donc réellement 
calomnieuse que lorsque les faits qu’elle 
contient sont faux. Cependant tous les 
législateurs ont senti qu’il est impossible 
d’autoriser tout individu à publier, sur le 
compte d’un autre, des faits dont la 
publication causerait à ce dernier un 
dommage réel, fussent-ils d’ailleurs 
vrais… La substitution du mot 
diffamation au mot calomnie fait 
disparaître, du moins en partie, cet 
embarras. La diffamation n’implique pas 
nécessairement la fausseté des faits, elle 
dénote, d’une part, l’intention de nuire, 
de l’autre, le dommage causé!’57 
There is only one point in this chapter 
which requires specific commentary: it 
is the substitution of the word 
defamation to the word calumny which 
was traditionally used in the law. The 
reasons dictating this choice are simple. 
The term of calumny, in its ordinary 
sense that is impossible to erase from the 
minds of men, carries with it the idea of 
falsity of the facts imputed. A 
publication is only really a calumny 
when the facts it contains are false. 
However, all the legislators have felt that 
it is impossible to authorise every 
individual to publish facts – whether or 
not true – relating to another person and 
whose publication could cause that 
person real damage… The substitution 
of the word defamation to the word 
calumny is remedying this issue, at least 
partly. Defamation does not necessarily 
imply the falsity of facts; it indicates on 
the one hand malicious intent, and on the 
other the damage caused! 
 
There are nonetheless indications of a paradigmatic change in the attitude of the 
French legislator to the exceptio veritatis. The 1944 ordinance and the 
subsequent domestic cases that considered its implementation and the scope of 
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the exceptio veritatis manifest a changing attitude towards the truth defence. The 
refusal of a defence of truth traditionally dominated the French law of 
defamation, except in the two limited circumstances in which a public interest in 
publishing the statement was recognised. Contrary to this, the dual effect of the 
ordinance of 6 May 1944 and of recent developments in the French legal 
landscape was to establish a liberal approach, whereby the availability of the 
truth defence is no longer an exception but is the principle.  
 
In the wake of the enactment of the ordinance it was suggested that the broad 
truth defence should only apply to the specific instances of defamation regulated 
by articles 30 and 31 of the 1881 law, which concern public officials. This is a 
convincing suggestion, which would have been in line with the original spirit of 
the 1881 law. Indeed, defamatory publications are more likely to serve some 
public interest in the context of articles 30 and 31 (which specifically regulate the 
publication of defamatory statements relating to the defamed person’s public 
duties)58 than in the context of article 29 (which regulates the publication of 
statements that are defamatory of a private individual). Thus, because it is more 
likely than not that a publication concerning a public institution or public official 
will be in the public interest, it would have been logical to reverse the rules only 
in the limited context of articles 30 and 31. There was no such reason which 
justified the introduction of a liberal approach to truth in the context of article 29.  
 
Contrary to this suggestion, the courts adopted a broad interpretation of the rules 
contained in the ordinance. The Cour de cassation thus considered that the 
exceptio veritatis should apply to all instances of defamation, including those 
involving private individuals. 59  Further, the Conseil constitutionnel’s recent 
decisions have significantly reduced the number of exceptions to the principle 
that a defendant will not be liable for publishing a true defamatory statement.60 
The one remaining exception is found in article 35, alinéa 3 a) of the 1881 law, 
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according to which truth is not a permissible defence where the words 
complained of relate to the defamed individual’s private life.  
 
In this context, the concept of ‘private life’ is not aligned with either the 
Strasbourg conception of private life in article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) or its domestic expression in article 9 of the French Civil 
code, which are understood to cover: 
 
‘[T]he right to privacy, the right to live, as far as one wishes, protected 
from publicity… the right to establish and to develop relationships with 
other human beings, especially in the emotional field for the development 
and fulfilment of one’s own personality.’61 
 
The reason for this is historical. In the original version of the law on the press, 
the limited permissibility of the defence of truth was designed to promote 
transparency in governmental decisions and accountability. There were two 
situations in which a public interest was held to exist.62 All remaining matters 
were held, by comparison, to be ‘private’.  
 
When the ordinance of 1944 modified the truth defence, it did not change the 
definition of private matters. What the ordinance did do was to reverse the 
paradigm of the exceptio veritatis. It established a presumption that anything 
published is in the public interest so that the defendant did not have to positively 
prove the social utility of the publication. The result is that the ordinance cannot 
be said to have introduced an absolute defence of truth, subject to one exception. 
Indeed, despite the changes it brought to the exceptio veritatis, after the 
enactment of the ordinance the standard interpretation of the notion of ‘private 
life’ remains that designating publications ‘not in the public interest’. In that 
sense, the availability of the defence of truth is still conditional on the 
publication’s social utility.  
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For the purposes of the (post-1944) 1881 law, the publication’s public interest is 
characterised in relation to publications which have to do with the political, 
economic or social environment, or which interfere with the public’s material or 
moral interests and generates a collective reaction of approval or disapproval. 
The definition of private life is residual. Any matters that do not correspond to 
these definitions fall within the scope of one’s private life.63 This distinct 
understanding of ‘private life’ has led one author to argue that the right to prove 
the truth of the defamatory statements remains an exception.64  
 
However, such 1881-specific conception of ‘private life’ is gradually 
disappearing. French law has come to positively recognise a right to privacy 
under article 9 of the Civil code, reflecting the new ‘private sphere’ that the law 
considers ought to be protected. Some authors predict that with the rise in 
defamation litigation involving private individuals, the concept of private life in 
the law of 1881 will come to accept that founded on article 9 of the Civil code,65 
which is largely aligned with the one in article 8 ECHR. This gradual evolution 
of the notion of private life would account for societal and legal changes. 
Breaches of the peace are no longer a high risk as they were in the 19th and early 
20th century.66 So there is no longer any reason to limit the defence of truth 
through the (post-1944) 1881-specific concept of ‘private life’, which constitutes 
an indirect incorporation of a public interest test to the admissibility of the 
defence of truth based on the need to protect the public peace. In fact, more 
recent pieces of scholarship have come to positively recognise truth as an 
absolute defence.67 This suggests that the 1881 law is evolving to recognise this 
modern conception of ‘private life’. Therefore, the notion of private life can no 
longer be assimilated to ‘not in the public interest’.  
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The consequence of this incremental change in the definition of ‘private life’ is 
that the availability of the defence of truth is no longer conditional on the 
publication’s social utility. Thus, despite the remaining exception in article 35, 
alinéa 3 a) the right to prove the truth of the defamatory statement to escape 
liability must therefore be seen as the principle rather than the exception. The 
consequence is that the law is largely returning to the regulation of calumny, in 
other words, of false statements.68 
 
2. A change of perspective: moving away from breaches of the public 
peace 
 
It has thus been shown through recent developments that defamation law has 
moved away from its original disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. A 
related consequence of these developments is a change of perspective. Less 
emphasis is placed on the risk of breach of the public peace. It is not clear, 
however, what the emphasis has shifted towards. 
 
According to Mayaud, the inversion of the paradigm in relation to truth in the 
1944 ordinance means that the focus has shifted from the wrong committed 
against an individual towards a quest for truth. From this quest emerges a ‘right 
to know’,69 labelled as such in the context of defamation claims by the Cour de 
cassation in its 2010 annual report.70  
 
While this argument is compelling, Mayaud does not positively identify a shift 
away from the focus on the wrong committed against a private individual. He 
simply deduces it from the acceptance that inasmuch as the statement was true 
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the defendant will not liable for having caused the damage. Building on this 
remark, another interpretation may be proposed. Since it is not possible to 
positively identify a shift away from the wrong committed against a private 
individual, it is arguable that there has in fact been no such shift. Instead, the 
change of focus relates to the justifications for protecting reputation. Owing to 
societal changes, breaches of the public peace are no longer a threat. Therefore, 
the law of defamation no longer protects the claimant’s reputation because of the 
potential public disorder that any interference might cause. It has come to protect 
the claimant’s reputation because of the intrinsic value of reputation for the 
individual. 
 
Seen through this new lens, the French wrong of defamation acquires a distinctly 
private (tortious) character. We have seen above that contrary to criminal 
defamation, in the tortious wrong the interest in protecting reputation may give 
way to the public interest in exposing the truth. So the increase in the scope of 
the truth defence is not due to the existence of a ‘quest for truth’ but rather to the 
privatisation of the criminal wrong of defamation. In that sense, there is a clear 
convergence of the French law of defamation towards the English model.  
 
3. The broken link between the nature of the regulation and the substance 
of the rules 
 
Duff argues that crimes are public in the sense that they are the proper concern of 
the public and are dealt with by a public institution: the criminal justice system. 
Their publicness might be either a cause or a consequence of the 
criminalisation.71 In the former situation, the wrong has consequences for the 
public as a whole, which warrant criminalisation. In the latter situation, the 
wrong is criminalised for reasons other than the consequences it has on the 
public as a whole. It therefore acquires a public character for the sole reason that 
it is dealt with by the criminal justice system.  
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Originally, the publicness of the French wrong of defamation was a cause of its 
criminalisation. Following the legal developments traced above, the French 
wrong’s public character has become consequential to the fact that it falls with 
the area of criminal law. And so in that sense, although the wrong is still criminal 
in nature, it has acquired a distinctly private character in that its purpose is to 
settle a dispute between two individuals. Yet the Guinchard Commission’s 
proposition to decriminalise the wrong in 2008,72 which would have reflected the 
change in the focus of the protection, failed. As a consequence, the original link 
existing between the nature of the regulation (tortious and criminal) and the 
substantive content of the rules is broken.  
 
C. Denying the link between distinct contents of proof and the nature of 
the regulation 
 
One objection, based on the content of the English and French evidentiary rules, 
could be advanced to disprove the break between the regulatory features and the 
content of the rules. It is that English law only requires that substantial truth be 
proven whereas French law requires that the exact truth be proven. For an 
English lawyer, this distinction might appear to echo the distinction between the 
civil and criminal evidentiary standards. However, contrary to this suggestion, 
this difference relates to the content of what has to be proved rather than to the 
standard to which truth has to be proved. It must be rationalised on the basis of 
the scope of the wrong, rather than the nature of the regulation. Thus, the modern 
rules on truth are fully disconnected from each jurisdiction’s regulatory features. 
 
1. Evidentiary standards and the nature of the regulation 
 
At first sight, the difference in the general civil and criminal standards of proof 
seems to be reflected in the English and French defamation laws’ requirement as 
to what has to be proved true. The criminal law standard, proof beyond 
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reasonable doubt,73 has been described as ‘a doubt which would cause the jury to 
hesitate or pause before taking a decision in their own affairs’.74 This evidentiary 
standard is necessary to overcome the presumption of innocence.75 By contrast, 
the civil law standard of proof on the balance of probabilities76 is a lower 
standard of proof: it only requires that the claimant prove that there is more than 
a 50% likelihood that the defendant’s breach of duty caused the harm.  
 
The requirements as to what has to be proved true in English and French laws of 
defamation seemingly echo this distinction. In the English law of defamation, 
which gives rise to civil liability, ‘the general rule is that the defendant must 
prove the truth of the defamatory sting of the publication but he need not prove 
the literal truth of every fact which he has stated. It is enough if he prove the 
substantial truth of every material fact.’77 Thus, in Rothschild the defendant 
newspaper successfully escaped liability by proving that the disputed statement, 
alleging that the banker claimant had brought the European Commissioner for 
Trade’s reputation into dispute, was substantially true.78 By contrast, in the 
French law of defamation, which gives rise to criminal liability, the standard is 
much stricter. The Cour de cassation requires that proof be perfect.79 In practice, 
this means that proof must relate to the disputed statement and be ‘complete’:80 
the defendant must prove every fact which he has stated. Substantial truth is not 
sufficient to justify; thus, the French requirements as to what has to be proved 
true are more stringent than the English ones. At first sight, a link may be drawn 
between the civil and criminal standards of proof, and the requirements as to 
what has to be proved true in the English and French laws of defamation. The 
English standard of substantial truth appears to echo the less stringent civil 
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 Rothschild v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 177, [2012] All ER (D) 104, approved 
on appeal. Tugendhat J noted that ‘a defendant who is sued for libel has a complete defence if he 
can prove that the words complained of are substantially true’ (at [15]). 
79
 Michel Véron, ‘Le Cumul des Moyens de Défense’ (2007) 2007(7) Dr pén comm. 97: ‘une 
preuve complète, parfaite et corrélative aux imputations ou aux allégations’. 
80
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balance of probabilities standards, and the French standard of complete truth 
could be seen as applying the more stringent criminal standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt.  
 
Contrary to this suggestion, the more or less stringent requirements as to what 
has to be proved true in England and France cannot be rationalised on the basis 
of each jurisdiction’s regulatory features and of the distinct civil and criminal 
evidentiary standards. Despite the appearances described above, in practice there 
can be no link between the civil and criminal standards of proof and the 
requirements as to what has to be proved true in English and French laws of 
defamation because the distinction between civil and criminal evidentiary 
standards is unknown in French law. Indeed,  
 
‘Unlike common law, continental European civil law does not generally 
distinguish between standards of proof for civil and criminal matters. 
Standard of proof is always the (full) conviction of the judge, a conviction 
intime (reasoned conviction)’.81 
 
This means that in France, regardless of whether the claim is civil or criminal, 
there is no difference in the standard of proof to which truth has to be proved. 
Rationalising the stricter French requirements as to what has to be proved true on 
the basis of the criminal nature of the French wrong of defamation is therefore 
mistaken. 
 
In fact, two separate issues must be distinguished: the evidentiary standards and 
the evidentiary contents. Evidentiary standards only dictate the level of certainty 
and the degree of evidence necessary to establish proof (on the balance of 
probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt). They do not dictate the content of 
what has to be proved true (or in other words, the substance of the evidence of 
truth: substantial or complete truth). More content does not necessarily command 
a higher degree of evidence or level of certainty. For instance, English law could 
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Collective Goods Preprint 1, 4; TR Lee, ‘Pleading and Proof: The Economics of Legal Burdens’ 
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require proof of complete (rather than substantial) truth without shifting the 
current balance of probabilities standard to that of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
 
2. Evidentiary contents and the scope of the wrong 
 
In the previous sub-section, I have denied the existence of a link between the 
distinct English and French requirements as to what has to be proved true and the 
nature of the regulation. In doing so, I refocused the debate on the evidentiary 
contents rather than on the evidentiary standards. I now provide a positive 
explanation for the existence of different requirements as to what has to be 
proved true, based on the different scope of the English and the French wrongs of 
defamation.  
 
The scope of a wrong influences the evidentiary contents required to successfully 
avail a defence. Where the scope of the wrong is wide, a given conduct is more 
likely to be considered wrongful. This justifies that the scope of the defence be 
correlatively wider, and that the rules relating to the content of what has to be 
proved be more lenient.  
 
It is undeniable that the English and the French wrongs of defamation have 
considerably different scopes. In broad terms, in both England and France 
liability arises for the publication of a statement referring to the claimant, 
carrying a defamatory meaning and that has caused or is likely to cause serious 
harm. However, the understanding of what qualifies as defamatory for the 
purposes of the English and French laws of defamation differs. While in both 
systems, the test embodies a societal norm against which the nature of the 
statement is judged,82 the French one has an additional requirement. According 
to the Cour de cassation, a statement cannot qualify as defamatory unless it 
consists in a sufficiently precise allegation of facts that can easily be proven and 
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be the object of a contradictory debate.83 Where the facts are not sufficiently 
precise to be proven, for instance when they are too general, the allegation does 
not qualify as defamatory. Liability for speech that falls short of the definition of 
defamation for the purposes of the law of 29 July 1881 arises under different 
causes of action, such as injures.84 The scope of the French wrong of defamation 
is therefore much narrower than the English one. Speech that would qualify as 
defamatory in England may not be characterised as such in France.  
 
The English and French rules relating to the content of what has to be proved 
echo this distinction in scope. The English wrong, which is wider in scope, has a 
more lenient requirement of substantial proof; the French wrong, which is 
narrower in scope, has a more exacting standard of complete and perfect proof. 
 
These observations support the view that the scope of the wrong and the content 
of what has to be proved true are interrelated. The asymmetry between the 
French and English standards is not a symptom of incompatible approaches to 
truth. The French rule is not less favourable to the defendant. The narrower 
definition of the wrong implies that there are fewer instances in which a 
publication will fall within the scope of the law of defamation. When the 
publication does qualify as defamatory, the disputed statement is by its very 
nature precise enough to be proven; the requirement that proof be exact rather 
than substantial therefore does not unduly complicate the defendant’s evidentiary 
burden.85 
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 Note, however, that while the French law of defamation requires that the contested allegation 
be sufficiently precise to be proven, the courts will be satisfied with a low degree of precision. As 
such, the Cour de cassation accepts that both innuendos and offensive expressions can satisfy the 
requirement of precision (Cass crim, 23 November 1993, Bull crim 1993, n°350; Cass crim, 14 
April 1992, Bull crim 1992, n°162). This is surprising insofar as ‘offensive expressions’ are 
theoretically too imprecise for speech to be characterised as ‘defamatory’. They are, in fact, a 
constituent element of another cause of action under which liability for speech can arise: injures 
(injurious words), which are defined in art. 29, alinéa 2 of the law of 29 July 1881. Thus, it 
would appear that the understanding of what counts as defamatory speech is somewhat flexible. 
The question becomes whether or not the offensive expression is a ‘disguise’ for the imputation 
of a sufficiently precise fact (Beignier et al (n 3), 445). Nevertheless, although disputed 
allegations may feature a variable degree of precision in the allegation of fact, the evidentiary 




To conclude, when one examines the relationship between the nature of the 
regulation and the rules on truth, it is clear that the original link no longer exists. 
Over the past decades, French law has adopted a new perspective, similar to that 
of its English counterpart. Despite the fact that in France defamation is a criminal 
wrong, it has adopted the civil goal of protecting reputation subject to a defence 
of truth, thereby relinquishing the criminal goal of preventing breaches of the 
peace and signalling a distinct privatisation of the wrong. Further, the different 
evidentiary standards are best rationalised on the basis of the scope of the wrong, 
rather than on that of the nature of the regulation. This leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that the rules on truth are now fully disconnected from the nature of 
the regulation. 
 
IV. The emergence of a shared approach to truth 
 
In the previous section a negative thesis has been advanced by denying the 
existence of a link between the nature of the regulation and the content of the 
modern rules. In this section, I build on other authors’ works to positively 
identify a similar doctrine of truth in the English and French laws of defamation. 
In both systems the preferred approach is to treat truth as a defence, and the 
disputed statement’s falsity is presumed; this signals the existence of a shared 
underlying value system. Further, in both jurisdictions the exceptions to the 
permissibility of the truth defence protect the individual’s privacy in pursuance 
of the public interest in social cohesion. These elements of similarity are 
indicative of the existence of a shared approach to the defence of truth in 
England and France. 
 
                                                                                                                               
disputed publication does not fully meet the originally stringent standard of precision. In this 
specific case of figure, it may be that the stringent evidentiary standard will put a French 
defendant at a disadvantage as compared to an English one.  
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A. Defence of truth and presumption of falsity: a similar balancing of 
conflicting rights 
 
In both England and France, the categorisation of truth as a defence results in a 
specific allocation of the burden of proof: the onus is on the defendant to prove 
the truth of the statement, rather than on the claimant to prove its falsity. This 
reveals a similar balancing of the conflicting rights to reputation and to freedom 
of expression, which in turn illustrates the existence of a shared underlying value 
system. I start by establishing the fact that truth is categorised as a defence in 
both jurisdictions. I then consider the conceptual implications of this 
categorisation. 
 
1. The categorisation of truth as a defence 
 
A fundamental element of similarity in the English and the French conceptions 
of truth is that they both categorise truth as a defence, rather than choosing to 
treat falsity as a definitional element of the wrong.  
 
It is generally accepted that torts are private civil wrongs, characterised by a 
breach of duty. In the absence of such a breach, there can be no wrong.86 From 
this perspective, the terminology of ‘damage’ in tort law is deceptive. It conceals 
the fundamental difference that exists between iniuria and damnum, i.e. between 
‘injury and harm, a civil wrong and its consequences, rights and loss’. 87 
Although iniuria virtually always brings about damnum,88 there is no logical 
connection between both. There can be iniuria without damnum, 89  and 
conversely damnum without iniuria. However, the iniuria represents the wrong 
grounding tortious liability:90 it is therefore essential to bring a claim. 
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In line with this explicative theory, there are two dominant ways of analysing the 
role of truth in the English law of defamation. On the first view, the law of 
defamation only protects deserved reputation. The core element of this 
explicative theory is based on the claimant’s own misconduct, which makes the 
exemption of liability an instance of damnum absque iniuria. While harm to 
reputation (damnum) is characterised, its wrongful character (iniuria) is not. This 
is because the infliction of the harm is, in a sense, justified by the defendant’s 
past misconduct. This view is best explained in the words of Street ACJ (as he 
was then) in the Australian case of Rofe v Smith’s Newspapers Ltd:91 ‘[A]s the 
object of civil proceedings is to clear the character of the claimant, no wrong is 
done to him by telling the truth about him. The presumption is that, by telling the 
truth about a man, his reputation is not lowered beyond its proper level, but is 
merely brought down to it.’92 This is the interpretation that is favoured by the 
case law.93  
 
On the second view, defamation is an attack to the claimant’s reputation 
(whether or not it is deserved) but the truth of the statement provides a good 
                                                
91
 (1924) 25 SR(NSW) 4. 
92
 Ibid, 21-22. 
93
 Silkin v Beaverbrook [1958] 2 All ER 516, [1958] 1 WLR 743, 745 (per Lord Diplock): ‘the 
law has maintained a balance between, on the one hand, the right of the individual … to his 
unsullied reputation if he deserves it, and on the other hand, … the right of the public… to 
express their views honestly and fearlessly’. Generally there is a line of cases which approve the 
principle laid down in M’Pherson v Daniels (n 6), 451: ‘the law will not permit a man to recover 
damages in respect of an injury to a character which he either does not, or ought not, to possess.’ 
See, most recently: Rothschild v Associated Newspapers Ltd (n 78), [39]; King v Grundon [2012] 
EWHC 2719, [2012] All ER (D) 96, [32]-[33]; Hamaizia v Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis [2013] EWHC 848, [2013] All ER (D) 253, [19]. That this is the position of the 
English courts is recognised by Parkes et al (n 12), 11.1. Note that Descheemaeker also used to 
support this view: Descheemaeker, ‘Veritas non est defamatio’ (n 2), 16; Eric Descheemaeker, 
‘'A Man of Bad Character Has Not So Much To Lose': Truth As a Defence in the South African 
Law of Defamation’ (2011) 128 SALJ 452, 461. He recently changed his view: see Eric 
Descheemaeker, ‘Mapping Defamation Defences’ (2015) 78 MLR 641, 651-52. Also see, 
supporting the idea that defamation only protects deserved reputations: James Goudkamp, Tort 
Law Defences (Hart Pub 2013), 480: ‘Recall that damage is an element of defamation. If the 
defendant’s statement is true, the claimant will not have suffered any damage. This is because a 
claimant who merely has his reputation reduced to its proper level is not injured in the eyes of the 
law. This situation is readily understandable. The law is not concerned with protecting 
undeservedly high reputations. It follows that the plea of truth is an absent element defence that 
negates the damage element of defamation.’ 
 201 
defence for committing the wrong. Thus, both damnum and iniuria are 
characterised, but the iniuria is committed iure.94  
 
A third possible interpretation, which stands halfway between the other two, is 
that defamatoriness and truth are mutually exclusive. So although damnum is 
characterised, iniuria is not because falsity is a necessary element to characterise 
defamatoriness. Truth is then analysed as an ‘absent element’ defence.95 The 
defendant’s assertion of truth is, in fact, the denial of a constituent element of the 
wrong: falsity. 
 
In my view, the first and the last approaches are disputable: the first because it 
misunderstands the concept of reputation, and the last because it reveals a 
circular reasoning. I therefore endorse the second interpretation.  
 
I start with a criticism of the first approach: namely, the one that holds that no 
injury is done when speaking true words because defamation only protects 
deserved reputation, or in other words reputation founded in character. 
Reputation was defined by Lord Denning MR as ‘what other people think [the 
plaintiff] is’, whereas his character is ‘what [the plaintiff] in fact is’.96 Thus, 
reputation designates the esteem in which others hold the claimant, whether or 
not that esteem is deserved. Conceptually, it is therefore wrong to say that the 
law of defamation does not protect undeserved reputations.97 It must nevertheless 
be recognised that this is the practice of the courts, and it is probably grounded in 
an idea of producing what is perceived to be a ‘just’ outcome: using the 
defamation trial as an occasion to realign reputation with character.  
 
I now turn to discuss the second approach (according to which when speaking 
true defamatory words about the claimant an injury is done, but truth excuses it) 
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and the third one (according to which when speaking true defamatory words 
about the claimant no injury is done). Under both views, it can be said that so far 
as civil proceedings are concerned a defendant will not be liable for having 
caused the damage in cases where the statement was true. The determination of 
the correct view then depends on the reason for which the defendant is not held 
liable. Is it because he has a valid defence (as asserted by the second view), or is 
it because no wrong was committed in the first place (as asserted by the third 
view)? Ultimately, this question turns to the role of truth in the law of 
defamation, and relatedly to the definition of defamatoriness. One must query 
whether truth is a defence to the wrong of defamation, or whether untruth is part 
of its definition.98 The answer to this question will determine whether one 
considers that a wrong has been done but is justified or excused; or that no wrong 
has been done.  
 
There is no universally accepted answer, and different views are expressed in the 
case law99 and in the scholarship.100 Nevertheless, a major problem with the third 
view (according to which a statement cannot be defamatory unless it is false) is 
that it is grounded in circular reasoning. It only considers falsity as a definitional 
element of the wrong because it is presumed, rather than positively proving that 
it is a constituent element of the wrong. It thus fails to positively disprove the 
labelling of truth as a defence. Therefore, the second view – that truth is properly 
speaking a defence – appears to be the most convincing interpretation.  
 
                                                
98
 This question was formulated in Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Tort Law Defences: A Defence of 
Conventionalism’ (2014) 77 MLR 493, 502. 
99
 A line of cases supports the third view: Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491, 503: ‘the law 
recognises in every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others 
unaffected by false statements to his discredit’; Youssoupoff (n 49), 584: ‘a false statement about 
a man to his discredit’. But there is an equally important number of cases which do not mention 
falsity as a definitional element of the wrong: Sim v Stretch [1936] 52 TLR 669, [1936] 2 All ER 
1237, 671: the test was whether the words would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of 
right-thinking members of society generally; Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008, [1997] 
EMLR 139, 152: defamation was defined as an attack on reputation, that is on a man’s standing 
in the world. 
100
 Descheemaeker defends the second approach, but Birks defended the third: Descheemaeker, 
‘Tort Law Defences’ (n 98), 502. The second approach is also favoured by Parkes et al (n 12), 
2.1; Blackstone and more recently Phillipson prefer the third: Sir William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Project Gutenberg 2009), 123, 125-26; Gavin Phillipson, 
‘The "Global Pariah", the Defamation Bill and the Human Rights Act’ (2012) 63 NILQ 149, 153. 
 203 
We have established that in England, truth is a defence (rather than falsity being 
a definitional element of the wrong). This is equally true in France. The enquiry 
is similar to that in English law, except that the terminology changes: we do not 
speak of damnum and iniuria, but of justification defences and excuse 
defences.101 
 
Whereas a justification defence is a determination that the defendant’s conduct 
was not criminally wrongful,102 an excuse defence is a determination that the 
defendant is not criminally blameworthy for having engaged in what was, none 
the less, criminally wrongful conduct.103,104 If truth is a justification defence, it 
follows that the wrong was not characterised; falsity is therefore a constituent 
element of the wrong. If, on the other hand, truth is considered an excuse 
defence, it follows that the wrong was characterised, but that the defendant is 
exempted from punishment; consequently, falsity is not a constituent element of 
the wrong. 
 
That truth is an excuse defence is clear when considering the historical 
development of the defence.105 Originally, the prima facie cause of action in 
defamation was indifferent to the truth or falsity of the statement. Therefore, the 
(then) limited exceptio veritatis clearly acted as an excuse defence: it merely 
prevented a finding of criminal liability despite the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct. The reason for which the law recognised a limited truth defence was 
based on the idea that some statements should be publishable because of their 
social utility – or in other words, because it was in the public interest that this 
information be known. I noted above that the 1944 ordinance merely inverted the 
pre-existing paradigm of the exceptio veritatis. 106  Whereas before 1944 
publications were presumed not to be in the public interest, following the 
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enactment of the ordinance the presumption became that the disputed publication 
pursues some sort of social utility. Consequently, a logical inference can be 
drawn. It is that the inversion of the paradigm of the exceptio veritatis has not 
introduced any change in the spirit of the defence. Therefore, the exceptio 
veritatis remains an excuse defence, as was the case in the original law on the 
press. This analysis is supported by the courts’ view that where the truth of the 
statement is established, the actus reus of the wrong (the publication of a 
defamatory statement) is nonetheless characterised.107 Clearly, this approach 
does not accommodate falsity as a definitional element of the wrong. 
 
2. Allocating the burden of proof: a similar balancing of conflicting rights 
 
The defence of truth is designed to defeat the presumption of falsity that exists in 
both English and French law. The effect of this presumption is that, once the 
claimant has proven that a defamatory statement designating him has been 
published, a presumption arises that the statement is false. It is then the defendant 
who bears the burden of proving that the statement was true. This illustrates the 
fact that England and France have balanced the conflicting rights to reputation 
and freedom of expression in a similar fashion, revealing a similar conceptual 
approach to the role of truth. 
 
The categorisation of truth as a defence in both jurisdictions may be explained by 
the existence of a similar system of domestic values. In England, under section 
3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 legislation must be read and given effect so 
far as possible in a way which is compatible with the rights contained in the 
ECHR. This has led one author to argue that we are witnessing a positive 
‘Europeanisation’ of English tort law.108 Indeed, in recent years the right to 
reputation has been drawn within the scope of the article 8 ECHR right to private 
life. This is affirmed both in the European Court of Human Rights and in 
domestic courts.109 The result is that the article 10 ECHR right to freedom of 
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expression is no longer the ‘starting point’, with reputation constituting a 
legitimate restriction.110 Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR are given equal value and 
must be balanced against one another.111 This is equally true in France, where 
recent cases have referred directly to Convention rights, bypassing the provisions 
of the law on the press.112 
 
The process of balancing the right to reputation against that to freedom of 
expression therefore results in an ordering of priorities. This order represents a 
value system in which different kinds of moral harm, broadly understood as the 
harm caused by the injustice of an unjust outcome, are weighed differently.113 
Significantly, due to the existence of different value systems (and therefore of a 
different ordering of priorities) the balancing process may produce distinct 
outcomes in different jurisdictions. For instance, although at common law there 
still exists a presumption of falsity in the USA, the First Amendment has had 
significant consequences on the constitutional law of defamation. Since the 
landmark case of Sullivan, the claimant must positively prove that the 
publication was made ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.’114 While this rule originally only 
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applied to public officials,115 it has been extended to public figures, and later to 
private defendants suing in relation to public speech.116 
 
Thus, the fact that both England and France share a presumption of falsity 
reveals that they share a similar value system. This is best described in 
Dworkin’s words: 
 
‘[W]hen the burden of proving truth is placed on the defendant in a 
defamation suit … after the claimant has proved defamation, this may 
represent some collective determination that it is a greater moral harm to 
suffer an uncompensated and false libel than to be held in damages for a 
libel that is in fact true.’117 
 
B. Replicationes: privacy, social cohesion and the rights context 
 
Section 8(5) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (ROA) and article 35, alinéa 
3, a) of the 1881 law constitute, in Descheemaeker’s Latin terminology, 
replicationes.118 These are essentially ‘defences to defences’, ‘whereby the onus 
shifts back to the claimant to prove a further set of facts… in order to dislodge a 
prima facie defence open to his adversary… and thereby reinstate the original 
finding of liability.’119 
 
In the same way that the existence of a presumption of falsity reveals a shared 
underlying value system in England and France, these replicationes are grounded 
in similar policy principles. In this section, I consider the English and the French 
exceptions to the truth defence and establish that they protect the individual’s 
right to privacy as a means to promote the goal of social cohesion. I argue that 
their classification in the law of defamation is not conceptually misguided, and 
note that the rights context and the new methodology it introduced – the  
‘ultimate balancing test’ – may in fact render this discussion irrelevant. 
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1. The English limitation: malicious disclosure of spent convictions 
 
In England, there exists one limit to the principle that truth is a complete defence 
to defamation liability. Section 8(5) ROA precludes reliance on the truth defence 
when the disclosure of a spent conviction is actuated by malice. 
 
As its name indicates, the purpose of the ROA is to facilitate the rehabilitation of 
convicted offenders. Its effect is that once the rehabilitation period has elapsed, 
the person is treated as if he had not committed, been charged with, prosecuted 
for, convicted of or sentenced for the relevant offence(s). There is no clear policy 
underlying the Act: the competing interests are non-disclosure of spent 
convictions and the right to tell the truth.120 But a generally accepted view is that 
the ROA prevents invasions of privacy.121 It embodies what the French have 
labelled a right to be forgotten,122 which is a specific instance of the more general 
right to privacy established by article 9 of the Civil code. Indeed, by preventing 
undue publicity for atoned offences, the ROA effectively protects the offender’s 
private life. Descheemaeker has recognised this and argued that section 8(5) has 
‘nothing to do with reputation and therefore, if one accepts the… equiparation 
[that the law of defamation protects reputation]…, nothing to do with the law of 
defamation.’123 Thus, in his view, it should be repealed. 
 
However, this view can be contested on three different grounds: by arguing that 
privacy is only protected as a secondary interest, that section 8(5) must not be 
read as encroaching upon the scope of the tort of misuse of private information, 
and that it is fact pursuing a goal that characterises the law of defamation. 
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The view that section 8(5) wrongly protects privacy interests can be opposed on 
the basis of the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ interests endorsed 
in Chapter 1.124 It was seen in Chapter 1 that one cause of action may protect a 
wide range of interests. However, not all these interests are protected in a ‘right-
constituting’ way as a primary interest. Some are protected as secondary 
interests, meaning that their protection is only consequential to some other right 
violation. In relation to section 8(5), Descheemaeker’s argument seems to 
assume that privacy is protected by the law of defamation as a primary interest, 
or in other words, in a right-constituting way. While it is not formulated as such, 
this interpretation follows from the fact he himself has accepted that the tort of 
defamation protects not only the (primary) interest in reputation but also other 
(secondary) interests that are consequential to the injury to reputation.125 He does 
not object to the protection of these secondary interests under the tort of 
defamation. Thus, the reason for which he calls for section 8(5) to be repealed 
must be that he sees it as protecting privacy in a right-constituting way and that 
this is inappropriate in the law of defamation, in which the only interest protected 
in a right-constituting way should be reputation. 
 
The view that privacy is protected in section 8(5) ROA in a right-constituting 
way can be opposed. Indeed, there is nothing to suggest that the protection of 
privacy interests by section 8(5) differs from that afforded to other interests that 
are consequential to the injury to reputation. In fact, Descheemaeker notes that 
the list ‘need not be closed and might be extended by courts as new cases are 
brought.’126 My interpretation is that the protection of privacy through the 
mechanism of section 8(5) ROA merely adds to this list. 
 
This argument is strengthened by the fact that although section 8(5) ROA affords 
an oblique protection to privacy rights, it does not in itself establish any right to 
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confidentiality in respect of spent convictions. In KJO v XIM, 127  Eady J 
commented on this suggestion and noted that: 
 
‘Obviously, no such claim was envisaged by the legislature at the time of the 
1974 enactment. The limited protection it afforded, although undoubtedly 
intended to facilitate the desirable public policy objective of rehabilitation, 
consisted of certain carefully defined rights or privileges.’128 
 
Consequently, he refused to extend the scope of the tort misuse of private 
information to cover the revelation of past criminal convictions on the basis of 
the policy underlying the ROA. To do so: 
 
‘[W]ould require clear authority, either in Strasbourg or domestic 
jurisprudence, to justify using the policy behind the Act to extend the legal 
remedies available beyond those that Parliament specifically provided. 
Ordinarily, a judgment as to whether there is a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in respect of a particular piece of information will have to be made 
according to the standards of ordinary reasonable onlookers. Here, on the 
other hand, the only context relied upon is the statutory regime. Where that is 
so, it is difficult to judge “reasonable expectations” other than from the 
wording sanctioned by Parliament or, perhaps, with any available guidance 
from Strasbourg jurisprudence on the significance of historic convictions.’129 
 
So, there exist conceptual discrepancies between section 8(5) of the ROA and the 
tort of misuse of private information. The former should not be seen as a subset 
of the latter; thus, section 8(5) cannot be interpreted as an encroachment of the 
tort of misuse of private information on the scope of the tort of defamation. 
 
What is more, the limited protection granted through section 8(5) of the ROA is 
established in pursuance of the same policy that irradiates all of defamation law: 
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the promotion of social cohesion.130 McNamara defined reputation as: 
 
‘[A] social judgment of a person based upon facts which are considered 
relevant by a community. It concerns the evaluation of a person in a 
community. An evaluation of a person’s reputation by a community 
always rests upon some sense of who is – and who is not – a part of the 
community.’131  
 
In other words, his theory rests on an interpretation of reputation as a factor of 
inclusion in, or exclusion from, a community. The test of defamatoriness relies 
on a conceptualisation of what constitutes the said community, grounded in 
moral judgments of the community’s members.132 On this view, the law of 
defamation recognises an overarching public interest in social cohesion, which is 
furthered through one of the dominant modes of protecting reputation: the 
vindication of the claimant’s good name. This has implications for the 
permissibility of the truth defence. Indeed, there may be instances in which this 
public interest in social cohesion qualifies the importance of the notion of truth. 
 
If we understand the process of rehabilitation as one that is undertaken with the 
goal of reintegrating the offender into society,133 section 8(5) of the ROA 
therefore protects the individual’s privacy as a means to promote the public 
interest in social cohesion. The protection that is afforded to privacy interests 
ultimately seeks to further the law of defamation’s own goals. 
 
2. The French private life exception 
 
The concern to promote social cohesion is also present in article 35, alinéa 3 a) 
of the 1881 law. We have seen above that the criminal wrong of defamation as a 
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whole was designed to prevent breaches of the public peace.134 In order to make 
this protection effective, the principle was that any defamatory matter was held 
to be private, except in those cases where the subject matter of the publication 
corresponded to one of the two recognised instances of public interest. It is 
therefore the preservation of a broad private domain that allowed the prevention 
of breaches of the peace. In order words, the existence of a large private domain 
was justified by a recognised public interest in preserving and promoting social 
cohesion. 
 
Although the 1944 ordinance modified the defence of truth, the changes it 
implemented were limited to inverting the pre-existing paradigm of the exceptio 
veritatis.135 Such inversion to the paradigm of the exceptio veritatis was subject 
to a number of exceptions, including that in article 35, alinéa 3 a) of the 1881 
law (which is the only one that survives to this day). The definition of the 
concept of ‘private life’ was not amended, and so it remained interpreted until 
recently as covering matters ‘not in the public interest’.136 In this context, 
because the legislator did not introduce any change to the spirit of the defence, it 
is arguable that underlying the exception in article 35, alinéa 3 a) is still a 
philosophy of promoting the public interest in social cohesion.137  
 
Therefore, much in the same way as in England, the exception to the general 
principle that no liability will arise in relation to true defamatory statements is 
protecting the individual’s privacy as a means to promote social cohesion. This 
interpretation of the English and French replicationes is in line with the 
argument made in Chapter 1 that reputation is protected as a fundamental aspect 
of social interaction. 
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 Note that the definition of ‘private life’ in art. 35, alinéa 3 a) has gradually grown closer to 
that in art. 8 ECHR and art. 9 of the Civil code: see above, IIIB1. When the legislator recognises 
this change and amends the law on the press to reflect it, the underlying philosophy of art. 35, 
alinéa 3 a) as a provision pursuing an objective of social cohesion will become out-dated. 
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3. Revisiting the replicationes in light of the ultimate balancing test 
 
The current protection afforded to privacy interests through the law of 
defamation is therefore not conceptually wrong. What is more, in light of the 
current ‘rights context’138 this discussion may become irrelevant. It has been 
noted above that the article 8 ECHR right to private life now extends to 
protection of one’s reputation.139 The result is a change in the way in which cases 
are approached. In the context of privacy, a new methodology has been 
recognised in what is commonly labelled the ‘ultimate balancing test’. Lord 
Steyn described it as follows: 
 
‘First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, 
where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on 
the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the 
individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with 
or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the 
proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call 
this the ultimate balancing test.’140 
 
The Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill largely ignored the impact of 
this new methodology on the substantive law of defamation.141 However, since 
reputation now falls within the scope of article 8 ECHR along with privacy, it 
was unlikely that this ultimate balancing test would remain confined to privacy 
cases. In the past years, domestic courts have referred to these balancing issues in 
a number of defamation cases.142 These references are not just theoretical. They 
have led to a change of perspective in the law of defamation, whereby article 10 
ECHR is no longer the starting point. Rather, articles 8 and 10 ECHR are 
balanced against one another. The substantive law of defamation has evolved to 
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recognise this change of perspective. In Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd,143 
Tugendhat J thus considered that Lord Nicholls’ view in Reynolds according to 
which ‘any lingering doubts should be resolved in favour of publication’144 could 
no longer be sustained.145 This is because it unduly prioritised freedom of 
expression over the protection of reputation.146,147 
 
When adopting the balancing methodology, the understanding of truth as an 
absolute defence is difficult to sustain.148 Its permissibility would then be based 
on an enquiry as to whether the matter was one in which the public had a 
legitimate interest. This would create a hybrid defence, sitting between the 
current defences of truth and qualified privilege. In light of this balancing 
approach, the exceptions contained in section 8(5) ROA and article 35, alinéa 3 
a) can no longer be challenged, because they are an expression of Lord Steyn’s 
new methodology. 
 
Indeed, framed in Strasbourg terms, the reasoning underlying section 8(5) ROA 
is that ‘because rehabilitation is a good in itself, there comes a point when it is 
both necessary and proportionate in a democratic society to restrict freedom of 
speech, in so far as revelation of the conviction(s) would simply be raking up the 
past and undermine the individual’s rightful opportunity to be accepted back in 
society.’ 149  Eady J suggests that in light of the rights compliant new 
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methodology this reasoning, which is based on proportionality,150 might find 
itself extended to other inconvenient facts. 151  Interestingly, this balancing 
approach tends to reinstate the criminal law’s ‘truth and public interest’ 
approach, 152  thus marking a break between the private nature of English 
defamation claims and the way in which the role of truth would be 
conceptualised.153 
 
Likewise in the context of article 35 alinéa 3 a), the Cour de cassation’s 
historical casuistic approach which sees ‘private life’ as matters ‘not in the public 
interest’ is in line with the Strasbourg balancing of competing rights. By 
considering whether the disputed statement was in the public interest, it clearly 
seeks to find a just equilibrium between the right to reputation protected by 
article 8 ECHR and that to freedom of expression protected by article 10 
ECHR.154 Note, however, that this rights-compliant interpretation is subject to 
the gradual evolution of the 1881-specific understanding of ‘private life’ into that 
of article 9 of the Civil code. An alignment with the Strasbourg approach might 
involve reversing, or at the very least halting such process. 
 
Viewed from the lens of the new methodology, the current replicationes are 
therefore undoubtedly within the scope of the law of defamation. This means that 
if the rights context is to permeate the substantive rules on defamation, their 
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existence will no longer be challenged as constituting a conceptual oddity in the 
law of defamation. This would further strengthen the conceptual similarity of the 
English and French approaches to the defence of truth. 
 
C. A shared approach to the truth defence 
 
We have seen in section III that the French rules on truth have grown closer to 
the English model. There also exist further indications of similarity between the 
two systems. This section has identified two major parallels as between English 
and French law. Both treat truth as a defence and recognise a presumption of 
falsity, meaning that the legal burden to prove the truth of the statement is on the 
defendant. This illustrates the fact that both systems tend to recognise greater 
moral harm in being left uncompensated for a false defamatory statement than in 
being held to account for a true statement. Further, both systems recognise that in 
some situations, the public interest in social cohesion justifies the restriction of 
the availability of the truth defence. And so although each system is influenced 
by the historical development of its rules on defamation and its legal culture, in 
respect of truth they share the same approach. This will be all the more evident if 
the rights context does lead to the ‘new methodology’ developed in privacy cases 




As seen above, the role of truth has significantly evolved in France. Due to 
societal changes, defamation is no longer a threat to the public peace. This has 
resulted in the gradual privatisation of the action, bringing the rules on truth 
closer to their English counterpart. The link between the French regulatory 
features and the substantive content of the rules on truth has therefore been 
broken. In fact, the comparative analysis has brought to light a similar doctrine of 
truth. The English and the French laws of defamation have notably categorised 
truth as a defence, thereby balancing conflicting rights in the same way, and have 
introduced limitations by reference to the public interest in social cohesion. This 
similarity in the treatment of truth will likely be strengthened by the rights 
context, in which defamation must now be seen as the interaction between two 
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fundamental rights: freedom of expression and reputation. As such, in relation to 
the truth defence, the link between the regulatory features and the substantive 
content of rules has been broken. This makes truth the clearest practical example 




THE REMEDIAL ASPECTS OF DEFAMATION: MODES OF 




Thus far, the comparative analysis has highlighted a tension between path 
dependence leading to institutional persistence on the one hand, and functional 
adaptability on the other hand. Due to the persistence of the tort/crime divide, 
another fundamental issue to be considered is that of remedial aspects of the 
wrong, whose institutional form is largely dictated by the nature of the 
regulation. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to consider whether and to 
what extent there is agreement in respect of responding to reputational damage, 
in light of each jurisdiction’s regulatory features. 
 
The analysis is functional in nature. It goes beyond the superficial comparison of 
tortious remedies and criminal penalties and rather focuses on the objectives that 
the English and French remedial aspects of defamation are striving to achieve. At 
first sight, the remedial goals of the English and French legal responses are 
aligned with the general objectives of tort and criminal law and so are not 
comparable. In England, damages are the standard remedy and aim at 
compensating the claimant and vindicating his good name. In France, the fine 
primarily acts as a punishment for the defendant. Contrary to this, the chapter 
argues that in practice, both English and French defamation proceedings feature 
a combination of compensatory, vindicatory and punitive aims and so are 
functionally comparable. What is a more, they share what will be termed a 
‘hybrid’ model of defamation liability; the chapter explains why this model 
exists in both jurisdictions. 
 
First, I outline the English and French legal responses to defamation, their 
official goals, and note the correspondence with the objectives of tortious 
remedies and criminal penalties. Second, I challenge the strength of this link by 
establishing that in practice the English and French remedial aspects of 
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defamation are functionally comparable and that in fact they both implement a 
hybrid model of liability. Third, I explain this discrepancy on the basis of a lack 
of reflection on the main modes of protecting reputation outlined in Chapter 1. I 
then argue that the current approach is illogical and rationalise the protection of 
reputation on the basis of only two of the four modes of protection. In the final 
section, I consider the wide-ranging practical consequences of this approach. 
 
II. The apparent link between the stated objectives of defamation 
proceedings in England and France and the nature of the 
regulation 
 
In this section, I outline the legal responses available in the English and French 
laws of defamation, their stated objectives, and argue that they exemplify the 
modern tortious and criminal responses to a wrong. This suggests that they are 
directly dictated by the regulatory features of each jurisdiction and, as such, are 
not comparable. 
 
A. Current remedial aspects of defamation in English and French law 
 
The outcome of a successful defamation claim differs as between England and 
France. In what follows, I outline the legal responses available in the English and 
French laws of defamation. 
 
1. English remedies 
 
Traditionally in the English tort of defamation, a successful claimant can receive 
two kinds of remedies: an award of damages, and an injunction. Whilst claiming 
both is standard practice, ‘it is the award of damages, not the grant of an 
injunction (in lieu of an undertaking), which is the primary remedy which the 
law provides on proof of this tort’.1 The Defamation Act 2013 has established 
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two further remedies. Sections 12(1) and 13 respectively allow a court giving 
judgment for the claimant to order the defendant to publish a summary of the 
judgment, and to order the operator of a website to remove the statement or any 
person who was not the author, editor, or publisher2 of the statement to stop 
distributing, selling or exhibiting it. 
 
For the purposes of the law of defamation, there are two relevant types of 
injunctions: interim injunctions restraining publication pending trial, and final 
injunctions after trial. The courts exercise exceptional caution when awarding 
injunctions3 in defamation cases, because of the obvious conflict with the right to 
freedom of expression.4  
 
The continued priority afforded to freedom of expression5 might evolve on 
account of the European Court of Human Right’s modern jurisprudence. 6 
Nevertheless, the preferred remedy remains an award of damages. This award is 
sophisticated: the court may award not only general compensatory damages, but 
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also aggravated, special and exemplary damages. This is presumably designed to 
make the damages award an effective remedy, providing sufficient satisfaction to 
the defamed claimant. Therefore, each type of damage has a specific function. 
General damages (which are presumed upon proof of publication),7 aggravated 
damages (which account for the aggravation of the injury to the claimant’s 
feelings due to the defendant’s conduct) and special damages (which cover any 
material or financial loss) are primarily designed to compensate the claimant for 
the damage to his reputation and to vindicate his good name.8 In addition, the 
court may choose to award exemplary damages where the defendant has 
deliberately libelled or slandered the claimant for profit. However, this award 
remains exceptional and in some ways anomalous, since it departs from the 
primarily compensatory purpose of tort law9 and conflicts with the right to 
freedom of expression.10 
 
2. French penalties 
 
In France, the primary responses to the wrong of defamation consist in a fine 
and/or (exceptionally) in a prison sentence. Their severity depends on the type of 
claimant and of statement. For a simple case involving the defamation of a 
private individual, since the law of 15 June 2000 abolished any possibility of 
imprisonment, the main penalty is a fine of up to €12,000.11 No additional 
penalties may be pronounced: in a recent case, the Cour de cassation quashed an 
appellate decision sentencing a convicted defendant to the payment of a fine and 
the publication of the judgement.12 The penalties are more severe for aggravated 
forms of defamation. The amount of the fine is increased up to €45,000; and 
instances of discriminatory defamation can still lead to a prison sentence of up to 
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12 months since they were explicitly excluded from the scope of the law of 15 
June 2000.13 
 
As is the case in England, great caution is exercised when considering the award 
of interim injunctions. This is because they directly conflict with the spirit of the 
1881 law, which proclaims in article 1 the principle of freedom of the press.14 
There exist two types of injunctions: those awarded on the basis of the ordinary 
law, and those labelled référés spéciaux (special injunctions). The latter category 
comprises injunctions for violations of one’s privacy and of one’s presumption 
of innocence.15 The former type of injunctions, based on articles 808 and 809 of 
the Civil procedure code, is only subsidiary to the référés spéciaux. These 
‘ordinary’ injunctions are typically awarded on the basis of a manifestly unlawful 
act or to prevent immediate damage, exclusively on the basis of urgency. They 
were used regularly in the 1960s to prevent wrongful interferences with 
individuals’ reputations;16 nowadays they remain the main type of injunctions 
awarded in relation to press wrongs. 
 
B. The apparent link between the remedial aspects of defamation and 
the regulatory features in England and France 
 
In order to best understand the English and French remedial aspects of 
defamation, it is necessary to move beyond a superficial comparison of tortious 
damages awards and criminal fines and consider the objectives that the English 
and French remedial aspects of defamation are striving to achieve. A discrepancy 
can be noted at the outset – while in England, some attention has been paid by 
the courts to the functions of remedial awards, the French courts and doctrinal 
writers have largely ignored this issue. Therefore, the following discussion is 
based on the stated objectives underpinning the English remedial awards, but 
only on the underlying objectives of the French penalties. 
                                                
13
 Art. 24 alinéa 6 of the law of 29 July 1881. 
14
 Bernard Beignier, L'Honneur et le Droit (LGDJ 1995), 150. He notes that injunctions aim at 
preventing the realisation of harm whereas the purpose of the 1881 law is to punish and repair the 
harm caused.  
15
 These are awarded respectively on the basis of art. 9 and art. 9-1 alinéa 2 of the Civil code. 
16
 Emmanuel Dreyer, JCl. Communication, Fasc. n°3710, 40. 
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In English defamation proceedings, damages are the standard remedy. Analysing 
the remedial goals of the compensatory damages award, Sir Thomas Bingham 
MR (as he then was) explained that: 
 
‘The successful claimant in a defamation action is entitled to recover, as 
general compensatory damages, such sum as will compensate him for the 
wrong he has suffered. That sum must compensate him for the damage to 
his reputation; vindicate his good name; and take account of the distress, 
hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused.’17 
 
By contrast, in France there is little (if any) analysis of the remedial goals of 
defamation actions. However, since the wrong of defamation falls within the 
scope of criminal law and criminal sanctions are primarily punitive, 18  the 
purpose of French defamation proceedings must be (at least in part) punitive. No 
other remedial goal is officially recognised, whether by the courts or doctrinal 
writers.19 
 
One argument could be advanced, suggesting that criminal wrongs (including 
defamation) in a sense pursue compensatory goals. This is because the action 
civile procedure allows a claimant to bring a tortious compensatory claim before 
a criminal court. However, this argument would be misguided. Indeed, the 
criminal penalties (in the defamation context, the payment of a fine) and tortious 
                                                
17
 John v MGN (n 1), 607. 
18
 See Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to 
the tort/crime distinction, VE. In the French context: Bernard Bouloc, Droit Pénal Général (23rd 
edn, Dalloz 2013), 27ff. Although Bouloc uses the word rétributif (ibid, 28), it is best translated 
as punitive rather than retributive. Indeed, it is apparent from the following discussion (ibid, 29ff) 
that the main aim of criminal penalties is not to inflict harm on the defendant for its own sake (as 
is implied in the use of the word ‘retributive’), but rather to inflict harm as a means to achieve a 
further goal. In this context, my choice to use the terminology of ‘punitive’ is intended to leave 
open what the ultimate goal of punishment is. I chose to ignore a literal translation in favour of 
one which better reproduces Bouloc’s underlying reasoning. 
19
 In fact, doctrinal writers largely ignore this issue. It is not discussed in any of the current major 
textbooks on the law of defamation (Bernard Beignier et al, Traité de Droit de la Presse et des 
Médias (Litec 2009), 749ff; Emmanuel Dreyer, Responsabilités Civile et Pénale des Médias: 
Presse, Télévision, Internet (3rd edn, LexisNexis, Litec 2011), 685-86). Their discussion of 
remedies is limited to a description of the evolution in the remedies available under the 1881 law. 
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remedies, and their associated remedial goals, remain conceptually separate from 
one another.  
 
This claim is perhaps best understood from a historical perspective. The law of 
the Frankish Empire did not distinguish between civil and criminal wrongs.20 
The same procedural rules applied to both, and the standard sanction was the 
composition pécuniaire,21 a monetary award that pursued what we can label in 
modern legal terminology compensatory and punitive goals. Two thirds of the 
composition pécuniaire were paid by the defendant to the victim as 
compensation; the remaining third was paid to the king and represented a fine 
imposed on the defendant for breaching the public order.22 Thus, the composition 
pécuniaire sought both to compensate the claimant and to punish the defendant. 
 
This state of affairs was preserved until the 13th century, when the public justice 
system acquired a monopoly over criminal proceedings. From then onwards, it 
became progressively accepted that compensatory damages awards were 
accessory to the criminal penalty.23 This had two main consequences. First, 
compensatory damages awards became characterised as a type of réparation 
civile (civil reparation or redress), pursuing distinct objectives from those of 
criminal proceedings (compensation rather than punishment).24 Second, the fact 
that one single wrongful act could ground both a criminal sanction and a civil 
mechanism of redress paved the way for the modern conceptualisation of the 
relationship between tort and crime. As is the case in England, in France 
wrongful interference with an individual’s right only grounds a tortious cause of 
action (typically culminating in a compensatory damages award), rather than a 
criminal one. The criminalisation of conduct depends on the public taking an 
interest in the wrong or on the articulation of a strong public policy argument in 
                                                
20
 Jean-Marie Carbasse, Histoire du Droit Pénal et de la Justice Criminelle (3rd edn, PUF 2014), 
44. 
21
 Ibid, 44, 48. 
22
 Ibid, 49. 
23




favour of criminalising conduct. 25  However, contrary to England, tort and 
criminal law (and relatedly, tortious and criminal proceedings) are not 
procedurally separate from one another. In France, because the fault 
requirements in civil and criminal wrongs are often identical 26  one single 
wrongful act can constitute both a civil and a criminal wrong. This has had a 
significant impact on procedural rules, including the fact that the action civile (a 
tortious claim typically brought on the basis of article 1382 of the Civil code) 
does not have to be brought before a civil court independently from the criminal 
proceedings.27 An action civile can be brought before a criminal court,28 and the 
criminal judge subsequently gives a decision on both the criminal action and the 
combined civil claim. Bringing the action civile is not mandatory; however, once 
an action civile is attached to the criminal proceedings, a defendant whose 
liability is established is liable for both the criminal penalty and the payment of 
compensatory damages.  
 
Yet, despite the fact that the criminal proceedings and the tortious claim are 
procedurally linked, they remain conceptually separate from one another. Indeed, 
they are brought on different grounds (criminal proceedings on the basis of the 
wrong as established by the Criminal code or other criminal laws, and tortious 
claims on the basis of article 1382) and pursue different goals (of punishment 
and compensation respectively).29 Therefore, it would be wrong to interpret the 
action civile procedure as a mechanism integrating a general compensatory goal 
in French criminal claims (including defamation claims). 
 
At first sight, these remedial goals of English and French defamation 
proceedings (whether stated or underlying) are aligned with each jurisdiction’s 
regulatory features. Indeed, as the distinction between civil and criminal liability 
                                                
25
 Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to the 
tort/crime distinction, VF.  
26
 Note that they are often, but not always identical: see Bouloc (n 18), 97. 
27
 Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to the 
tort/crime distinction, VB. 
28
 Art. 3 of the Criminal procedure code. 
29
 Note that in defamation cases the action civile is not brought on the basis of art. 1382 of the 
Civil code but on that of the law of 29 July 1881. This has significant consequences, which will 
be considered below in section IIIB. 
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emerged, each system also began to distinguish between civil remedies and 
criminal penalties. This distinction is now entrenched in the law. As was seen in 
Chapter 1,30 over time tortious remedies and criminal penalties have developed 
distinct characteristics (including specific remedial goals) that find an echo in the 
English and French responses to the wrong of defamation. 
 
First, the remedial goals of English damages awards are aligned with the 
objectives of English tort law. According to Honoré,  
 
‘[O]ne point of creating a tort … is to define and give content to people’s 
rights by providing them with a mechanism for protecting them and 
securing compensation if their rights are infringed.’31  
 
Thus, the main purpose of tortious remedies is to put the claimant in the position 
he was in prior to the commission of the wrong.32 This is typically achieved 
through the paradigmatic award of compensatory damages.33 Defamation law’s 
concern to compensate the claimant, both for the injury to reputation and his 
injured feelings, is clearly in line with this general approach. It must be noted 
that compensation of injured feelings, sometimes referred to as ‘solatium’, is not 
an extraordinary occurrence in tort law.34 This remedial goal is encountered in a 
number of other tortious causes of action when the rights that have been 
wrongfully interfered with do not have patrimonial consequences, including in 
                                                
30
 Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to the 
tort/crime distinction, V. 
31
 Tony Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law - Questions and Answers’ in David G Owen (ed), 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (OUP 1995), 75. In this sense in France: Boris Starck, 
Essai d'une Théorie Générale de la Responsabilité Civile Considérée en sa Double Fonction de 
Garantie et de Peine Privée (L Rodstein 1947). 
32
 See Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to 
the tort/crime distinction, VE. 
33
 Note that in various torts (the best illustration being the tort of misuse of private information) 
the courts can also award interim injunctions pending trial. However, their purpose differs from 
that of compensatory awards. They do not aim at putting the claimant in the position he would 
have been in had the wrong not been committed. Rather, they seek to prevent the putative wrong 
from occurring. 
34
 But see below IIIB, which objects to the protection of injured feelings in the law of 
defamation. 
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the tort of misuse of private information. 35  The second remedial goal of 
defamation actions acknowledged by Sir Thomas Bingham MR is the vindication 
of the claimant’s good name. In England, vindication is not only a formal goal of 
the law of defamation; it is more generally recognised as a goal of English tort 
law36 in that it ‘mark[s] the infringement of a right.’37 So, the two main remedial 
goals of English defamation law comply with those of English tort law. 
 
The one remedial goal that is not stated as a formal objective of English remedies 
in defamation proceedings, but that is at first sight the sole remedial goal of 
French defamation actions, is that of punishing the defendant. 38  This is 
presumably because in England defamation is a tortious wrong, and punitive 
objectives typically characterise criminal, rather than tortious proceedings. 
Indeed, the main purpose of creating a criminal wrong is to deter future 
wrongdoing through threat of criminal liability and, failing that, to punish the 
defendant for committing the wrong.39 Criminal penalties are primarily punitive: 
they punish the defendant for the morally or socially wrongful act that he 
committed. This is generally achieved through the imposition of a prison 
sentence, of a fine or of alternative measures that restrict or remove the accused’s 
liberty. 40  In light of this, it is rather unsurprising that punishment is not 
recognised as a remedial goal of defamation proceedings in England, since the 
criminal wrong of defamatory libel was formally abolished by section 73 of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009. It is equally unsurprising to find that punishment 
                                                
35
 In this sense: Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Solatium and Injury to Feelings: Roman law, English law 
and Modern Tort Theory’ in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott (eds), Iniuria and the Common 
Law (Hart Pub 2013), 78. 
36
 See, for example, Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop [2005] UKPC 15, 
[2006] 1 AC 328, [19]: ‘An award of compensation will go some distance towards vindicating 
the infringed… right.’ See, generally: R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245. This has led to the recognition of a new 
category of damages, ‘vindicatory damages’. The existence of this vindicatory goal is also 
recognised in a variety of textbooks, some of which are listed in Jason NE Varuhas, ‘The 
Concept of 'Vindication' in the Law of Torts: Rights, Interests and Damages’ (2014) 34 OJLS 1, 
fn 1. 
37
 Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department (n 36), [99]. 
38
 There is one major exception to this statement, which is the possibility to award exemplary 
damages. Its significance is considered below in section IIIA. 
39
 Bouloc (n 18), 496. 
40
 Ibid, 558ff. 
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is an underlying remedial goal of the French wrong of defamation, given that it is 
formally a criminal wrong. 
 
The above comparison of the English and French responses to the wrong of 
defamation reveals significant differences between the two jurisdictions. Each 
system seemingly has a different focus and recognises different remedial goals. 
The English tortious action focuses primarily on compensating and vindicating 
the claimant. On the other hand, the very nature of the French criminal action 
mandates a focus on punishing the defendant. While in both jurisdictions the 
primary remedy is monetarised, in England it consists in a damages award and in 
France it is a fine. In practice, this means that the former focuses on the harm 
suffered by the claimant, with the award serving a compensatory purpose; 
whereas the latter focuses on the defendant’s wrongful act, and the fine is paid to 
the Public Treasury as a punishment.41 
 
These characteristics are distinguishing traits of tortious and criminal types of 
regulation respectively, and correspond to each system’s regulatory features. In 
view of this observation, the respective responses to the wrong appear to have 
been dictated by these features. It is therefore tempting to conclude that the 
English and French remedies for defamation evidence distinct approaches to the 
wrong, and so are not comparable. 
 
III. The functional comparability of English and French remedies 
 
Contrary to the preliminary conclusion reached in the previous section, this 
section argues that in practice the remedial aspects of defamation are functionally 
comparable in England and France. First, English tortious proceedings have 
grown to accommodate a punitive goal. Second, French criminal proceedings 
have come to integrate a vindicatory and a compensatory goal. This has resulted 
in the creation of a hybrid model of liability, which draws on the tortious and the 
criminal models of liability, and reveals a shared conceptual approach to the 
remedial aspects of defamation. 
                                                
41
 Roger Merle and André Vitu, Traité de Droit Criminel, vol 1 (7th edn, Cujas 1997), 788ff. 
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A. The English tort of defamation and the punitive goal 
 
English tort law officially does not punish: ‘the object of the award of damages 
in tort nowadays is not to punish the wrongdoer, but to compensate the person to 
whom the wrong has been done.’42 There are two objections to this statement of 
principle. The first is not specific to defamation proceedings; it relates to the 
availability of exemplary damages in tort law generally. The second is specific to 
defamation claims. It is that general damages contain an element of punishment, 
which acts as a solatium to compensate (or console) the claimant’s injured 
feelings. 
 
In special circumstances, tort law allows for the award of exemplary (or 
‘punitive’) damages. Their anomalous presence in tort was examined in the 
seminal case of Rookes v Barnard.43 Lord Devlin rationalised the rules regulating 
the award of exemplary damages by analysing the pre-existing cases in which 
they had been awarded. He uncovered three categories in which exemplary 
damages can be awarded,44 as well as three considerations to be taken into 
account when awarding them.45 Defamation cases for which exemplary damages 
are awarded fall under the second category. These are cases in which the 
defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself 
which may well exceed the compensation payable to the claimant. This typically 
involves media defendants rather than private individuals, since they engage in 
activities aimed at profit. 
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 McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1965] 2 QB 86, [1964] 3 All ER 947, 106 (per 
Pearson LJ). 
43
 Above n 10.  
44
 Ibid, 1226-27: ‘The first category is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the 
servants of the government. … Cases in the second category are those in which the defendant’s 
conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the 
compensation payable to the claimant. … To these two categories which are established as part of 
the common law there must of course be added any category in which exemplary damages are 
expressly authorised by statute.’ 
45
 Ibid, 1227-28: ‘First, the claimant cannot recover exemplary damages unless he is the victim of 
the punishable behaviour. … Secondly, the power to award exemplary damages constitutes a 
weapon that …  can also be used against liberty. … Thirdly, the means of the parties, irrelevant 
in the assessment of compensation, are material in the assessment of exemplary damages. 
Everything which aggravates or mitigates the defendant's conduct is relevant.’ 
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Prior to Rookes v Barnard, ‘punitive’ damages were loosely described as 
‘inflict[ing] an added burden on the defendant proportionate to his conduct.’46 
They were therefore punitive in a literal sense. Following Rookes v Barnard, 
punishment is described as a means rather than as an end. Their punitive effect is 
widely accepted, but punishment is not recognised as a purpose.47 Rather, it is 
considered to be incidental to exemplary damages’ goal of deterrence.48 The 
validity of this distinction is doubtful. Simons notes that it is a characteristic of 
criminal wrongs to punish, whether as a means or an end.49 So punishment, even 
as a means to attain a further goal, theoretically has no place in tort law. Further, 
the differentiation between purpose and effect is near impossible to operate in 
practice. The interchangeable use of ‘exemplary’ and ‘punitive’ labels in 
different common law jurisdictions50 is, in itself, an indication that it has proved 
impossible to fully abandon the punitive goal. This view is reinforced by the fact 
that the amount of damages is determined by reference to the profit putatively 
made from the defamatory statement. Such focus on the consequences of the 
defendant’s wrong, rather than on the claimant’s losses, strongly echoes the 
criminal law’s punitive features.51 
 
This punitive aim will likely have a more limited incidence for media defendants 
now that the Crime and Courts Act 2013 has come into force. By virtue of 
sections 34(1) and 34(2), and subject to the exceptions in section 34(3), 
exemplary damages can no longer be awarded against a defendant publisher in 
                                                
46
 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027, [1972] 1 All ER 801, 1071. 
47
 McCarey (n 42), 107: ‘This is not punishment; it is merely preventing the defendant from 
obtaining a reward for his wrong-doing’. 
48
 Cassell (n 46), 1073: ‘Speaking for myself, I prefer “exemplary,” not because “punitive” is 
necessarily inaccurate, but “exemplary” better expresses the policy of the law as expressed in the 
cases. It is intended to teach the defendant and others that “tort does not pay” by demonstrating 
what consequences the law inflicts rather than simply to make the defendant suffer an extra 
penalty for what he has done, although that does, of course, precisely describe its effect.’ The 
idea of incidental punishment is drawn from James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, 
Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Hart Pub 2002), 10. 
49
 Kenneth W Simons, ‘The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives’ 
(2008) 17 Widener LJ 719, 729. 
50
 The United States and Canada describing them as ‘punitive’ whereas Australia, New Zealand 
and England settled for the ‘exemplary’ label. See: Edelman (n 48), 11. 
51
 In this sense, see Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and 
introduction to the tort/crime distinction, VE. 
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relation to the publication of news-related material if the defendant was the 
member of an approved regulator at the relevant time. This may reduce the 
number of cases in which exemplary damages will be awarded. 
 
However, some measure of punishment is also found in defamation cases in the 
award of general damages. According to Smith, damages awards may be 
analysed as serving a function similar to that of criminal penalties. He 
distinguishes two approaches to damages: 
 
‘The first way, which I call the duty view, supposes that damages awards 
confirm existing legal duties to pay damages. According to this view, 
damages awards are structurally similar to awards that require defendants 
to do things such as deliver contractually promised goods, cease 
nuisances, or pay contractual debts. Like these awards, damages awards 
are essentially rubber stamps: they require defendants to do what they 
should have done already. In contrast, the second way of understanding 
damages awards, which I call the liability view, supposes that insofar as it 
makes sense to speak at all of legal duties to pay damages, such duties are 
created – not confirmed – by damages awards. According to this view, 
damages awards are structurally similar to awards that require criminal 
wrongdoers to pay fines.’52 
 
The argument that general damages serve a punitive purpose is supported by the 
fact that from a comparative perspective, the quantum of English damages 
awards is extremely high. In France, damages awards are historically 
considerably lower than in England.53 To this day, damages in England are very 
high, with a current ‘ceiling’ figure of around £275,000.54 On the other hand, in 
France the compensation offered to the partie civile is typically in the few 
thousands of euros.55 Yet the method of calculating the quantum of damages is 
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 Stephen Smith, ‘Duties, liabilities, and damages’ (2012) 125 Harvard L Rev 1727, 1727. 
53
 Ignace Rothenberg, ‘Damages for Libel in the United States and on the European Continent’  
24 Journal of Comp Leg and Int Law 6, 12.  
54
 Cairns v Modi [2012] EWCA Civ 1382, [2013] 1 WLR 1015, [25]. 
55
 Patrick Auvret, JCl. Communication, Fasc. n°3705, 94. 
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similar to the English one and takes into account the same type of factors. These 
include the extent to which the statement was circulated, the fact that the victim 
had a bad reputation to start with and any relevant aggravating circumstances.56 
There is no reason to suppose that a defamed person suffers less in France than in 
England. Likewise, nothing suggests that reputation is valued less in France than 
it is in England. In fact, the tradition of avenging an insult by blood rather than 
by money survived longer on the continent, 57  and even seeped from the 
aristocracy into the middle classes.58 This suggests that reputation possesses a 
value in France that is at the very least comparable to that which it possesses in 
England. 
 
There are various ways in which to interpret this discrepancy in the quantum of 
damages. It could be the result of the arbitrary pricing of a lost reputation in two 
different countries. It could also be a legacy of jury trials, whereby in the absence 
of a reasoned judgment (which typically concludes a judge only trial), a higher 
sum was needed to vindicate the claimant’s name.59 Alternatively (or perhaps in 
conjunction with the previous interpretations), the lower quantum of 
compensatory awards in France may account for the fact that the defendant has 
already been punished. Indeed, we noted in Chapter 1 that the concept of 
‘vindication’ is multi-faceted.60 There are two aspects to it: one relates to the 
honour construct of reputation and is punitive, the second relates to the sociality 
construct of reputation and is communicative. However, there exists no accepted 
definition of vindication in the case law. This may have created some confusion 
in the law of defamation about the meaning of ‘vindication’ and led to an 
amalgamation of both communicative and punitive types of vindication. Thus, 
the English tort of defamation currently accommodates a measure of punishment, 
which (wrongfully) partakes in convincing the public of the baselessness of the 
charge. Indeed, in the current state of the law it is clear that in itself a judgement 
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 Ibid, 48ff. 
57
 Chapter 3: Tortious and criminal standards of liability in the English and French laws of 
defamation, IVA. 
58
 Rothenberg (n 53), 12. 
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 In this sense, see Cairns v Modi (n 54), [30]. 
60
 Chapter 1: The modern law of wrongs against reputation: an overview and introduction to the 
tort/crime distinction, IIA. 
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for the claimant, or a symbolic damages award, will not be sufficient to vindicate 
the claimant’s reputation.61 
 
Under this view, which adheres to both the duty and the liability views described 
above, the award of general damages in the tort of defamation can be split into 
two. Reflecting the duty view, the first part is indeed compensatory; the second, 
which is in excess of compensation, reflects the liability view and is punitive. 
However, owing to the inherent difficulty of providing a pecuniary assessment 
for non-pecuniary loss (and the consequent difficulty to draw a line between the 
compensatory and the punitive aspects)62 the courts do not itemise or distinguish 
between the two parts of the award. 
 
As a result, the claim made in section II that a link exists between the regulatory 
features of English defamation law and the available responses must be refined. 
Indeed, the general goal of punishment is one that is typically associated with 
criminal, rather than with tortious claims. The link between the tortious nature of 
the regulation and the available remedies is not as strong as was originally 
thought. 
 
B. The French criminal wrong of defamation, vindication and 
compensation 
 
Much in the same way as their English counterpart, French defamation 
proceedings pursue objectives other than that of punishment. Specifically, they 
have come to accommodate vindicatory and compensatory goals, mirroring the 
objectives of defamation actions in England. 
 
Two reasons suggest that French responses to defamation accommodate a 
vindicatory goal (admittedly incidental to the punitive one). First, the procedural 
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 In this sense: Purnell v Business F1 Magazine Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 744, [2008] 1 WLR 1, 
specifically [29]-[30]. 
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 In this sense, see Rookes v Barnard (n 10): ‘when one examines the cases in which large 
damages have been awarded for conduct of this sort [involving malevolence or spite], it is not at 
all easy to say whether the idea of compensation or the idea of punishment has prevailed’ (per 
Lord Devlin at 1221). 
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framework of the 1881 law empowers the victim. While Nathan Oman describes 
empowerment as a distinguishing trait of tortious, as opposed to criminal 
proceedings,63 this reasoning can be extended to French defamation claims. 
Indeed, according to article 48, 6° of the law of 29 July 1881, it is the victim who 
controls the action in defamation proceedings. The prosecutor can only pursue it 
on the basis of the victim’s official preliminary complaint.64 The reason for 
which this rule was introduced in the 1881 law was that the legislature 
considered that defamation proceedings might aggravate the pre-existing 
reputational losses by publicising the defamatory statement. This would produce 
a result opposed to that which was originally sought in defamation proceedings, 
which was to avenge the insult suffered by the victim.65 It was therefore decided 
that the power to decide whether a prosecution should be brought would 
(primarily) be vested in the victim. The prosecutor still has a discretionary power 
to decide whether or not criminal proceedings should be filed, but he cannot do 
so without a preliminary complaint on the victim’s part. The victim is thereby 
empowered, as is the case in civil suits. This means that in the same way as in 
civil proceedings, the victim’s act of initiating suit signals her contestation of the 
truth of the statement. This goes some way to convince the public of the 
baselessness of the charge. Second, French responses to defamation possess a 
communicative function which may be analysed as indicating the baselessness of 
the defamatory statement. Indeed, criminal sentences carry a special stigma, 
signalling that the defendant’s conduct is socially blameworthy.66 The value of 
the punishment partly resides in the communication of the censure imposed on 
the defendant’s act, which in the defamation context informs the public of the 
fact that the defamatory statement was untenable.67 It is interesting to note, in 
this passage, the clear link that exists between the punitive and the 
communicative aspects of vindication. These should, in theory, be kept separate 
from one another; however it is extremely difficult to do so in practice, as was 
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already seen above in relation to the punitive aspect of English compensatory 
awards.68 
 
Further, despite its criminal nature the French wrong of defamation has come to 
recognise a goal of compensation, as is evident from the fact that the protection 
of reputation is sometimes likened to that of a bien (good).69 The first indicium is 
found in the fact that, like its English counterpart, French law protects the 
reputation of corporations.70 The case law has no difficulty in recognising that 
corporate claimants can suffer reputational damage.71 However, the recognition 
of a right for corporations to bring defamation proceedings can only be 
rationalised on the basis of what was described in Chapter 1 as the property 
construct of reputation.72 Indeed, Skolnick notes that ‘a corporation falsely 
accused of bankruptcy might lose property, but it cannot lose dignity, a 
distinction that judges do not always appreciate.’73 Therefore, the sole purpose of 
defamation proceedings in which the defamed claimant is a corporation is to 
compensate, rather than to console or to vindicate. 
 
A second indicium suggests that this compensatory goal is in fact recognised in 
respect of all claimants, not just corporations. French doctrinal writers recognise 
that wrongful interferences with the right to reputation cause losses.74 These are 
usually compensated on the basis of an action civile. This mechanism allows the 
victim of a criminal wrong to obtain civil damages during the course of a 
criminal process, as if she were bringing a claim before a civil court.75 It is 
available in respect of all criminal wrongs. However, in relation to the wrong of 
defamation (and press wrongs more generally) the action civile departs from 
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traditional principles. The action is not brought on the basis of article 1382 of the 
Civil code as is classically the case, but on the basis of the 1881 law.76 This rule 
was established in order to ensure that victims do not bring an action civile on 
the basis of article 1382 as a way of circumventing the procedural constraints 
established in the 1881 law. Consequently, a general goal of compensation has 
been integrated in the law on the press. In fact, in France defamation proceedings 
do not only compensate the victim’s injury to reputation, but also her préjudice 
moral (non-pecuniary losses, which include injured feelings).77 
 
The conclusion of the preceding analysis is that the link that originally existed 
between the regulatory features of French defamation law and its remedial 
aspects is not as strong as was originally suggested. Indeed, the goals of 
vindication and compensation are typically associated with tortious, rather than 
with criminal claims; yet they have seeped into the criminal wrong of 
defamation.  
 
Overall, England and France both recognise three broad remedial goals in 
defamation actions: vindication, compensation and punishment. While they are 
balanced differently in each jurisdiction (England gives primacy to the first two, 
and France to the third one), they evidence the fact that the English and French 
remedial aspects of defamation are functionally comparable. Significantly, this 
finding challenges the strength of the link between the English and French 
regulatory features and their substantive approach to the remedial aspects of 
defamation. 
 
C. A hybrid model of liability 
 
The consequence of the functional comparability of remedial goals in defamation 
actions identified above is the emergence, in both jurisdictions, of a hybrid 
model of liability. Drawing on the tortious and the criminal models of liability, it 
focuses both on the damage suffered and the wrong committed, and justifies 
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legal redress by reference to both the claimant’s damage and the defendant’s 
wrong. Importantly, it signals the existence of a similar conceptual approach to 
the remedial aspects of defamation. 
 
In both England and France, the current model of defamation liability focuses 
both on the damage suffered and the wrong committed. This challenges the 
classic understanding according to which tort and crime possess different models 
of liability. Indeed, the traditional representation of the primary purposes of tort 
and crime being compensation and punishment presupposes the existence of two 
distinct models of liability. Tort law focuses on ‘whether the claimant suffered 
… an infringement at the defendant’s hands.’78 The imposition of liability is the 
result of a two-step enquiry. First, the claimant must prove that the defendant 
committed a tortious wrong or wrongfully interfered with his rights. The 
characterisation of the defendant’s wrongful act justifies the imposition of 
liability. Second, the enquiry turns to the type and extent of damage suffered by 
the claimant. This determines what is required to correct his or her loss. Criminal 
law, on the other hand, has a defendant-orientated agenda. Its focus is on 
‘whether the defendant committed such a wrong.’79 So the imposition of liability 
only involves a one-step enquiry: the characterisation of relevant culpable 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant.  
 
The functional comparability of tortious and criminal remedial goals identified in 
the English and French wrongs of defamation challenges this traditional account 
of the two models of liability. Since the compensatory and punitive aims coexist 
in defamation proceedings, the action is divided into two. Insofar as it seeks to 
compensate the claimant, it focuses on the infringement of his rights and the 
extent of the damage suffered. Insofar as it seeks to punish the defendant, it 
focuses on his wrongful act and on the determination of his culpability. In that 
sense, defamation claims are fundamentally hybrid. They focus both on the 
damage suffered by the claimant and on the wrong committed by the defendant, 
which are characteristics of tortious and criminal proceedings respectively. 
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The hybridisation of defamation liability is also apparent from the fact that the 
current English and French models of liability justify the sanctions they impose 
by reference to both the claimant’s damage and the defendant’s wrong. Again, 
this challenges the traditional tortious and criminal models of liability. 
 
In tort, liability is imposed ‘for the infringement of the claimant’s legally 
protected rights’;80 remedies are therefore awarded to correct the claimant’s 
damage. By contrast, in criminal law, liability is imposed ‘for the culpable 
commission of a wrong, which merits condemnation and punishment’;81 penalties 
are consequently imposed to punish the defendant for the wrong he committed. 
Contrary to these principles, English and French legal responses to defamation are 
concerned both with the claimant’s damage and the defendant’s wrong. 
 
In English law, probably due to the existence of both tortious and criminal 
remedial goals in defamation cases, the imposition of sanctions in defamation 
actions is alternatively based on the claimant’s damage or the defendant’s wrong. 
Lord Hailsham in Cassell v Broome endorsed the approach taken in the High 
Court of Australia,82 in which Windeyer J analysed redress in defamation actions 
as being awarded on the basis of the wrong committed by the defendant rather 
than for the damage that ensued:83 
 
 ‘It seems to me that, properly speaking, a man defamed does not get 
compensation for his damaged reputation. He gets damages because he 
was injured in his reputation, that is simply because he was publicly 
defamed.’84 
 
By contrast, other cases still endorse the more traditional tort view according to 
which damages are awarded in defamation cases to compensate the claimant for 
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the damage suffered. For instance, in John v MGN Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
considered that one of the purposes of the compensatory award is to compensate 
the claimant ‘for the damage to his reputation’.85 Recent cases support this 
approach. Thus, Mr Justice Nicol in the 2014 case of Kadir v Channel S 
Television considered that ‘since the essence of libel is damage to reputation, one 
purpose of damages is to compensate the claimant for harm to his or its 
reputation’.86 Other purposes listed by this line of cases include the vindication 
of the claimant’s good name and compensation for distress and hurt feelings,87 
but none refer to the defendant’s wrong as the basis of the award. 
 
In fact, both views are incomplete and therefore incorrect. Due to the functional 
comparability of remedial goals, and the consequent dual focus of defamation 
proceedings on the claimant’s damage and the defendant’s wrong, sanctions are 
imposed both for the damage suffered by the claimant and because of the wrong 
committed by the defendant.  
 
This understanding of the justifications for the imposition of sanctions in 
defamation cases is not formally recognised in the case law. However, it flows 
from the foregoing analysis and accounts for the unique characteristics of the 
wrong of defamation, which protects a complex legal interest. This approach is 
atypical, but not unknown in tort law. It is the approach that was used in the late 
1700s-early 1800s. Mitchell mentions it in his historical study of defamation. 
Considering the traditional relevance of the defendant’s malicious motive to the 
quantum of damages, he argues that: 
 
‘The explanation lies in an approach to compensation different to the one 
we are familiar with today. The current approach is, broadly, to focus on 
correcting loss; the approach that can be seen in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries, by contrast, awarded damages for loss and to mark the fact 
that the claimant had suffered a wrong. “Injury”, to use the word 
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employed in Pearson v Lemaitre, was not a synonym for loss. It was both 
the wrong and its consequences.’88 
 
This approach is currently found in at least one other tortious cause of action, 
that of false imprisonment. Indeed, the ‘unlawful imposition of constraint on 
another’s freedom of movement from a particular place’ 89  is actionable 
regardless of the claimant’s knowledge of his imprisonment at the time the 
wrong was committed. This rule is rationalised on the basis of the supreme 
importance which the law attaches to the liberty of the individual.90 The fact that 
the wrong is actionable in the absence of any special damage shows that damages 
are awarded, at least in part, to mark the fact that the defendant has culpably 
committed a wrong, which merits condemnation. 
 
A similar approach is found in the French law of defamation. As is traditionally 
the case in England, in France criminal penalties are imposed because of the 
wrong committed by the defendant; and tortious remedies are awarded for the 
damage caused by the criminal wrong. The general rule is that the prosecution 
and the action civile can be brought independently from one another. However, 
in relation to the wrong of defamation criminal proceedings can only be launched 
on the basis of the victim’s preliminary complaint.91 This complaint can also 
launch the action civile; it is then described as a plainte avec constitution de 
partie civile. In these instances, the criminal proceedings are launched on the 
basis of the victim’s action civile.92 Sanctions for defamation are then imposed 
by the criminal judge both because of the wrong committed by the defendant and 
for the damage suffered by the claimant. 
 
Overall, the identification of a dual focus in defamation proceedings (on the 
claimant’s damage and the defendant’s wrong) and of a related dual justification 
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for the imposition of sanctions (for the claimant’s damage and because of the 
defendant’s wrong) uncovers a distinct measure of substantive similarity in 
English and French defamation laws. While each jurisdiction’s regulatory 
features play a role in determining the form of the available legal responses, 
English and French responses to defamation are functionally comparable despite 
the existence of such a link. In fact, analysis of the objectives of defamation 
proceedings reveals the existence, in both systems, of a hybrid model of liability 
which draws on the traditional tortious and criminal models. This finding 
supports the argument announced in the Introduction, namely that despite 
substantive differences owing to their regulatory features, England and France 
adopt a shared conceptual approach to defamation.93 
 
Yet, a formal change in the nature of the regulation of defamation is highly 
unlikely, whether in England or France. In the former jurisdiction, recent reform 
has made a positive choice to reject the criminal regulation of defamation and so 
this position is likely to endure. In the latter jurisdiction, there exist political and 
social impediments to the amendment of the 1881 law, which have led to the 
rejection of the Guinchard Commission’s proposition to decriminalise 
defamation. 94  In this context, the barriers to formal convergence of legal 
responses to defamation have been circumvented by their functional adaptability. 
This is evident from the fact that in France, the amount of fines in defamation 
cases has gradually been lowered:95 as far as possible, the punitive goal has been 
relinquished. This has led to the emergence of a shared conceptual approach to 
the remedial aspects of defamation in England and France, as exemplified in both 
systems by the existence of a hybrid model of liability.  
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IV. A reconsideration of remedial aspects of defamation in light of 
the modes of protecting reputation 
 
The comparative analysis of the English and French remedial aspects of 
defamation revealed the existence, in both jurisdictions, of a hybrid model of 
liability. This section investigates the origins of this model of liability. It argues 
that its emergence is due to a lack of reflection on the appropriate modes of 
protecting reputation, and a failure to recognise the link between these modes of 
protection and the remedial goals of defamation proceedings. A renewed 
reflection on the modes of protecting reputation in fact suggests that only two of 
them – vindication of one’s good name and compensation of economic losses – 
should be retained. 
 
A. The link between the modes of protecting reputation and the 
remedial goals in defamation actions 
 
It was seen in Chapter 1 that in recent years, considerable efforts have been made 
in the common law literature to analyse the nature of reputation. Authors have 
uncovered ‘constructs’ of reputation (property, honour, dignity, sociality), which 
dictate distinct modes of protecting reputation (respectively compensating 
economic losses, compensating injured feelings, punishing the risk of breach to 
the public peace, and vindicating reputation in order to promote social cohesion). 
Based on these modes of protection, which involve different types of harm, it is 
possible to determine what the corresponding objectives of defamation law are. 
They are broadly to compensate, to punish and to vindicate. Not all systems will 
recognise all these modes of protecting reputation; consequently, defamation 
proceedings may feature different remedial goals from one jurisdiction to the 
other. 
 
The problem with the current English and French hybrid models of liability is 
that they accommodate all the remedial goals listed above – compensation, 
punishment, vindication – without appropriately recognising or reflecting on the 
modes of protecting reputation. This is an illogical approach; the modes of 
protecting reputation should be the starting point and should dictate the 
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consequent remedial goals of legal responses to defamation. This is an important 
point. Indeed, in what follows I argue that two of the four main modes of 
protecting reputation should be abandoned. This argument has consequences on 
what I argue to be the appropriate remedial goals of defamation proceedings. 
 
B. Punishing the (risk of) breaches to the public peace: an out-dated 
mode of protection 
 
The first mode of protecting reputation which should be relinquished is that of 
punishing the (risk of) breach to the public peace, because it is out-dated. It 
originated in the honour construct of reputation, which Post defined as ‘a form of 
reputation in which an individual personally identifies with the normative 
characteristics of a particular social role and in return personally receives from 
others the regard and estimation that society accords to that role.’96 This type of 
reputation is directly linked to the individual’s social status and as such rests on a 
fundamentally unequal vision of society. It generated a concern to preserve the 
social peace against the practice of duelling, which was particularly popular in 
the 19th century. This was achieved through punishing breaches of the public 
order. 
 
However, the non-egalitarian conception of society underlining the concept of 
reputation as honour is outmoded97 and conflicts with the modern concept of 
equality.98 What is more, changes in historical and societal circumstances have 
lastingly removed the need to punish the (risk of) breaches to the public peace. 
Given the decrease and ultimate disappearance of the practice of duelling 
identified in Chapter 3,99 the dangerous practice that had originally justified that 
defamation actions integrate a remedial goal of punishment has died out. Since 
punishing the breaches of the public peace can no longer justify the protection of 
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reputation, it must be recognised that the punitive goal of defamation 
proceedings is no longer relevant. 
 
The evolution of French remedial goals to accommodate new objectives of 
compensation and vindication is an illustration of this phenomenon. Their 
gradual recognition was analysed in section III as circumventing the refusal to 
decriminalise defamation. While defamation remains a criminal wrong, 
defamation proceedings have integrated tortious remedial goals. This reflects a 
progressive loss of importance of the punitive goal of defamation proceedings 
and a gradual privatisation of the wrong.100 
 
C. Compensating injured feelings: a ‘category mistake’101 
 
The second mode of protecting reputation that should be relinquished is that of 
compensating injured feelings, because it originates in a mistaken understanding 
of the interests that are protected by tort law. This means of protection is 
grounded in the dignity construct of reputation, which Mullis and Scott 
rationalised on the basis of the ‘looking-glass self’ theory.102 Under this view, 
wrongful interference with an individual’s reputation harms their self-esteem, 
seen as an aspect of their psychological integrity. In turn, this calls for these 
injured feelings to be compensated.  
 
As is well known, the difficulty with rights whose violation causes an injury that 
is not patrimonial – including reputation – is that they cannot easily be assessed 
in money. Thus, in the English tort of defamation the general damages award is 
understood to serve one or more, often interlocking purposes, including 
consolation for the distress and hurt feelings which the claimant suffered from 
the publication of the statement (‘solatium’). According to Descheemaeker, using 
this concept generates two separate strands of ambiguity.103  
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First, it is unclear whether the interests protected are the claimant’s feelings 
(‘internal’ interests) or the claimant’s corpus, fama or dignitas (‘external’ 
interests, specifically in our case the injury to reputation). Descheemaeker 
opposes the compensation of injured feelings by noting that only ‘external’ 
interests should be protected. He argues that it is illogical, in the context of rights 
whose violation causes a non-patrimonial injury, to compensate injured feelings 
rather than corpus, fama and dignitas. The reason for this is that the distinction 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ interests is not limited to causes of action 
generating non-patrimonial loss but rather ‘cut[s] across the whole spectrum of 
the law of wrongs.’ 104  Indeed, regardless of whether the right violated is 
patrimonial or not, the claimant always suffers a subjective emotional distress in 
addition to the right violation. If one’s car has been damaged, the consequences 
can also be categorised on the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ levels: besides the fact 
that the claimant’s property right has been violated, he is bound to suffer 
emotional distress flowing from the right violation. It is therefore incoherent to 
compensate ‘external’ interests in relation to violations of patrimonial rights, and 
‘internal’ interests in relation to violations of non-patrimonial rights. In other 
words, it is incoherent to compensate one claimant for the value of the damage 
done to his car, and another claimant for the distress and hurt feelings which 
result from the injury to his reputation (rather than to compensate the injured 
reputation itself). It is even more incoherent to compensate both ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ interests in relation to violations of non-patrimonial rights (say, in the 
defamation context, to compensate both injured feelings and the injury to 
reputation), as it essentially involves double counting the same rights 
violation.105 
 
This is a convincing argument, which is in line with the definition of the wrong 
of defamation. In Chapter 1, endorsing Stevens’ theory of torts as violations of 
private rights, defamation was presented as an injury to one’s right to reputation 
(in other words, to one’s ‘external’ interest in reputation). Because reputational 
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injuries cannot be assessed monetarily, an instinctive connection is made 
between this type of harm and hurt feelings. The same cannot be said of property 
damage, for which the loss is intuitively apprehended as the diminution in value 
measured by the cost of repair. But the law must adopt a principled approach to 
damages awards: protection should be afforded to the same type of interest 
(external or internal), regardless of which type of right has been violated. The 
long-standing approach of the law is to approach emotional loss ‘indirectly, 
through the valuation of the external rights whose violation led to the inner 
turmoil.’106 There is no reason to depart from this approach, and so what should 
be compensated in defamation is the injury to reputation rather than the 
claimant’s injured feelings. 
 
The concept of ‘solatium’ also generates a second strand of ambiguity. 
Compensation for injured feelings fosters uncertainty as to whether the legal 
response to defamation aims at compensating the claimant or punishing the 
defendant. This ambiguity has been recognised above. It was noted in section III 
that the current compensatory award in England is both compensatory and 
punitive (for the part of the award that is in excess of compensation).107 In fact, it 
is likely that the punitive part of the compensatory award accounts for the injury 
to the claimant’s feelings. This interpretation is supported by Greer LJ’s 
comments on the quantum of damages awarded in Youssoupoff:108 
 
‘[T]he damages are very large for a lady who… has not been able to 
show that her reputation has in any way suffered… [but] It is very 
difficult to put a money value upon the mental pain and suffering that 
were undergone.’109 
 
This statement suggests that the surprisingly high quantum of damages 
accounted for the claimant’s mental pain and suffering. What I analysed as the 
punitive part of compensatory damages is in this case directly justified on the 
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basis of the claimant’s injured feelings. In France, compensation for injured 
feelings through the victim’s action civile is also functionally ambiguous, insofar 
as the action civile is based on the (criminal) law on the press rather than on 
article 1382 of the Civil code.  
 
The recognition of compensation of injured feelings as a mode of protecting 
reputation is therefore the result of a mistaken understanding of the interests 
protected by tort law. It complicates the attempts to unravel the losses in the tort 
of defamation and relatedly the identification of that tort’s remedial goals. This 
mode of protection, and its related goal of compensation (of injured feelings), 
must be abandoned. 
 
D. Two remedial goals for defamation: vindication and compensation 
(of economic losses) 
 
Echoing the suggestions made in Chapter 1, the preceding analysis recommends 
that two modes of protecting reputation be abandoned – protecting the (risk of) 
breach to the public peace, because it is out-dated, and compensating injured 
feelings, because it originates in a ‘category mistake’. Only two modes of 
protecting reputation should be retained: vindication of one’s good name, and 
compensation of economic losses. Consequently, the remedial goals of 
defamation actions should strictly be to vindicate and to compensate.  
 
Maintaining only two remedial goals of vindication and compensation of 
economic losses is in line with the understanding that defamation protects both 
the claimant’s primary interest in his reputation, but also a number of other, 
secondary interests. Under this view, the losses caused by the wrong of 
defamation can be classified under two heads: (1) the basic injury to reputation 
and (2) consequential losses. The remedial goals of vindication and 
compensation of economic losses can be linked to these two categories of losses 
in defamation actions. The starting point is (1): the injury to reputation, for which 
the legal response must seek to vindicate the claimant’s name. However it is also 
recognised that the claimant must be compensated for (2): losses consequential to 
the injured reputation. In theory, these can include both economic losses and 
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injured feelings. However, it was explained above that injured feelings should 
not be compensated; thus, they will not qualify as relevant compensable 
consequential losses. The secondary objective of defamation proceedings must 
strictly be to compensate the economic losses consequential to the injury to 
reputation. 
 
Mullis and Scott have objected to the view that reputation must be primarily 
protected as a fundamental aspect of social interaction, which underlies the 
prescribed objective of vindication.110 They argue that there is a fundamental 
incompatibility between the quintessentially public nature of reputation and the 
idea that the right to private life in article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) now extends to the protection of one’s reputation.111 
Nevertheless, their argument is disputable. Howarth’s sociality theory 
rationalises the protection of reputation on the basis of its importance for social 
cohesion. It is based on the idea that in relation to reputational losses ‘society as 
well as the individual is the loser’.112 This approach, which conceptualises 
reputation as a wrong which has consequences for the public as a whole, is also 
found in the honour construct of reputation. However, the sociality construct 
approaches it from a different perspective. It does not focus on the potential 
disruptions to the public peace, but rather on the interference with an individual’s 
ability ‘to form and maintain social bonds.’113 Contrary to the honour construct 
of reputation, the theory of sociality accommodates both public and private 
aspects of reputation. The ‘threat of social isolation and rejection’ can impact the 
society’s cohesion as a whole, as well as the defamed individual’s health and 
wellbeing.114 Under this view, there is no particular difficulty in recognising 
vindication as the primary goal of defamation proceedings whilst including the 
protection of reputation within the scope of article 8 ECHR. 
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V. Ramifications: the nature of the regulation and the importance of 
alternative remedies 
 
The suggestion that there are only two relevant remedial goals in defamation 
actions (vindication being the primary one and compensation of economic losses 
the secondary one) has two practical consequences. First, defamation actions 
should no longer pursue punitive objectives, and the compensatory goal should 
be limited to compensation of economic losses. Second, the primary remedy for 
defamation should be relief in natura rather than an award of damages. 
Recognising these consequences and incorporating the recommended changes 
would effectively align the English and French remedial aspects of defamation. 
 
A. Draining punitive goals and limiting compensatory goals in 
defamation actions 
 
Since the modes of protecting reputation determine the relevant remedial goals of 
defamation actions, it is entirely obvious from the foregoing discussion that 
compensation of injured feelings should no longer be an objective of the law of 
defamation. It has been shown that the objective of compensation of injured 
feelings originated in a ‘category mistake’, which wrongly led to the recognition 
of another (equally mistaken) mode of protecting reputation. Thus, the 
compensatory goal must be limited to the claimant’s economic losses.  
 
Likewise, the remedial goal of punishment, originally grounded in the out-dated 
concern to protect the public peace, should be abandoned. This has been duly 
recognised in England, where the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolished the 
criminal offence of defamatory libel.115 By contrast, in France the Guinchard 
Commission’s 2008 proposition to decriminalise defamation failed. 116 
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Defamation remains a criminal wrong, and defamation actions consequently 
pursue punitive aims. The reason for this is simply that the French are culturally 
strongly attached to the criminal regulation of press wrongs, including 
defamation. Indeed, the law of 29 July 1881 is understood to offer a procedural 
framework which is extremely protective of the right to freedom of 
expression.117 By comparison, the law of article 1382 is seen as a threat to 
freedom of expression because it sidesteps the procedural guarantees offered to 
defendant publishers under the law on the press.118 Thus, in 2008 one lawyer 
commenting on the proposed decriminalisation of defamation claimed that ‘la loi 
pénale protège la presse, la loi civile la menace’ (criminal law protects the press, 
civil law threatens it).119 Although there are signs that the French wrong of 
defamation is growing more private in nature (because it uses tortious standards 
of liability,120 has come to recognise an absolute defence of truth121 and pursues 
tortious remedial goals),122 the wrong has not been decriminalised.  
 
This refusal to decriminalise defamation reveals a lack of reflection about the 
modes of protecting reputation (which clearly call for punitive goals to be 
abandoned). Maintaining the pre-existing state of affairs was the easier choice, 
but it is conceptually mistaken. A renewed reflection on the decriminalisation of 
defamation in France, and on the way in which to best balance the conflicting 
rights to reputation and to freedom of expression within the framework of civil 
liability, is necessary.123 
 
B. The pre-eminence of relief in natura 
 
Once the law of defamation abandons the remedial goal of punishment and limits 
the compensatory goal, it will be left with two remedial goals: a primary goal of 
                                                
117
 Chapter 2: The framework of defamation liability in comparative historical perspective, IIIB. 
118
 Ibid, IIB4. 
119
 Jean-Pierre Mignard, ‘Dépénaliser la Diffamation: le Nouveau Miroir aux Alouettes’ 
Médiapart (Paris, 8 December 2008). 
120
 See Chapter 3: Tortious and criminal standards of liability in the English and French laws of 
defamation, IIIB, IIIC. 
121
 See Chapter 4: A similar doctrine of truth across the tortious and criminal wrongs of 
defamation, IIIB. 
122
 See above, IIIB. 
123
 See further Chapter 6: Conclusions, III. 
 250 
vindication (whereby reputation is protected as a means to promote social 
cohesion), and a secondary goal of compensation of economic losses. In Cassell 
v Broome, Lord Hailsham suggested that vindication could be successfully 
achieved through an award of compensatory damages. Indeed, the award was 
necessary: 
 
‘[I]n case the libel, driven underground, emerges from its lurking place at 
some future date, … [so the claimant is] able to point to a sum awarded 
by a jury sufficient to convince a bystander of the baselessness of the 
charge.’124 
 
Contrary to this, it is submitted that the most effective type of legal redress is not 
monetary. Rather, the preferred form of redress should be a form of relief in 
natura (sometimes referred to as ‘alternative’ or ‘discursive’ remedies). 125 
Indeed, the remedial efficacy of the traditional remedies (primarily, the 
compensatory damages award) is questionable.126 It is widely recognised that in 
defamation proceedings something other than a mere economic interest is at 
stake. Thus, a South African case described the primary purpose of defamation 
proceedings as the vindication of ‘the intangible, socially-constructed and 
intensely meaningful good name of the injured person’.127 In fact, based on the 
extremely high odds of losing a defamation suit, one researcher suggested that 
something other than the financial gain of damages awards motivates claimants 
to sue.128 Though his empirical study is US-based, his suggestion is also true of 
English claimants, as is evidence by the fact that they sometimes seek 
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declaratory relief (for instance a declaration of falsity) instead of the traditional 
remedies available in defamation actions.129 In one such case, Eady J stressed 
that ‘the declaration of falsity… is not an empty gesture.’130 Instead, claimants 
see it as a statutory means of obtaining vindication ‘in light of the evidence that 
they have put before the court.’131 
 
This is consistent with the view taken in Chapters 1132 and 4,133 namely that 
reputation as an aspect of sociality causes loss of status and of social ties. The 
inherently social nature of the wrong mandates that the aim of the defamation 
action be to vindicate the claimant’s reputation so as to rehabilitate him or her in 
the eyes of the community, and thus to strengthen social cohesion by ‘reversing 
some of the effects of rights-violations that are not captured by traditional … 
awards.’134 This understanding of vindication clearly conflicts with the use of 
damages awards as a vindicatory means of redress. However, although some 
mechanisms of relief in natura already exist in the English and French systems, 
they are relegated to a position of secondary importance, and so their efficacy is 
limited. 
 
1. Existing mechanisms of relief in natura in England in France 
 
There already exist a number of mechanisms of relief in natura in both the 
English and the French laws of defamation. In England, the value of apologies 
and corrections has been recognised. The importance of an apology is first and 
foremost the validation that the claimant has been defamed against and that he 
was justified in bringing an action:135 the claimant is ‘vindicated out of the 
defendant’s mouth’, more forcefully than from his own. 136  Various other 
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theoretical benefits of receiving an apology have been identified: adjusting an 
imbalance of power between the parties, attributing responsibility for harm, 
reducing the claimant’s anger or desire to see the wrongdoer punished,137 
deterrence and the recognition of a symbolic value to the claimant who requested 
it.138 The benefits of a sincere apology, coupled with appropriate corrections 
where the statement is false, can therefore go a long way in restoring the 
claimant’s good name. This is because they possess the communicative aspect 
necessary to achieve the vindicatory goal of defamation proceedings. 
 
This has been acknowledged by the legislator. The summary procedure under 
sections 8 and 9 of the 1996 Defamation Act states that provision can be made 
for summary relief where a suitable apology, agreed by the parties, is made. 
Further, under section 2 of the 1996 Act, defendants are able to make an offer of 
amends, which includes an offer to publish a suitable correction and an apology. 
The case law has come to recognise such vindicatory potential in the context of 
an offer of amends: 
 
‘If an early unqualified offer to make amends is made and accepted and 
an agreed apology is published, … there is bound to be substantial 
mitigation. The defendant … has offered to make and publish a suitable 
correction and apology … and has offered to pay proper compensation 
and costs… The claimant knows that his reputation has been repaired to 
the full extent that is possible. He is vindicated.’139 
 
Finally, section 12(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 now grants a court finding for 
the claimant the power to order the publication of a summary of the judgment. 
According to section 12(2), the wording of any summary, and the time, manner, 
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form and place of its publication are to be for parties to agree. This type of 
redress legitimates the claimant’s assertion of falsity, and therefore goes a long 
way to restore his name. 
 
A similar mechanism exists in France and is sometimes awarded as tortious 
redress following the claimant’s action civile.140 But perhaps more interesting are 
the French rights of correction and reply, whose importance is well 
established.141 The right of correction is defined in article 12 of the law on the 
press. It consists in the recognition of a right to insert a statement to make all 
relevant corrections to the original statement, insofar as it was inaccurate. It 
therefore allows for the truth of the statement to be established. The refusal to 
insert a correction in the relevant journal or periodical is a criminal wrong 
punishable by a fine of up to €3,750. This type of response is commonly 
assimilated to a retraction insofar as ‘it forces the journal to publish the 
corrective matter as an authentic document, and not merely as the views of the 
other side’. 142  Its undoubted advantages are its rapidity 143  and persuasive 
force.144  
 
The right of reply is established in article 13 of the law on the press. It is a 
general and unqualified right, granted to any person named in a published 
newspaper article.145 It is vested in the person designated in the statement upon 
publication of the statement, and can therefore usefully mitigate reputational 
damage at the outset. The refusal to insert a reply amounts to a criminal wrong 
punishable by a maximum fine of €3,750, and up to three months’ imprisonment 
if the original statement related to electoral matters.146 Article 13, which acted as 
a model in other continental jurisdictions, has been the subject of extensive 
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commentary by American jurists.147 It has been praised for its rapidity and its 
mandatory force.148 It is a procedure that empowers the victim, and re-establishes 
the moral equality of the parties that was interfered with by creating an 
adversarial discussion in the media. By contrast with court judgements, which 
rarely come to the attention of the public, its publication in the same media 
source as the original statement ensures a wide propagation of the claimant’s 
view.149 If the issue goes to court, it is likely to only raise simple issues for 
decision.150 
 
2. A similar hierarchy of sanctions: subsidiary importance of relief in 
natura 
 
Despite the fact that mechanisms of relief in natura already exist in England and 
France, under their current form, their capacity to vindicate the claimant is 
somewhat limited. This is because both jurisdictions fail to recognise vindication 
as the primary remedial goal of defamation actions. Consequently, the most 
appropriate form of redress to vindicate the claimant’s good name – relief in 
natura – remains subsidiary to the more traditional responses.  
 
In England, the mechanisms of apology and correction can only be applied in 
two very limited settings: the summary procedure under sections 8 and 9 of the 
Defamation Act 1996, and the offer of amends procedure under section 2 of the 
same statute. What is more, although their vindicatory potential has been 
acknowledged both in doctrinal works and in practice, they are only taken into 
account as a factor mitigating damages. As such, when it is accepted the offer of 
amends allows a defendant to admit his wrong, offer a correction and/or apology 
and pay the complainant an agreed sum of money. But its importance remains 
secondary to that of monetary damages. Indeed, when the offer of amends is 
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accepted, the correction and apology does not allow the defendant to escape 
paying damages. They only mitigate the quantum of damages. The general tort 
conceptualisation of an award of damages as ‘the remedy for all civil wrongs’151 
is not questioned. The limited efficacy of apologies and corrections was also seen 
in claims brought before the (now abolished) Press Complaints Commission 
(PCC). While apologies were used by the PCC as a method of facilitating a 
settlement between the complainant and a publisher, they were only perceived as 
a mechanism assuaging wounded feelings.152 In fact, apologies are no longer 
used in the complaints brought before the Independent Press Standards 
Organisation (IPSO), which replaced the PCC in October 2014. The only 
remedies available for breaches of the Code of Practice are ‘the publication of 
[the Complaints Committee’s] upheld adjudication and/or a correction.’153 
 
Further, the efficacy of section 12 of the 2013 Act has been questioned on 
account of the fact that so far, the existence of a reasoned judgment has had a 
limited influence on the quantum of damages attributed to the claimant. In 
Purnell v F1 Business Magazine Ltd & Another,154 Laws LJ considered that: 
 
‘The effect of such an earlier judgment no doubt depends on all the 
circumstances and, generally speaking, the effect in relation to 
vindication will I think most likely be marginal.’155 
 
This reasoning can be extended to the mechanism in section 12 to suggest that 
this alternative remedy will have a limited impact. The public will likely 
continue to turn to the quantum of damages to determine whether or not the 
claimant’s reputation was injured.156  Therefore, in relation to the remedial 
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aspects of defamation the 2013 Act is a missed opportunity. It brings little 
change to improve the vindicatory potential of the law;157 and since it came into 
force on 1 January 2014, there will likely be no further reform of the law in the 
near future.158 
 
In France, the order to publicise the judgment is also limited in that it can only be 
awarded as a remedy to the victim’s action civile. It is not a type of legal redress 
established by the law of 1881; as such, awarding it outside of the action civile 
would constitute a secondary penalty, which can only be awarded in specific 
circumstances.159 
 
More importantly, despite the praise that is formulated in favour of the French 
rights of correction and reply, on closer analysis their importance appears to be 
restricted. The scope of the right of correction is dually limited. First, it is only 
applicable to statements published in the periodical press. More importantly, 
according to article 12 alinéa 1 of the law on the press, it is only applicable to 
statements concerning governmental matters carried out by persons discharging a 
public mission service. The purpose of the right of correction is to protect the 
government against the falsehoods published in the media regarding its mode of 
functioning.160 The interests it protects are those of the state rather than those of 
private individuals. Its vindicatory potential is therefore non-existent in relation 
to private claimants. 
 
The right of reply is also unduly praised for its vindicatory potential for the 
private claimant’s reputation. A number of critiques have been made against it. 
Since the reply is only subjected to limited judicial control, there are possibilities 
for abuses: it ‘can be made futile by a little ingenuity. A newspaper can 
accompany the printed reply with a second insult worse than the first.’161 Further, 
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the scope of the right of reply is limited. It is both too narrow (it is limited to a 
publication in a periodical, newspaper or journal) and too wide (it is applicable to 
any person designated in the publication, regardless of the defamatory nature of 
the words). Its vindicatory potential is therefore doubly limited. The right of 
reply is not available to all defamed claimants, depending on where the statement 
was published. It is also limited to providing the claimant’s view rather than to 
mark the fact that his reputational right was infringed. There is another, stronger 
line of criticism that has not been noted thus far. Neither the right of reply nor the 
proceedings originating in the refusal to insert such a reply constitute a remedy. 
The criminal proceedings compelling the insertion of a reply are wholly 
independent from defamation proceedings.162 Where the right of reply has been 
exercised, it can in theory result in the mitigation of damages; however in 
practice judges often ignore it.163 This suggests that article 13 is only granted a 
subsidiary status in the 1881 law. Its importance is secondary to that of 
traditional sanctions, since its only effect is to reduce the quantum of damages.164 
 
To conclude, in both England and France the recognised inefficacy of traditional 
remedies has led to the recognition of some mechanisms of redress in natura. 
But in both jurisdictions they remain relegated to a position of secondary 
importance: they are only relied on in mitigation of damages. In order to 
implement the remedial goals of vindication and compensation of economic 
losses in an efficacious manner, it would be necessary to invert the hierarchy of 
legal responses. Reflecting the fact that vindication is the primary goal of 
defamation actions, relief in natura should be the standard remedy. More 
traditional means of redress such as damages awards should only be subsidiary to 
a scheme of ‘alternative’ remedies, which could include but would not be limited 
to the current mechanisms of relief in natura. If these changes were to be 
implemented, the English and the French remedial aspects of defamation would 
not just be functionally comparable, as is presently case. They would become 
positively aligned with one another. 
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Beyond the obvious substantive differences in the English and French legal 
responses to defamation, which are dictated by their respective regulatory 
features, this chapter argued that they are functionally comparable. Indeed, in 
both systems defamation actions pursue compensatory, vindicatory and punitive 
goals. This finding challenges the strength of the link between the English and 
French regulatory features and their substantive approach to the remedial aspects 
of defamation. The consequence of this functional comparability is the creation 
of a hybrid model of liability, which draws on the tortious and criminal models 
of liability. The existence of such a hybrid model of liability illustrates the fact 
that England and France adopt a shared conceptual approach to key aspects of 
defamation despite substantive differences owing to their regulatory features. 
 
The explanation for the current state of affairs is found in a lack of reflection 
around the modes of protecting reputation. Their analysis in fact suggests that 
only two such modes of protection should be retained – that of vindicating the 
claimant’s good name, and that of compensating his (consequential) economic 
losses. This finding has significant practical consequences: it calls for the 
abandonment of any punitive goals and for mechanisms of relief in natura to 
become the standard remedy. Should these suggestions be implemented, England 
and France would effectively adopt a common remedial framework. 







The perception that the domestic laws of defamation are fundamentally different 
across the European Union (EU) is reinforced by the fact that the nature of the 
regulation – tortious or criminal – varies considerably from one jurisdiction to 
the other. These divergences are sometimes rationalised on the basis of distinct 
approaches to conceptual legal frameworks.1 In this thesis, I have challenged this 
view by arguing that despite substantive differences owing to the regulatory 
features of each system, England and France adopt a shared conceptual approach 
to the wrong of defamation. The purpose of this final chapter is to bring together 
the analysis in the preceding chapters to draw conclusions and reflect on the 
consequences of the thesis’ findings. 
 
In section II, confirming the argument announced in the Introduction,2 I illustrate 
the existence of a shared conceptual approach in the English and French laws of 
defamation, despite the remaining substantive differences which are dictated by 
the regulatory features of each system. In the sections that follow, I consider the 
ramifications of this finding and offer a new perspective on the decriminalisation 
and harmonisation debates. In section III, I note that there are two factors which, 
in addition to the ‘chilling effect’ of criminal libel, mandate a renewed debate on 
the necessity of decriminalising French defamation law. In section IV, I reflect 
on the feasibility of harmonising the laws of defamation across the Member 
States of the EU by challenging the perceived ‘heterogeneity of the national laws 
in this area’.3 In the concluding section, I reflect on further research that may be 
carried out on the basis of this thesis’ conclusions. 
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II. A similar conceptual approach to defamation in England and 
France 
 
A starting point of the thesis was the noticeably divergent structure of 
defamation liability in England and France. The opposition between tortious and 
criminal liability, and the existence or absence of a sub-division of the wrong of 
defamation according to the (im)permanence of the statement suggested that the 
two systems were very dissimilar, and as such were not comparable. The 
opposite outcomes of the recent decriminalisation movements (which led to the 
abolition of the offence of defamatory libel in England, but did not come to 
anything in France) strengthened this view.  
 
Contrary to this, the analysis in Chapter 2 revealed a similar philosophy 
underlying the English and French frameworks of liability. Indeed, it was argued 
that the historical divergence in the regulatory features (with a pre-eminence of 
tortious liability in England, and criminal liability in France) was influenced by 
similar considerations relating to fundamental rights. Both jurisdictions sought to 
establish a framework of liability that would offer the best possible protection to 
the right to freedom of expression. However, owing to past experiences and the 
internal characteristics of the common law and civilian legal traditions, these 
similar considerations led to different regulatory outcomes. 
 
The criminal regulation of defamation was not unknown in either England or 
France; however, each system’s experience of the criminal wrong of defamation 
differed. In England, the arbitrariness of political libels and the traditional 
predominance of criminal actions against newspapers, which effectively 
permitted governmental censorship, led to heavy criticism of the criminalisation 
of defamation.4 By contrast, in France the criminal regulation of defamation was 
widely accepted. The protection of freedom of expression was therefore achieved 
within the criminal framework by establishing unique procedural rules in the law 
of 29 July 1881. This led to the – seemingly counter-intuitive – view that the 
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criminal law is more protective of freedom of expression than its civil 
counterpart.5 
 
In addition to past experiences of the criminal regulation of defamation, the 
internal characteristics of the common law and civilian legal traditions also 
shaped the regulatory outcomes in England and France. In both systems the 
concern to protect the right to freedom of expression led to the rejection of a 
general principle of liability for defamation in favour of precisely defined legal 
principles. Significantly, the areas of law that feature these precise legal rules are 
not the same in England and France. In England, despite the emergence of the 
tort of negligence, precise legal rules remain a distinguishing trait of tortious 
liability. On the other hand, in France these precise legal rules are found in the 
criminal law; tortious liability turns to the clausula generalis of article 1382 of 
the Civil code. The regulatory features of the English and French laws of 
defamation were therefore largely determined by the internal characteristics of 
the common law and the civilian legal tradition.6  
 
Thus, the philosophy underlying the regulatory outcomes in England and France 
was similar, although the reasoning processes diverged significantly. 7  I 
consequently argued that the regulatory features of England and France do not 
originate in a reasoned choice; rather, they are path dependent. This finding is of 
utmost importance, because it suggests that the distinction between tortious and 
criminal liability in England and France does not necessarily epitomise 
fundamentally irreconcilable conceptions of reputation. Indeed, in the last section 
of Chapter 2 I denied that the English and French regulatory features have had 
any influence on the internal structure of the wrong. More specifically, I rejected 
the argument that the English-specific distinction between libel and slander could 
be rationalised on the basis of the English tortious type of regulation. To the 
contrary, I explained it on the basis of a mistaken focus on the means of 
committing the wrong, which is also found in the French law on the press.8 
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In the analysis that followed, I built on this reasoning to positively establish the 
comparability of the English and French laws of defamation despite their 
different regulatory features. Chapters 3-5 focused on features of the English and 
French laws of defamation that follow the general structure of the law of wrongs. 
They presented a specific interest because they appeared to differ significantly on 
account of each system’s distinct regulatory features. Yet, on closer analysis the 
link between the nature of the regulation – tortious or criminal – and the 
substantive content of the rules is not as strong as was originally suggested, and 
in some cases has even disappeared. In fact, in respect of each studied feature, I 
argued that England and France adopt a common conceptual approach. 
 
In Chapter 3, I noted that there is no direct link between the traditional tortious 
and criminal standards of liability and those which are currently applied in the 
English and French laws of defamation. England draws on notions that originate 
in the criminal rules on fault (such as intent to injure);9 conversely, France has 
integrated a strict liability standard which is typically found in tortious causes of 
action.10 Further, when comparing the standards of liability by reference to the 
hierarchical lines along which responsibility for defamation is organised in 
English and French law, it became apparent that the rules on fault are broadly 
similar across the two systems. They illustrate a common approach to fault in the 
English and French laws of defamation. 
 
Thus, the nature of the regulation has had a limited influence on the English and 
French rules on fault.11 Rather, they are the direct result of a concern to 
implement strict standards of liability in relation to media defendants at a time 
when the press was expanding rapidly.12 Their preservation was explained in 
Chapter 3 on account of notions of embeddedness. They are maintained because 
they express a habit of dealing with fault standards in a particular way. Efforts to 
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change them have been either unsuccessful or inexistent, due to societal factors.13 
Overall, it is clear from the analysis in Chapter 3 that England and France’s 
regulatory features have had a limited influence on their standards of liability. 
They are broadly similar and, though inappropriate, they are embedded in the 
English and French laws of defamation and are resisting legal change. 
 
In Chapter 4, the absence of a link between the nature of the regulation and the 
substantive rules on defamation in England and France became even more 
apparent. The comparative historical perspective highlighted the fact that the 
rules on truth were originally linked to the nature of the regulation. In the tortious 
wrong of defamation, the value of truth has long justified the rule that its 
exposure be the paramount interest and that the law should consequently 
recognise an absolute defence of truth. By contrast, in the criminal wrong of 
defamation the focus was on the wrong committed by the defendant and the 
public disorders that it could cause. Thus, the issue of truth or falsity was largely 
irrelevant, the primary focus being on the preservation of the public peace.14 Yet, 
20th century and more recent legal developments have gradually aligned the 
French rules on truth with their English counterpart. Both systems now focus on 
the protection of reputation against false statements;15 therefore, the link between 
the nature of the regulation and the substantive rules on truth has been broken. In 
the final section of Chapter 4, I positively identified a shared approach to truth in 
England and France. In both jurisdictions there is a presumption of falsity, which 
is for the defendant to rebut. Thus, truth is a defence (rather than falsity being a 
constituent element of the wrong). This is the result of a similar balancing of the 
conflicting rights to reputation and freedom of expression.16 What is more, the 
replicationes to the truth defence follow the same approach in England and 
France. They protect the defamed individual’s privacy as a secondary interest, 
and promote the public interest in social cohesion,17 which underlies what I later 
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argued in Chapter 5 should be recognised as the primary mode of protecting 
reputation: the vindication of the defamed claimant’s good name. 
 
As a result, England and France’s regulatory features no longer have any 
influence on the rules on truth. I argued in Chapter 4 that the reason for this was 
a change in historical and societal circumstances. The gradual disappearance of 
the practices of duelling and relatedly of the (risk of) breaches to the public 
peace led the French law of defamation to recognise the public interest in 
exposing the truth. 18  This paved the way for the emergence of a shared 
conceptual approach to truth in England and France. 
 
In Chapter 5, I analysed the remedial aspects of the English and French laws of 
defamation. At first sight, the English remedies and French penalties are directly 
dictated by the regulatory features of each jurisdiction, and their official 
functions (whether stated or underlying) are aligned with the goals of tort and 
criminal law respectively. 19  However, the analysis of the objectives of 
defamation proceedings in England and France highlighted a discrepancy 
between the official goals of the law of defamation and the goals that are applied, 
in practice. Thus, the English tort of defamation recognises a measure of 
punishment. 20  Conversely, the French criminal wrong of defamation has 
integrated goals of compensation and vindication.21  As a consequence, the 
English and French remedial aspects of defamation are functionally comparable 
in that they pursue the same objectives of compensation, vindication and 
punishment (although these are weighed differently). And so it became apparent 
in Chapter 5 that the link between the English and French regulatory features and 
the remedial aspects of defamation is not as strong as was originally suggested. 
A common conceptual approach was subsequently identified in what I labelled a 
hybrid model of defamation liability, which possesses characteristics of both the 
tortious and the criminal models of liability.22 
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In the final sections of Chapter 5, I explained the functional comparability of the 
English and French remedial aspects of defamation, and their shared hybrid 
model of liability, on the basis of a lack of reflection around the appropriate 
modes of protecting reputation, which in turn determine the remedial goals of 
defamation actions. I suggested that two of the main modes of protecting 
reputation should be abandoned: punishment of breaches to the public peace 
(because it is out-dated)23 and compensation of injured feelings (because it relies 
on a mistaken understanding of the interests which are protected by tort law).24 
Thus, only two modes of protecting reputation should be maintained: vindication 
of one’s good name in order to promote social cohesion (because reputation is a 
fundamental aspect of social interaction), and compensation of economic losses 
(because interference with reputational interests can cause significant economic 
damage). I then explored the consequences which these recommended changes 
would have on the appropriate objectives of defamation proceedings (they would 
strictly be to vindicate and compensate the claimant)25 and form of remedies for 
reputational injuries (relief in natura would be favoured over more traditional 
methods of redress).26 The recognition and implementation of these changes in 
England and France would have the effect of aligning their responses to the 
wrong of defamation and, ultimately, of creating a common remedial framework. 
 
I concluded by noting that the functional comparability of the English and 
French remedial aspects of defamation challenges the strength of the link 
between their regulatory features and their substantive rules. England and France 
currently share a similar conceptual approach to the remedial aspects of 
defamation, as is evidenced by the existence, in both systems, of a hybrid model 
of liability.  
 
Overall, what becomes apparent from the foregoing discussion is that although 
the English and French laws of defamation have different regulatory features, a 
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substantial measure of commonality can be found between the two systems. In 
each chapter, I challenged the strength (or the continued existence) of the link 
between the English and French regulatory features and their substantive rules on 
defamation, and positively identified a similar approach to key aspects of the law 
of defamation. Thus, confirming the argument announced at the start of the 
thesis,27 it is clear that despite substantive differences owing to the regulatory 
features of each system, England and France adopt a shared conceptual approach 
to the wrong of defamation. In what follows, I highlight the ramifications of my 
analysis. As was suggested in the Introduction,28 the findings of this thesis might 
influence the future developments of the law of defamation in two ways. First, 
factors have emerged over the course of the preceding analysis which highlight 
the continued relevance of the decriminalisation debate; second, the broad 
comparability of the English and French laws of defamation challenges the 
perception that there is ‘no common vision as to how [harmonisation] might best 
be achieved.’29 
 
III. Ramification (1): the decriminalisation debate 
 
The decriminalisation debate is typically grounded in the ‘chilling effect’ created 
by the criminal regulation of abuses of the right to freedom of expression.30 The 
analysis in the preceding chapters uncovered two additional factors which 
suggest that a renewed debate on the decriminalisation of French defamation law 
is warranted.  
 
First, the analysis of the modes of protecting reputation in Chapter 5 showed that 
the concern to punish the (risk of) breaches to the public peace is out-dated, as is 
its associated punitive goal. The refusal to decriminalise defamation despite the 
Guinchard Commission’s 2008 recommendations31 is therefore the result of a 
mistake. It was prompted by a concern to preserve the current criminal 
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framework of liability, which is viewed as being more protective of the right to 
freedom of expression than the tortious one. The law of article 1382 is seen as a 
threat to freedom of expression because it sidesteps the procedural guarantees 
offered to defendant publishers under the law on the press.32 Yet, this refusal to 
decriminalise defamation failed to question the continued relevance of the 
punitive goal. That the need to punish the (risk of) breaches to the public peace is 
out-dated is not a revolutionary suggestion. As early as 2001, in the context of 
the English offence of defamatory libel, Walker noted that: 
 
‘There is no [longer any] convincing rationale for the offense, as the 
historic concerns about the standing of “great men” and the prevention of 
more violent resolutions, such as duelling, have largely disappeared.’33 
 
Because it is no longer necessary to punish the (risk of) breaches to the public 
peace, considering a possible decriminalisation of the French wrong of 
defamation would be logical. If the French legislator did revert to a tortious 
regulation of defamation on the basis of the disappearance of the historic 
necessity to punish breaches of the peace, his choice would provide a good 
illustration of Stevens’ theory on the relationship between tortious and criminal 
wrongs, which I outlined and endorsed in Chapter 1. According to Stevens, 
tortious wrongs are a basic category, which the criminal law builds upon in order 
to determine whether the given wrong is sufficiently serious to warrant a public 
sanction.34 Under this view, since there is no longer any rationale warranting the 
criminalisation of defamation in France, it is necessary to reconsider its potential 
decriminalisation. This is not only because of the ‘chilling effect’ that the 
criminal regulation of defamation creates in France; it is also because there is no 
longer any strong public policy argument in favour of criminalising defamation.  
 
In addition to the out-dated character of the punitive goal and despite the 
resistance encountered by decriminalisation movements in France, the French 
cause of action has grown distinctly more private, to the point that it questions 
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the continued relevance of a criminal regulation of defamation. In Chapter 3, it 
was noted that the law of 29 July 1881 implemented a strict liability standard, 
which reflects a tortious standard of liability and cannot be reconciled with the 
general rules on fault in criminal law.35 Of even greater significance is the fact 
that the French criminal law of defamation has come to accept an absolute 
defence of truth, subject to the provisions of article 35, alinéa 3 a) of the law on 
the press. As explained in Chapter 4, the purpose of the criminal law of 
defamation – the protection of the public peace – warrants indifference to the 
truth or falsity of the statement.36 The fact that the treatment of the French 
exceptio veritatis has gradually become practically analogous to that of the 
English defence of truth suggests that the French wrong’s centre of gravity is 
shifting. The wrong is coming to accept the tortious treatment of truth. Thus, 
although the protection of one’s reputation is a valid limit to the right to freedom 
of expression, the value of truth justifies that its exposure be considered the 
paramount interest. Therefore, the focus of the wrong is no longer on the 
(potential) breaches to the public peace, but rather on the claimant’s reputation. 
Such a focus on the claimant’s damage rather than on the defendant’s wrong is a 
distinguishing trait of tortious, rather than criminal liability. Finally, in France 
the action civile for defamation is now based on the (criminal) law on the press. 
It was consequently deduced in Chapter 5 that the French law of defamation has 
come to recognise a goal of compensation, which traditionally characterises 
tortious, rather than criminal proceedings.37 
 
This changing attitude is reflected in statutes. The law of 15 June 2000 abolished 
the paradigmatically criminal imprisonment penalty in defamation cases. The 
law of 29 July 1982 on online communications adopted the concept of 
réputation, relinquishing the notions of honneur and considération which are 
traditionally used in France. Although this change of terminology is somewhat 
isolated, it is worth noting. Indeed, it sidesteps the distinction between honneur 
and considération, which is difficult to ascertain and implicitly carries with it 
out-dated notions of rank or status. As seen in Chapter 2, these notions grounded 
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the idea that defamation is a public wrong warranting criminalisation.38 Adopting 
the concept of réputation therefore distances French law from the traditional 
criminal framework of liability. 
 
The out-dated character of the policy argument in favour of criminalising 
defamation, and the gradual privatisation of the French wrong highlight the need 
for a renewed reflection on decriminalisation of French defamation law. This 
reflection needs to go beyond the traditional suggestions for reforming the 
provisions of the law on the press. Indeed, these suggestions for reform are 
inherently limited in that they focus on legal change within the criminal 
framework, for instance by extending the prescription period. They consequently 
fail to recognise the fundamental questions that must be addressed in relation to 
defamation. The first question is whether defamation requires a (literally) 
extraordinary framework of liability in order to protect the right to freedom of 
expression. This issue has been touched upon in Chapter 2 when comparing the 
position of defamation on the English and French national legal maps.39 In light 
of the English regulation of defamation, it appears that a freestanding framework 
of liability may not be necessary, although some procedural safeguards 
(including a short limitation period, but perhaps not as short as the French one) 
are indispensable. The second (and more fundamental) question is whether the 
current framework of liability – specifically, the criminal regulation of 
defamation – is adequate. This will be best approached in light of the discussion 
on the justifications for protecting reputation. 
 
IV. Ramification (2): the harmonisation debate 
 
The analysis in the preceding chapters also offers a new perspective on the 
practical feasibility of harmonisation of defamation laws in the European Union. 
The Introduction mentioned the difficulties encountered in finding a consensus 
as to how to include defamation within the scope of the Rome II Regulation.40 It 
noted that one suggestion to simplify the current state of affairs is to harmonise 
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the substantive laws of defamation in the European Union. However, the 
perception that the domestic laws of defamation are fundamentally different 
across the EU has prevented an in-depth consideration of the feasibility of such 
harmonisation. 
 
The issues of harmonisation and decriminalisation are often approached 
together.41 When doing so, a considerable practical hurdle to the harmonisation 
of defamation laws across the EU is the fact that the juridical categorisation of 
defamation varies greatly as between the twenty-eight Member States. This issue 
is at the core of the thesis, which considered the extent to which the nature of the 
regulation – tortious or criminal – influences the substantive content of the rules 
on defamation in England and France. Its conclusion, outlined above in section 
II, is that despite substantive differences owing to the regulatory features of each 
system, England and France adopt a shared conceptual approach to the wrong of 
defamation. This is significant for the harmonisation debate, as it challenges the 
traditional understanding that the distinct juridical categorisations of defamation 
preclude a finding a similarity.  
 
Indeed, the similarities outlined in the previous chapters – similar frameworks of 
liability and standards of fault, a shared conceptual approach to truth, the 
functional comparability of the remedial aspects of defamation – indicate that 
contrary to Kenny and Heffernan’s claim,42 the English and the French laws of 
defamation do share a similar conceptual legal framework. This challenges the 
perceived ‘heterogeneity of the national laws in this area’,43 often exemplified by 
the distinct regulatory features in each jurisdiction. Thus, the view that there 
exist fundamental differences in the domestic laws of the twenty-eight Member 
States appears not to be grounded in an in-depth research going beyond the 
superficial level of labels. Further in-depth research will therefore be necessary 
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to establish whether the recommended substantive harmonisation of defamation 
laws is feasible, or not.  
 
V. Concluding remarks and further research 
 
In conclusion, the laws of defamation in England and France are not so 
dissimilar as was originally suggested by the apparent irreconcilability of the 
nature of their regulation. Of course, there exist substantive differences owing to 
the regulatory features of each system. However, this thesis has proved that the 
nature of the regulation is not always the sole, or even the primary determinant of 
the substantive content of the rules on defamation. In fact, I have identified the 
existence of a shared conceptual approach to key aspects of the wrong of 
defamation in England and France. 
 
The findings of the present study suggest that there is ample scope for further 
research in this area, both within the English and the French laws of defamation, 
and more broadly across the domestic laws of defamation of the Member States 
of the European Union. As this study has shown, in England and France the 
balance in the modes of protecting reputation has changed. Further research on 
the current balance can shed new light on the necessity to implement alternative 
remedies as the primary means of redress for reputational harm, and on which 
type of remedy would be appropriate to do so. Second, and specifically in 
relation to France, the tension between the modern justifications for protecting 
reputation and the barriers to decriminalisation (both practical and cultural) calls 
for renewed scrutiny. Third, and finally, further comparative research on other 
Member States’ laws of defamation will be necessary to extend the thesis’ 
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